ERISA Supreme Court Attorney Fees Case Goes Way of Plaintiffs

4United States Supreme Court 112904 For those who care about ERISA participants and beneficiaries being able to find good counsel for their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court decision this morning in Hardt v. Reliance Insurance Co., No. 09-448 (U.S. May 24, 2010) is welcome news.

In a nearly unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas (Justice Stevens wrote to concur in part), the Court held that:

A fee claimant need not be a “prevailing party” to be eligible for an attorney’s fees award under §1132(g)(1) [Section 502(g)(1)]. Interpreting the section to require a party to attain that status is contrary to §1132(g)(1)’s plain text. The words “prevailing party” do not appear in the provision. Nor does anything else in §1132(g)(1)’s text purport to limit the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party.” Instead, §1132(g)(1) expressly grants district courts “discretion” to award attorney’s fees “to either party.” (Emphasis added.) That language contrasts sharply with §1132(g)(2), which governs the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA actions to recover delinquent employer contributions to a multiemployer plan. In such cases, only plaintiffs who obtain “a judgment in favor of the plan” may seek attorney’s fees.§1132(g)(2)(D). The contrast between these two paragraphs makes clear that Congress knows how to impose express limits on the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases. Because Congress failed to include in §1132(g)(1) an express “prevailing party” requirement, the Fourth Circuit’s decision adding that term of art to the statute more closely resembles “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[ing] one.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 359.

The case is interesting because it poses a common legal issue in ERISA litigation.  The court, after pointing out problems with a plan administrator’s interpretation of plan terms, remands the case back to the company and the company ends up awarding the initially requested benefits to the employee.

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Health Reform and Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities

One of the most troubling aspects of the U.S. health care system is the existence, and extent, of racial and ethnic health disparities. Research has amply documented that members of racial and ethnic minority groups receive fewer health care services and lower quality health care than non-minority patients (see, for example, the rather damning portrait drawn by the Institute of Medicine’s 2003 study titled “Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care”). These disparities remain even when insurance status, socioeconomic status, and other important factors are controlled for in scientific studies.

There are many likely causes of race- and ethnicity-based health disparities. Among them: patient-level variables such as cultural preferences, mistrust of health care providers, and degrees of knowledge; system-level factors such as the geographic availability of health care providers, the use of managed care in publicly sponsored health care programs, and a general lack of institutional funding for language interpretation and translation services; and provider-level variables such as prejudice, stereotyping, and clinical uncertainty when treating minority patients.

Yet for all the evidence showing the existence of racial and ethnic health disparities, government agencies, health care providers, and health plans and insurers do not routinely collect data pertaining to patients’ race, ethnicity, and primary language.

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Does the Threat of Future Copyright Infringement Amount to Irreparable Harm?

Chief among the bundle of rights one obtains in property ownership is the right to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of that property.  This “sole and despotic dominion” that an individual commands over their property is placed in danger, of course, when the property becomes subject to the wants and needs of others.  Absent the owner’s consent (as in the case of licensing) or operation of law (as with adverse possession), a property owner would be able to bring an action for trespass for such intrusions.

A judge holding a defendant liable for trespass perhaps carries the vision of plaintiffs having their rights vindicated, but cases do not end at liability.  The judge must also determine whether further remedies beyond damages are appropriate, including whether a permanent injunction should issue.  Such is a weighty decision touches upon an extraordinary remedy: a court order that a defendant must cease and desist its illegal activity or face punishment for contempt.   That being said, in many property cases, a court order only issuing damages would effectuate a judicial licensing of the behavior.  With that result, the incentives are adjusted such that the right to exclude does not rest with the plaintiff; instead, it is determined only by the extent to which the defendant is willing and able to engage in the trespassing behavior.  As such, the courts have presumptively treated infringement of property rights as worthy of injunctive relief.

That has also been the rule in copyright infringement cases for the last few decades. 

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