Super Mujer: Justice Sonia Sotomayor as a Role Model

When President Barack Obama nominated Justice Sonia Sotomayor a year ago, the debate surrounding her confirmation included a wide array of scrutiny.  Some of the items of discussion were more relevant and more substantive than others.

As the US Supreme Court’s first Latina, third female, and first Type 1 Diabetic to serve on the bench, the greatest amount of focus seemed to fall upon her non-legal, personal history.  Particularly, as this blog has noted, the confirmation hearings concentrated on whether that personal history and her self-identified “Wise Latina”-ness would enhance or detract from her ability to effectively and fairly “say what the law is.”

Nearly a year after her confirmation, the evaluation of the Wise Latina’s first session as a Justice has already begun.  But what if, a year later, we approached the discussion concerning her role on the Court from another direction?  Instead of a debate centered only on Justice Sotomayor’s specific job performance, the discussion might also include the value that comes from choosing a role model that can inspire the underrepresented within the legal community.

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From M’Naghten to Hinckley to Clark: “The Incredible Shrinking Insanity Defense”

In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten (left) killed the secretary of the Prime Minister of England.  Medical evidence introduced at his murder trial indicated that he suffered paranoid delusions, leading to his acquittal and eventually to judicial recognition of something like the modern insanity defense. 

After a period of expansion in the mid-twentieth century, the insanity defense has been progressively restricted since John Hinckley’s successful use of the defense during his trial on charges arising from his attempted assassination of President Reagan.  Janie Kim now recounts the story of the “incredible shrinking insanity defense,” as she calls it, in a fascinating new paper on SSRN.

She focuses particularly on the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Clark v. Arizona. 

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ERISA Supreme Court Attorney Fees Case Goes Way of Plaintiffs

4United States Supreme Court 112904 For those who care about ERISA participants and beneficiaries being able to find good counsel for their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court decision this morning in Hardt v. Reliance Insurance Co., No. 09-448 (U.S. May 24, 2010) is welcome news.

In a nearly unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas (Justice Stevens wrote to concur in part), the Court held that:

A fee claimant need not be a “prevailing party” to be eligible for an attorney’s fees award under §1132(g)(1) [Section 502(g)(1)]. Interpreting the section to require a party to attain that status is contrary to §1132(g)(1)’s plain text. The words “prevailing party” do not appear in the provision. Nor does anything else in §1132(g)(1)’s text purport to limit the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party.” Instead, §1132(g)(1) expressly grants district courts “discretion” to award attorney’s fees “to either party.” (Emphasis added.) That language contrasts sharply with §1132(g)(2), which governs the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA actions to recover delinquent employer contributions to a multiemployer plan. In such cases, only plaintiffs who obtain “a judgment in favor of the plan” may seek attorney’s fees.§1132(g)(2)(D). The contrast between these two paragraphs makes clear that Congress knows how to impose express limits on the availability of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases. Because Congress failed to include in §1132(g)(1) an express “prevailing party” requirement, the Fourth Circuit’s decision adding that term of art to the statute more closely resembles “invent[ing] a statute rather than interpret[ing] one.” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 359.

The case is interesting because it poses a common legal issue in ERISA litigation.  The court, after pointing out problems with a plan administrator’s interpretation of plan terms, remands the case back to the company and the company ends up awarding the initially requested benefits to the employee.

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