More Advice for Online Contact

Following up on my post regarding email negotiation last week, the ABA Journal noted this week that there are limits on the use of social spaces in order to gather information:

A lawyer who wants to see what a potential witness says to personal contacts on his or her Facebook or MySpace page has one good option, a recent ethics opinion suggests: Ask for access.

Alternative approaches, such as secretly sending a third party to “friend” a Facebook user, are unethical because they are deceptive, says the Philadelphia Bar Association in a March advisory opinion.

Not telling the potential witness of the third party’s affiliation with the lawyer “omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to be allowed access to the witness’s pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness,” the opinion explains.

“The omission would purposefully conceal that fact from the witness for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow access, when she [might] not do so if she knew the third person was associated with the inquirer and the true purpose of the access was to obtain information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.”

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In America You Can’t Buy Justice. But You Can Rent It.

In our final Law Governing Lawyers class, we had an extended discussion of proposed ABA rules strongly encouraging—if not requiring—minimumpro bono work by members of the bar (or law school students). What prompted this was our reading on the unmet need for legal services.  Among the indigent, those seeking immigration or asylum, and the mentally ill, legal services are virtually unobtainable. 

This is especially true for civil actions; at least in criminal actions an attorney can be appointed for an indigent client.  Civil representation for disadvantaged clients, in contrast, is often unaffordable.  When they can afford it, the lawyer is usually one whose entire client base is barely able to afford any fee.  Such attorneys mean well but be struggling with humongous case loads and limited resources.  My basic legal processes are infeasible for them, especially a thorough investigation or discovery.  While trying to help so many in need, they may be unable to provide any client with truly competent or adequate representation. 

Legal clinics (such as our own venerable Marquette Volunteer Legal Clinic) try to fill the gap, but often such clinics can only offer advice and direction.  They cannot or do not provide representation.

Against this backdrop, the ABA House of Delegates has considered and rejected changes to Model Rule 6.1 that would require lawyers to provide at least 50 hours of pro bono work per year, with a relatively cheap hourly buy-out.  There are of course, always mechanistic complaints: how would compliance be recorded? how would the requirement be enforced? what would the penalty be?  These can be worked out.

The real problem seems to be other complaints that are more philosophical.  What can a lawyer accomplish in 50 hours per year?  Would forced-labor representation be substandard?  Shouldn’t lawyers be able to avoid practicing in skill-areas they don’t want to practice in?  And why are we picking on lawyers?  Do doctors or plumbers have to do pro bono work?

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Reinstatement of a Wrongfully Discharged Lawyer?

 

Earlier this week, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued an interesting decision involving remedies for the discharge of in-house counsel in violation of the Equal Pay, Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. Sands v. Menard, Inc., involved a claim by a lawyer terminated from her position as vice president and executive general counsel of the Wisconsin-based building supplies company. The lawyer had claimed that she was the victim of gender-based pay discrimination. The matter was submitted to arbitration, and Menard was determined to have violated the lawyer’s rights in underpaying her and retaliating for her complaint.

The arbitration panel awarded the lawyer compensatory and punitive damages and also ordered reinstatement, a remedy that neither party sought. In upholding the reinstatement order, the court provided the following analysis:

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