Seventh Circuit: Earlier Sentence Served in Juvenile Detention Facility Can Make Defendant a Career Offender

seventh circuitAfter pleading guilty in federal court to various drug-trafficking offenses, Isaiah Gregory received an eye-popping sentence of 327 months in prison — more than 27 years behind bars.  Driving this extraordinary sentence was the district court’s finding that Gregory was a “career offender” under the federal sentencing guidelines.  It was the career offender guideline that raised Gregory’s guidelines range from either 120-135 months (as he calculated it) or 121-151 months (as the government calculated it) to 262-327 months.   Thus, the career-offender finding likely added more than fourteen years to Gregory’s sentence.

Although the term “career offender” may conjure up images of a hardened criminal with a rap sheet down to your knees, the guidelines require only two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense in order to trigger the career-offender sentence enhancement. 

Even at that, Gregory hardly seems the sort of defendant that the Sentencing Commission must have had in mind when it drafted the career-offender guideline.  In particular, one of his two qualifying convictions was a $30 robbery he committed when he was only fifteen (he is now in his mid-20’s) — a robbery for which he was sent, not to prison, but to a juvenile detention facility.  Although it is not clear that the conviction should have counted under the plain terms of the career-offender guideline, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed his sentence last week in United States v. Gregory (No. 09-2735). 

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Seventh Circuit Weighs in on Crime-Lab Evidence

seventh circuitThe Supreme Court was not the only court wrestling this week with the admissibility of crime-lab evidence.  A day after the Justices heard oral argument in Briscoe v. Virginia, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Turner (No. 08-3109).  Both cases put into question the vitality of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).

A jury convicted Turner of selling crack to an undercover police officer.  The drugs were sent to the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed by a chemist named Hanson, who confirmed that they were indeed crack.  The government intended to call Hanson to testify to this effect, but she went on maternity leave before the trial.  So Hanson’s supervisor, Block, was summoned instead.  Based on Hanson’s notes and data, Block testified that he agreed with her conclusion that the drugs were crack.

On appeal, Turner argued that Block’s testimony violated Melendez-Diaz

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Seventh Circuit Demands “Intellectual Discipline” at Sentencing

seventh circuitIt’s almost like Judge Easterbrook read my article.  I have a forthcoming piece in the Marquette Law Review arguing that appellate courts ought generally to demand more rigor of trial judges in explaining their sentences and specifically to require greater attention to objective benchmarks.  Not surprisingly, I was quite pleased to read the Seventh Circuit’s opinion earlier this week in United States v. Kirkpatrick (No. 09-2382) (Easterbrook, J.), in which the court called for “intellectual discipline” at sentencing and vacated a sentence because the district judge failed to use the sentencing guidelines as an initial benchmark.

Here’s what happened.  Following his arrest for unlawful gun possession, Kirkpatrick confessed to four murders and then told his cellmate that he had arranged a contract hit on a federal agent.  After more than 200 hundred hours of investigation, law enforcement officials determined that all of these claims were false.  (Why Kirkpatrick would confess to four murders he did not actually commit is a mystery to me.)  With a conviction only for the gun-possession crime, Kirkpatrick’s guidelines range was calculated to be 37-46 months.  The district judge, however, felt he deserved more because of the false statements and the wasted law enforcement effort they caused.  So the sentence actually imposed was 108 months — more than twice the guidelines maximum. 

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