Court Unanimously Affirms Diploma Privilege

The Wisconsin Supreme Court voted this morning, 7-0, to maintain the state’s longstanding diploma privilege, in its current form. The unanimous ruling denied rulemaking petition 09-09, in which Steve Levine and various other members of the bar sought either to extend the diploma privilege, as embodied in Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 40.03, to all ABA-accredited law schools (well beyond Marquette and Wisconsin) or to abolish it altogether. The Court’s ruling was foreshadowed by comments that individual Justices had made in an open administrative hearing and subsequent conference this past Thursday, suggesting that the Court, for all of its members’ varied backgrounds, did not favor the petition. I was among the members of the public speaking before the Court on Thursday and emphasized two points: (1) that the existing approach has been beneficial public policy for the state’s courts and the public and (2) that, in fact, both Marquette and Wisconsin are distinguishable from every other ABA-accredited law school in the important extent to which their students are exposed to precepts of Wisconsin law (as well as in other respects). I also mentioned an additional consideration, with reference both to the petition to amend or repeal and to the recently (and favorably) concluded constitutional challenge to the diploma privilege: requests such as this are destabilizing, imposing costs with no offsetting benefits. They divert the law schools from other important public policy concerns, including ones in which I would rather expect the entire bar to be interested: e.g., how to provide leadership in facilitating access to justice. This additional consideration suggested that, if the Court were inclined in the direction of denying the petition, it should leave no doubt on the matter. The Court—through its unanimous ruling and the strong comments of individual Justices during the open administrative conference—did precisely that.

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Wrong Advice About Civil Commitment Law Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Last spring, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Padilla v. Kentucky that an attorney’s incorrect advice regarding the deportation consequences of a guilty plea might violate the client’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  Padilla was a surprisingly broadly worded expansion of the Sixth Amendment right into the realm of advice on the collateral consequences of a conviction.  Although Padilla raised more questions than it answered, the decision may prove an extraordinarily important one in light of the proliferation of collateral consequences over the past couple of decades.

Now the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that Padilla does indeed extend beyond deportation advice.  In Bauder v. Dep’t of Corrections (No. 10-10657), the court affirmed a grant of habeas relief based on an attorney’s incorrect advice that the petitioner would not face the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually violent predator if he pled no contest to a stalking charge.

In addition to its extension of the Padilla reasoning to a new collateral consequence, Bauder strikes me as quite significant for at least two reasons.  

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Best of the Blogs: Clerkship Edition

This week, two posts on federal judicial clerkships particularly caught my eye.  First, at Concurring Opinions, David Hoffman reported on the “quickly unraveling clerkship market.”  Under the “Federal Judges Law Clerk Hiring Plan,” law schools are not supposed to send supporting materials for student clerkship applicants, and judges are not supposed to interview student applicants, before September of the students’ third year.  This is intended to stop a race to the bottom among the judges, who might otherwise move their hiring processes ever earlier in order to snag the most promising clerkship candidates.  (When I was a law student in the mid-1990’s, the norm was hiring midway through the 2L year.  This seemed truly absurd at my law school because the first semester was ungraded, and third-semester grades were not yet available when clerks were hired; judges were thus selecting clerks based on only a single semester of grades.)

According to Hoffman, the “dam is about to burst,” as more and more judges and law schools are violating or circumventing the Plan.  I was particularly intrigued by his observation that judges are circumventing the Plan by hiring practicing lawyers instead of law students.  This is certainly nothing new — I had several classmates who moved from practice to clerkship and back again over our first few years out of school — but I wonder if it has become more common in response to restrictions on hiring law students.

I also wonder if judges tend to get better clerks when they hire practitioners.  

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