The Safety and Justice Challenge
In Ethics and Infinity, philosopher and Nazi prison survivor Emmanuel Levinas is asked about responsibility for “the Other” and says, “You know that sentence of Dostoyevsky: ‘We are all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than the others’. This is not owing to such or such a guilt which is really mine, or to offenses that I would have committed; but because I am responsible for a total responsibility, which answers for all the others and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. The I always has one responsibility more than all the others.”
I was a third-year law student in a seminar on Law and Theology when I read that passage and wrestled with it. The philosophical writings of the Jewish Holocaust survivors and of German Christian writers, such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who suffered under the Nazi regime examined the obligation of the individual in relation to others and the state. Levinas was asserting an extraordinarily expansive (and I thought at the time unrealistic) ethical obligation of the person in relation to the other: to be wholly responsible for seeing and uplifting the human dignity of others, even if there is no reciprocity. Is it possible to secure safety and to render justice to the idea of human dignity at the same time?
At that stage in my education, I had already worked with prisoners as a law student in a clinic, so I had some sense how dehumanizing a jail or prison is to the people locked inside. I had also worked in a prosecutor’s office directing people into the prison or jail system and could understand why some people had to be removed from the community. Both experiences shaped my professional views.