Seventh Circuit – Page 19 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Sentence Explanation in the Seventh Circuit: What’s Good for the Goose . . .

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:October 5, 2010
Post category:Federal Criminal Law & Process Federal Sentencing Seventh Circuit

Ever since the Supreme Court converted the federal sentencing guidelines from mandatory to advisory in 2005, I’ve followed with particular interest the case law on how sentences must be explained in the new regime. Even more specifically, I have focused on the question of when sentencing judges are required to respond expressly to defendants’ arguments for lenience. (See, for example, my post here.) I’ve also wondered about the flipside of that question — when must judges respond expressly to prosecutors’ arguments in aggravation? — but cases on this seem far less common. Last week, though, the Seventh Circuit addressed an issue that seems closely related to my hypothetical question.

In United States v. Glosser (No. 08-4015), the judge made a promise to the defendant at his change-of-plea hearing that he would impose the statutory minimum 120-month sentence in the case, notwithstanding the prosecutor’s suggestion that the government might seek more. And, indeed, it turned out that the government sought a 210-month sentence in light of firearms found at Glosser’s resident. The judge, however, mostly stuck to his promise and imposed a 121-month sentence. The government appealed.

Seventh Circuit Cleans Up the “Other Bad Acts” Mess (a Little)

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:August 11, 2010
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Evidence Federal Criminal Law & Process Seventh Circuit

I’ve blogged on a number of occasions about the messy state of the law relating to the admissibility of “other bad acts” evidence (e.g., here and here). Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) indicates that other bad acts may not be used against a criminal defendant to show bad character or a propensity to commit crime. However, the Rule includes a number of exceptions, and courts have not only tended to interpret those exceptions expansively, but have also recognized an additional exception for evidence that is “inextricably intertwined” with proof of a charged offense.

Given the expansively interpreted exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b) itself, the inextricable intertwinement exception seemed to me an unnecessary and confusing addition to the law. The Seventh Circuit has now indicated its agreement with that view.

Seventh Circuit Revisits the Second Amendment

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:July 13, 2010
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Seventh Circuit

Here’s another one to file under “no, we don’t want a revolution.” A few days ago, I posted on a new Seventh Circuit opinion that seemed to adopt a minimalist reading of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carr v. United States. Over a vigorous dissent, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the validity of pre-Carr decisions regarding the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Now, the Seventh Circuit has a new opinion that reaffirms the validity of a gun-control statute, and another dissent accuses the court of incorrectly limiting a recent Supreme Court decision.

Last year, I posted on the interesting panel decision in United States v. Skoien, in which the Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court for the government to attempt to justify 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in the face of the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge. The panel relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. However, the government successfully sought en banc review, and now the en banc court has decided simply to affirm Skoien’s conviction without further proceedings.