Federal Law & Legal System – Page 186 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Cert Grant: What Is “Knowing” Identity Theft?

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:October 20, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process U.S. Supreme Court

A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, imposes a mandatory two-year prison sentence on defendants who “knowingly” use “a means of identification of another person” in the course of committing a felony. The two years is in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying felony. But what exactly does the word “knowingly” refer to in the statute: is it enough that the defendant knew that he was using a means of identification, or must the government also prove that the defendant knew the identification belonged to another person? This is the question raised in a case that the Supreme Court agreed to hear earlier today, United States v. Flores-Figueroa. The unpublished opinion below can be found at 2008 WL 1808508.

SCOTUS Blog summarizes the facts as follows:

Seventh Circuit Week in Review

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:October 19, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Seventh Circuit

Beginning with this post, I will provide a regular weekend review of new Seventh Circuit opinions in criminal cases. The past week was actually very quiet on the criminal front, with only one new opinion (and that one not especially significant in terms of discussing or modifying the law). In United States v. Jackson, the three defendants were convicted of mail fraud in connection with a scheme to bilk their car insurance carriers by submitting false theft claims. The Seventh Circuit had little apparent difficulty in affirming the convictions over the defendants’ arguments that the evidence was insufficient, that material evidence had been withheld by the government, and that evidence of a prior conviction had been improperly admitted.

Doing Doors in Kewaskum

Post author:Richard M. Esenberg
Post published:October 19, 2008
Post category:Eastern District of Wisconsin First Amendment

Last Tuesday, a consent judgment was entered in the Eastern District of Wisconsin resolving a free speech claim brought by a self-described “traveling evangelist.” The plaintiff Michael Foht was told by the Kewaskum Police that he could distribute religious literature only to people who said that they wanted it. This meant that he could not leave literature at private residences (he must first knock on the door and ask permission) or leaflet automobiles.

This instruction was based on an extraordinarily broad village ordinance which prohibited the distribution of “any printed matter on literature on public or private property” or the placement of such literature on motor vehicles. The ordinance had an exception for the distribution of literature to persons “willing to accept” it.

Foht apparently attempted to clarify the matter with the village attorney, who failed to return his calls. That turned out to be expensive.

Foht filed suit and the village, finally obtaining the proper legal advice, repealed the ordinance. The consent decree declares that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional and should not have been applied to Foht and awards him $11,000 in attorneys fees and costs.

The result is unexceptional, but the fact of the case may be instructive. What the law requires and whether it is complied with are two different matters. I doubt that this type of ordinance was only to be found in Kewaskum, Wisconsin.