Priorities for the New President: Restore Parole in the Federal Criminal Justice System

This is part of a series of posts this month focusing on priorities for a new presidential administration.

In the area of federal criminal law, the next administration ought to undertake a number of initiatives: polish the Department of Justice’s tarnished image by ensuring that appointments to leadership positions are rigorously merit-based and by avoiding dubious prosecutions that appear politically motivated; make the federal criminal justice system a real leader and innovator in developing community-based alternatives to prison for nonviolent offenders; likewise, make the federal system a leader and innovator in implementing restorative justice and other processes that are more responsive to victim needs than conventional criminal case processing; seek the elimination of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes; and bring greater coherence and transparency to an executive clemency process that was extraordinarily kind to Scooter Libby, but that rarely does anything for offenders who are not politically connected. Although I regard all of these as matters of considerable urgency–and will perhaps blog about some of them at greater length later this month–I might put still another initiative at the top of the list: restore the possibility of parole release for federal prisoners.

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What Is an “Offense”?: Another ACCA Puzzle for the Courts

I’ve posted a few times on recent Armed Career Criminal Act cases (e.g., here).  With several Supreme Court decisions last term on the scope of the ACCA, this has been an especially dynamic area of federal sentencing law.  The cases nicely illustrate one of the fundamental problems with the ACCA, which is that Congress sought to single out certain categories of prior state convictions as triggers for the ACCA fifteen-year mandatory minimum, when each state criminal justice system has its own idiosyncratic structure, terminology, and practice norms.  Congress did not, and could not, take into account the particularities of fifty different systems when drafting the ACCA.  As a result, the courts have faced a steady stream of difficult cases requiring them to determine which types of prior convictions from which states actually count as a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense” (three of which trigger the fifteen-year minimum).  The Supreme Court’s May decision in United States v. Rodriquez provides a good example of the difficulty.

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Should Sentencing Judges Be Required to Respond to Defendants’ Arguments for Lenience?

I address this question in a new paper I’ve just posted on SSRN entitled “Explaining Sentences.” Here is the gist of the paper. Since 2005, federal judges have had increased discretion to impose sentences below the range prescribed in the federal sentencing guidelines. Since the guidelines ranges are based almost entirely on the aggravating circumstances of the crime, defendants typically argue for below-range sentences based on mitigating personal circumstances (e.g., post-offense rehabilitation, effects of extended incarceration on innocent family members, positive record of military or other community service, mental illness, physical disability, age). Some precedent, perhaps most notably in the Seventh Circuit, indicates that sentencing judges should respond to such arguments even when they choose to impose a guidelines sentence, explaining to defendants why their arguments have been rejected. Other decisions, however, indicate that the sentencing judge need do little or nothing to explain a guidelines sentence. For instance, in Rita v. United States, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate it would suffice if the sentencing judge merely acknowledged the defendant’s arguments at some point somewhere on the record.

I think decisions like the one in Rita are unfortunate. Given what is at stake–often years of a person’s life–it seems a small enough imposition to require district court judges to explain themselves in a more thorough manner. Moreover, a robust explanation requirement may help to counteract the natural tendency of busy judges (as Judge Posner puts it) just “to impose the guidelines sentence and be done with it”–a practice that threatens to undermine the Supreme Court’s rejection of mandatory sentencing guidelines three years ago.

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