Should Non-Precedential Opinions Be “Precedential But Overrulable” Opinions?

A post at Legal Theory Blog alerted me to Amy E. Sloan‘s new article, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em:  A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 895 (2008), available on SSRN.  Amy Sloan is an Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Legal Skills program at University of Baltimore School of Law.  She is well known to legal writing professors, and to many law students, as the author of a popular legal research textbook, Basic Legal Research: Tools and Strategies.

Sloan makes an interesting argument, advocating that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 be amended to assign non-precedential opinions a sort of “mixed” precedential value, specifically, that “non-precedential opinions [would be] binding unless overruled by a later panel’s precedential opinion.”  She contends that giving non-precedential cases this “‘overrulable’ status” would ensure that the opinions’ precedential weight would “correspond[] to their position within the traditional hierarchy of federal decisional law.”  

Continue ReadingShould Non-Precedential Opinions Be “Precedential But Overrulable” Opinions?

With Obama Elected, Will This Be the Last Term for Justice Stevens?

Justice John Paul Stevens has long been regarded as a stalwart of the Supreme Court’s liberal wing, but he turns 89 next year.  If he cares about having an ideologically similar successor on the Court, he may want to retire on a timetable that will permit a successor to be confirmed in time for the start of the next October term.  Not only would this permit a smooth transition for his colleagues, but it would also allow soon-to-be-President Obama to take advantage of his party’s large majority in the Senate.  Mid-term elections are notoriously tough on sitting presidents, so it might be risky for Stevens to wait much longer — from the standpoint of maximizing the odds of an easy confirmation for a liberal successor. 

But I hope that Stevens will not act in so transparently political a manner.  The Court’s legitimacy rests to no small extent on perceptions that its members are above politics.  Sure, anyone who is paying attention knows that there are “liberals” and “conservatives” on the Court, and no once can reasonably expect the Justices entirely to suppress their fundamental political values when they decide cases.  But that sort of partisanship is different than trying to control the composition of the Court, which seems to me something considerably crasser.  I hope that Stevens remains on the Court for as long as he feels that he can function effectively — even if that means President Palin selects his successor.

Continue ReadingWith Obama Elected, Will This Be the Last Term for Justice Stevens?

Finding a New Canon of Statutory Interpretation in an Old Case

Yesterday, Professor Anita Krishnakumar gave an intriguing presentation on her latest paper entitled “The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The National Narrative Canon.”  A copy of her paper can be found here.  In her paper, Professor Krishnakumar explores the controversial, but not often discussed, portion of the famous Holy Trinity Church decision.  The well-known, and still somewhat controversial, portion of the decision finds the Court relying on the “spirit” of the statute instead of its plain language — with support from legislative history.  The more controversial section of the opinion argues that even setting aside traditional methods of statutory interpretation, the statute — which was essentially an anti-immigrant labor statute — could not be enforced against the employer church because the United States of America “is a Christian nation.”  Professor Krishnakumar argues that this methodology constitutes an interpretive canon for statutory interpretation: the national narrative canon.  She also points to other Supreme Court opinions that use a similar methodology where the Court not only uses traditional interpretive canons, but also this national narrative canon — relying on history and public norms — in deciding the cases.

Professor Krishnakumar warns that this newly-identified, but long extant, national narrative canon poses a threat to the perceived legitimacy of courts’ statutory interpretation because it often runs contrary to the text of the statute, produces bad policy, and can create an unfair exception for a particular entity.  While the national narrative canon has been used selectively, it will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court — and indeed other courts — moves more towards this public norms approach to statutory interpretation.  In this age of New Textualism, it strikes me as likely that — as seen with the cases Professor Krishnakumar analyzes — to the degree its used, the Court will couple the national narrative canon with another more traditional approach to statutory interpretation in reaching its decision.  In this regard, the Court will continue to make the national narrative canon less effective in terms of precedential value, seemingly serving more as dicta.  However, its potential effect  should not be understated, as these portions of the Court’s opinion can still have powerful effects in the political realm in ways which may run contrary to our society’s commitment to pluralism and diversity.

Continue ReadingFinding a New Canon of Statutory Interpretation in an Old Case