Just in time for exam-writing law professors comes the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Krieger (No. 09-1333) — a case that has just that sort of counter-intuitive, “it can’t be right” flavor that makes great testing fodder.  Among other things, the case illustrates the odd place we have ended up in our jurisprudence on procedural rights at sentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Harris v. United States.

Here’s what happened.  Jennifer Krieger was prescribed fentanyl, a powerful opioid, to help her with severe back pain.  She gave some of the drug to her friend Jennifer Curry for recreational use.  Curry misused the fentanyl, as well as a variety of other substances, and died the next day.  Krieger was then indicted for distributing fentanyl with death resulting.  That’s when things got really weird. 

It turns out that the government’s main witness, the medical examiner who concluded that Curry died of fentanyl toxicity, had some serious legal problems of his own and fled the country. 

Last week, in United States v. Reyes-Hernandez (No. 09-1249), the Seventh Circuit overruled United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2006), and held that sentencing judges may consider “the disparate treatment of immigration defendants that is created by fast-track programs in determining whether a Guidelines sentence is greater than necessary under the § 3553(a) factors” (30).  This is an important decision that deepens a circuit split on the sentencing of illegal reentrants into this country. 

At least sixteen districts, including the Mexican border districts, have developed fast-track programs that offer extraordinary sentencing benefits for illegal reentrants who plead guilty in an especially expedited fashion.  (For background, see my article at 27 Hamline L. Rev. 357.)  However, many other districts, including all of the Seventh Circuit districts, do not offer defendants the fast-track option, which creates wide sentencing disparities in illegal reentry cases.  When the federal sentencing guidelines were converted from mandatory to advisory in 2005, many defendants in non-fast-track districts argued that judges ought to give them the fast-track benefit in order to mitigate the disparities.  Appellate courts, however, uniformly rejected these arguments prior to 2007, when the Supreme Court reemphasized the discretionary nature of federal sentencing in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85.  Post-Kimbrough, three circuits, now joined by the Seventh, have ruled that sentencing judges may consider the fast-track disparities.