Seventh Circuit Week in Review, Part I: Use of Prior Convictions

The Seventh Circuit had two new criminal opinions in the past week, including a partial defendant win that broke a string of at least eleven consecutive victories by the government.  The two opinions focus on the admissibility of a defendant’s prior convictions at trial and the application of the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines, respectively.  Because I have a bit more than usual to say about the two cases, I will just cover the prior convictions case here, and leave the crack case (featuring a partial defendant victory) for another post tomorrow.

In United States v. Perkins (No. 07-3383), a jury in the Southern District of Illinois convicted Perkins of various drug trafficking offenses.  During his trial, the prosecutor introduced into evidence Perkins’ three prior convictions for cocaine-related offenses, as well as testimony that Perkins had attempted to hide cocaine in his mouth when he was arrested in connection with one of the earlier convictions.  On appeal, Perkins argued that the evidence should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Although the Rules do indeed prohibit the use of prior convictions to establish a defendant’s propensity to commit new crimes, the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Bauer) rejected Perkins’ argument.  More specifically, the court held that Perkins’ prior convictions were admissible because they helped to establish “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake” — all acceptable purposes of prior convictions evidence under Rule 404(b).

For what it’s worth, my own view is that propensity evidence actually should be admissible as such.

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Laboratories of Democracy at the Local Level

Matt Parlow has a thought-provoking new article in print: Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 371 (2008).  (A draft can be downloaded here.)  Matt contends that the oft-quoted argument of Justice Brandeis (pictured to the left) that states may appropriately serve as laboraties for “novel social and economic experiments” applies equally well — indeed, perhaps even better — to cities and other local units of government.  Citing recent immigration initiatives and living wage ordinances (including one in Madison, Wisconsin), Matt notes a long history of local-level policy innovation in this country.  He argues,

Because they are smaller in size, local governments are more capable of being responsive to the needs of their respective communities because they are more in touch with their constituents.  This leads, in theory, to more responsive and representative policy-making as local government officials make decisions informed by the community’s wants and needs.

In light of these considerations, Matt argues against the tendency of some courts to squelch local initiatives through narrow constructions of home rule powers and liberal invocations of the implied preemption doctrine.

All of this connects nicely to the recent, lively discussion on this Blog of Milwaukee’s ballot initiative mandating paid sick leave for employees.  I take it that Matt would be skeptical of arguments that the Milwaukee law is preempted by state and federal law — at the least, his analysis would suggest some good reasons why a court ought to be slow to find preemption. 

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If The Drew Fits, Charge It?

Being fascinated with both the use (and misuse) of technology and criminal law in general, I have been intently following the Lori Drew case. For those of you who haven’t, however, Drew is the Missouri mother who — as a response to some animus between 13-year-old Megan Meier and Drew’s daughter — created a false persona, “Josh Evans,” on Myspace to flirt with and gain the trust of Meier, then insulted and demeaned her to the point where Meier committed suicide. Missouri state officials reviewed the case, but felt that there was no appropriate state statute under which to bring charges against Drew; federal prosecutors in Missouri declined to charge the case for similar reasons. However, federal prosecutors in California (where Myspace’s servers are located) disagreed; claiming jurisdiction, they charged and were subsequently able to indict Drew under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Specifically, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in California is charging her with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime for anyone to

intentionally access[] a computer without authorization or exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] . . . information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.

The indictment can be found here, if anyone is interested in reading it, but the gist of the argument that the AUSAs in California are making is that by giving fictitious profile information, Drew violated Myspace’s Terms of Service, thus “exceeding” the access authorized by Myspace. Then, as she used this fictitious profile to “obtain information” from Myspace’s servers — personal information about Megan, as best as I can tell — to commit the tort of infliction of emotional distress upon Meier, and since to access Myspace’s servers she was required to send packets of data across state lines, she met all the elements of the crime.

Continue ReadingIf The Drew Fits, Charge It?
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