In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. As a remedy, the Court excised the statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), requiring the district court to impose a sentence within the guideline range, thereby rendering the guidelines effectively advisory. Under Booker‘s advisory guideline regime, district courts must still calculate and consider the guidelines, but are free to impose a reasonable sentence above or below the range based on the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

So, sentencing is now a two-step process. (In some circuits, it’s three steps, but let that pass.) The court must first calculate the guideline range, just as it did before Booker, and then at step two determine an appropriate sentence in light of all the statutory factors.

But guideline calculations can be quite complex. The Guidelines Manual approaches 600 pages, and studies have shown that, depending on who is doing the calculating, the same set of facts can produce divergent guideline ranges. (See Professor O’Hear’s article, “The Myth of Uniformity,” 17 Fed. Sent. Rep. 249, for more on this.) Must the court, post-Booker, still resolve all disputed guideline issues, even though it has settled on an appropriate sentence under the statutory factors? Last week, in United States v. Sanner, the Seventh Circuit addressed this question.

The Seventh Circuit had only one new opinion in a criminal case last week.  In United States v. Smith (No. 08-1477), the defendant received a twenty-year sentence for distributing child pornography.  On appeal, Smith challenged his sentence on various grounds, including (most notably) a truly remarkable colloquy between his lawyer and the sentencing judge, in which the judge indicated that the Bureau of Prisons had the authority to decide how much of Smith’s sentence would actually be served in prison.  If the judge’s comments are taken at face value, then the judge’s understanding of the law was clearly wrong.  (The judge was not referring here to the 15-percent reduction in sentence length available for “good time,” but to an alleged authority to release the defendant at “any time” up to the full twenty years.)  Such a mistake would betray not only a disconcerting ignorance of the way the federal criminal justice system has operated since parole was abolished in the 1980’s — a full 85 percent of the sentence must now be served as a minimum in all cases — but would also raise questions about whether Smith’s sentence was set unnecessarily high.  After all, the judge was apparently operating under the mistaken belief that prison officials could release Smith as soon as he no longer presented a danger to the community — given that premise, it is easy to imagine a judge erring on the side of a more severe sentence.

The Seventh Circuit (per Judge Manion) nonetheless affirmed.