Will Wisconsin Chart Its Own Course on Environmental Issues?

The exterior of the U.S. Supreme Court building with white stone columns and a white facade.

In a series of recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has sharply restricted the power of the United States Environmental Protection Agency to effectively exercise jurisdiction over natural resources within the states. These include West Virginia v. EPA (endorsing the “major questions doctrine” and restricting EPA’s power to require cleaner energy generation without clear congressional authorization); Sackett v. EPA (limiting the scope of EPA’s authority over “waters of the United States,” and eliminating federal authority over many wetlands); Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (overruling the Chevron doctrine of deferring to agency interpretations of law in most circumstances); SEC v. Jarkesy (holding that agencies may not employ in-house tribunals, in lieu of jury trials, when seeking civil penalties); and Corner Post v. Board of Governors, FRS (pausing the statute of limitations to challenge agency regulations until the plaintiff suffers injury).

The shift away from federal power elevates the role states can play in charting a course on environmental issues. The Sackett Court emphasized that states, not the EPA, hold the “primary responsibilities and rights . . . to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution” and “to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.” Some evidence supports the idea that states will be eager to fill gaps in federal regulation of the environment and corresponding enforcement activities. Wisconsin, for example, has a rich history of water law. All the way back in 1853, the Wisconsin Supreme Court endorsed the principle that “if [a] stream is navigable in fact, the public have the right to use it for the purposes of navigation, and the right of the owner [of abutting land] is subject to the public easement.” Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 308 (1853). In the 20th century, the state became a national leader in conservation and was at the vanguard of the development of the public trust doctrine.

Even in the 21st century, Wisconsin authorities have sometimes stepped in to protect the state’s natural resources when federal jurisdiction receded. In 2001, for example, the Supreme Court invalidated the “migratory bird rule,” under which federal agencies had exercised jurisdiction over pollutant discharges into certain isolated intrastate waters. The decision, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, removed a sizeable percentage of wetlands from federal protection. The Wisconsin Legislature acted almost instantly, taking only a few months to enable state control over such discharges by creating a new category of “nonfederal wetlands.” The state law expressly addressed the Supreme Court’s decision. By its terms, it applies when discharges into wetlands are determined “not to be subject to regulation under [the federal Clean Water Act] due to the decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers . . . or any subsequent interpretations of that decision by a federal agency or by a federal district or federal appellate court that applies to wetlands located in this state.” Wis. Stat. 281.36(1m)(a)1 (as created by 2001 Wisconsin Act 6). The act effectively restored protection of wetlands that the Supreme Court removed from federal jurisdiction in SWANCC, albeit under state authority. Later, the state implemented an innovative water quality trading program to help curb nonpoint source pollution and meet the state’s aggressive water quality limits for phosphorous pollution. Wisconsin citizens can be proud of the state’s progress in those areas and many others.

But more recent developments are less promising. The ballyhooed “Year of Clean Drinking Water in Wisconsin” was less successful than Governor Evers probably hoped. Similarly, after Assembly Speaker Robin Vos created a “Water Quality Task Force” in 2019, all thirteen of the bills it proposed died in the state Senate. In 2017, the Legislature removed some smaller wetlands from protection under state law, backtracking from the 2001 enactment. And the past few years have been marked by political skirmishes over the power of state agencies to enact groundwater standards for PFAS and other chemicals, disputes over the Department of Natural Resources’ power to require environmental cleanups, and the delayed release of state funds earmarked for remediation activities.

Wisconsin’s uneven record on environmental protection is certainly not unique. But the state–or rather, all the states–are being thrust to the forefront in such matters. Of course, a state will not necessarily regulate anew, or step up enforcement, just because it has the opportunity to do so. And any reckoning with environmental issues will no doubt have to wait until after the November elections currently dominating politics. Whenever the dust settles, it will be interesting to see how states respond in the new era of a somewhat-diminished EPA.

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New Marquette Lawyer Magazine Sees Past Problems as Shedding Light on Future Challenges (Post 1 of 3)

This cover of the summer issue of the Marquette Lawyer. The Summer 2019 issue of Marquette Lawyer features three pairs of stories with an underlying common theme that can be summed up by one of the headlines: “In Search of Better Outcomes.” This issue of the Marquette Law School semiannual magazine overall has a substantial historical orientation, but it also speaks strongly to current realities and issues—as has become even clearer since the magazine hit the streets a few weeks ago. Simply put, learning about the past helps in understanding the present and considering the future. This post takes up one pair of articles: the cover story and a reaction to it.

The cover story, “Dying Constitutionalism and the Fourteenth Amendment,” is an edited version of the Robert F. Boden Lecture given at Marquette Law School in fall 2018, by Ernest A. Young, the Alston & Bird Professor at Duke Law School. While the Fourteenth Amendment later would be crucial to the growth of constitutional protections and the extension of civil rights—the linchpin of America’s “second founding,” as it is sometimes called—Young focuses on the first 75 years after the amendment was ratified in 1868. It was a period of broad suppression of civil rights, particularly those of African Americans—the Fourteenth Amendment not working much to the contrary.

Young’s purpose is not so much historical as jurisprudential: He presents his essay as a cautionary tale about “living constitutionalism,” demonstrating that, while that mode of constitutional interpretation was not the Court’s stated approach in those 75 years, it could have been: For “every one of [living constitutionalism’s] modalities strongly supported the compromise or even abandonment of the amendment’s core purpose of freedom and equality for black Americans.” Simply stated, the history of the use of the amendment is a reminder that “social progress is not inevitable, that social forces can push constitutional meaning in bad as well as good directions, that living can turn into dying constitutionalism if we are not very, very careful,” Young writes.

In a comment on Young’s lecture, David A. Strauss, Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago and author of The Living Constitution (Oxford 2012), says that the early failures under the Fourteenth Amendment need to be reckoned with by those who are proponents of living constitutionalism. He writes that Young’s lecture shows that “in the end, there is only so much that the law can do to save a society from its own moral failings.”

A future post will discuss another pair of articles in the magazine that would support the same reaction. Click here to read both Young’s lecture and Strauss’s comment.

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New Cases on the Constitutionality of Long Sentences for Juveniles: The Graham Saga Continues

In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court barred the sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for crimes committed by anyone under eighteen years of age. Grounded in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Court’s holding recognized only one exception: juvenile LWOP might be permissible in cases involving homicide.

Despite its seemingly straightforward character, the Graham holding has spawned considerable litigation in the lower courts over its scope and application. Two interesting appellate decisions from last month highlight some of the difficulties.

In the first, U.S. v. Mathurin, the Eleventh Circuit had to consider whether a 685-month prison term should be treated as the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes.  

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