Learning About Law . . . by Watching Football?

instant replayWho knew you could learn so much about jurisprudence from the NFL rulebook?  In a new paper on SSRN, Chad Oldfather (Vikings fan) and 3L Matthew Fernholz (Bears fan) demonstrate that it is surprisingly illuminating to compare and contrast the rules of instant replay with the rules of appellate review.  Their title says it all: “Comparative Procedure on a Sunday Afternoon: Instant Replay in the NFL as a Process of Appellate Review.”  Here is the abstract:

During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice John Roberts famously likened the judicial role to that of a baseball umpire. The increased prevalence of video evidence makes it likely that judges will find another sporting analogue for their role – that of the instant replay official in the NFL. (Indeed, many have already done so.) This Essay explores the analogy. In so doing it seeks not only to consider its appropriateness in a narrow sense (much as many commentators considered the appropriateness of the Chief Justice’s analogy), but also to conduct something of a comparative analysis and thereby to use it as a vehicle for illustrating some general characteristics of a process of decisional review.

This is a fun and — only six days until the Packers’ season opener! — timely article.

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Catholics on the Court

huge_3_19675Three recent events have added a new wrinkle to a debate that has been taking place among legal scholars: what, if anything, does it mean to be both a Catholic and a Supreme Court Justice?

First, the confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor has added a sixth practicing Catholic to the Supreme Court.  As a proportion of the Court’s membership, Catholics on the Court currently exceed their proportionate representation in the general public by a significant amount.  This is an astonishing historical fact, although its significance is not self-evident.

Second, Frank Colucci’s book, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence, was recently reviewed  in the Wall Street Journal by Northwestern University Law School Professor John McGinnis.  Apparently, Mr. Colucci does not adhere to the conventional wisdom that Justice Kennedy is an unpredictable jurist whose primary concerns are the aggrandizement of the Supreme Court and the divination of narrow, fact-based holdings.  Instead, and somewhat unexpectedly, Corlucci argues that Justice Kennedy’s approach to the interpretation of the Constitution is best understood as seeking to advance a moral imperative.

Justice Kennedy’s objective, according to Corlucci, is to vindicate and preserve an ever increasing share of individual liberty within our broader society.  Here is the key portion of Professor McGinnis’ review:

Looking for the sources of Justice Kennedy’s moral judgment, Mr. Colucci discovers one in post-Vatican II Catholic thought, including papal encyclicals like Dignitatis Humanae.  In Roper v. Simmons, a ruling forbidding the death penalty for criminals under the age of 18, Justice Kennedy wrote that juveniles only rarely exhibit ‘irreparable corruption’ – a phrase that a secular judge might not have used.  (Justice Kennedy is an observant Catholic).  It is odd to reflect that the justice most influenced by contemporary Catholic thought may today be – because of his emphasis on individual rights – the decisive vote for preserving the abortion status quo.

It is intriguing to consider whether there is, in fact, a demonstrable connection between Catholic social thought and Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of an evolving liberty interest guaranteed by the Constitution.

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Of Lifelines and Waiver

seventh circuit

When a lawyer is making what is clearly a losing argument, a judge will sometimes throw the lawyer a lifeline, using a question to suggest a more fruitful line of attack.  An astute lawyer will follow the judge’s cue and adapt his or her argument accordingly.

Such does not seem to be the case with the lawyer in United States v. Foster (No. 08-1914).

Last year, in United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held that a conviction for criminal recklessness in Indiana does not count as a prior “crime of violence” for purposes of triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Darryl Foster, however, was given the ACCA sentence enhancement based on a prior conviction for criminal recklessness in Indiana.  Looks like a slam-dunk issue on appeal, right? 

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