Seventh Circuit – Page 32 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:May 22, 2009
Post category:Seventh Circuit

By the default, the title “Case of the Week” must go to the only new opinion of the week: United States v. Gooden (No. 08-3240). And even Gooden only barely qualifies, as the opinion is merely a slightly amended version of an earlier opinion in the case (noted in my post here). The only difference I can see in the amended opinion is a clarification that the notice requirements of Rule 32(h) do not apply to post-Booker variances per the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008).

Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Watch the “R” Word, Prosecutors!

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:May 18, 2009
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Seventh Circuit

Two months ago, I posted here about the Seventh Circuit’s sharp rebuke of a prosecutor in United States v. Farinella, in which the defendant was charged with selling mislabeled bottles of salad dressing. The court’s concerns focused, in part, on the prosecutor’s repeated suggestions to the jury that the salad dressing was spoiled, despite the absence of any evidence to that effect. The court, per Judge Posner, rightly took the prosecutor to task for attempting to inflame the jury’s emotions through evocative, but misleading, characterizations of the evidence. We can and should expect prosecutors to act with integrity and restraint in carrying on their critically important public functions, rather than playing the adversarial system for all it’s worth. In my experience, the vast majority of prosecutors appreciate — apologies to Vince Lombardi — that winning is not the only thing. But, when prosecutors do occasionally cross the line, as in Farinella, I am happy to see the courts call them out.

I was reminded of Farinella when reading the court’s decision last week in United States v. Mannava (No. 07-3748), in which the court, again per Judge Posner, overturned the defendant’s child enticement conviction based, again, on the prosecutor’s repeated use of misleading and inflammatory language in front of the jury.

Permission to Skip to the Chase

Post author:Jon Deitrich
Post published:May 17, 2009
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Federal Sentencing Seventh Circuit

In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. As a remedy, the Court excised the statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), requiring the district court to impose a sentence within the guideline range, thereby rendering the guidelines effectively advisory. Under Booker‘s advisory guideline regime, district courts must still calculate and consider the guidelines, but are free to impose a reasonable sentence above or below the range based on the other sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

So, sentencing is now a two-step process. (In some circuits, it’s three steps, but let that pass.) The court must first calculate the guideline range, just as it did before Booker, and then at step two determine an appropriate sentence in light of all the statutory factors.

But guideline calculations can be quite complex. The Guidelines Manual approaches 600 pages, and studies have shown that, depending on who is doing the calculating, the same set of facts can produce divergent guideline ranges. (See Professor O’Hear’s article, “The Myth of Uniformity,” 17 Fed. Sent. Rep. 249, for more on this.) Must the court, post-Booker, still resolve all disputed guideline issues, even though it has settled on an appropriate sentence under the statutory factors? Last week, in United States v. Sanner, the Seventh Circuit addressed this question.