John Paul Stevens’ Restraint

After he retired in 2010, John Paul Stevens published Five Chiefs: A Supreme Court Memoir.  After a brief description of the first twelve Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court, from John Jay through Harlan Fiske Stone, he describes in more detail the last five with whom he was professionally acquainted.  Stevens clerked for Wiley Rutledge, after earning the highest GPA in the history of Northwestern Law School, during the 1947 – 48 Term when Fred Vinson was Chief Justice.  Stevens was in private practice in Chicago, sometimes teaching antitrust law at the University of Chicago, when Earl Warren presided over the Court.  It was during this time, however, that he argued his only case before the Court.  In Five Chiefs, he notes that the most memorable aspect of his experience as an advocate before the Court was the sheer proximity of the Justices.  Though the distance between the lawyer and the bench is over six feet, Stevens felt sure that “Chief Justice Warren could have shaken my hand had he wished.”

Details like this provide an inside glimpse of the Court.  Early in his account, Stevens describes how the prohibition against playing basketball in the gym directly above the courtroom occurred during Vinson’s tenure: Byron White, one of Vinson’s first clerks and a former All-American, was practicing layups during oral argument.  Stevens’ anecdotes are always respectful of their subjects and strike one as rather tame, at least until one realizes that civility, the ability to “disagree without being disagreeable,” is of the utmost importance to him.

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A Second Look at the Sharia Law Amendment

Last week, the Tenth Circuit issued a decision on Oklahoma’s “Sharia Law Amendment.” A quick summary for those who haven’t followed: In 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a ballot initiative that amended their state’s constitution to prohibit Oklahoma courts from “considering or using” either “international law” or “Sharia Law” in making judicial decisions. A district court issued a preliminary injunction that at least temporarily prohibited the law from taking effect on the ground that its language regarding Sharia Law violates the Establishment Clause. The Tenth Circuit decision held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunction.

Although not yet addressed by the courts, I think it’s worth noting that the Amendment’s language on international law may also be unconstitutional. The reason is the Supremacy Clause. First note that the Amendment explicitly prohibits Oklahoma courts from “considering or using” international law in the form of both treaties and custom. This prohibition is unqualified, and thus at least facially encompasses treaties and custom of all kinds.

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Delay in Criminal Procedure: What’s Good for the Goose Is . . . Well, Never Mind

Earlier this week, in Gonzalez v. Thaler (No. 10-895), the Supreme Court rejected Rafael Gonzalez’s pro se habeas corpus petition because it was filed about five weeks too late.  The Court did not comment on the deep irony of this decision: what Gonzalez was complaining about in his petition — the issue that the Court refused to address on the merits — was a ten-year delay between the time that he was charged and the time that he was brought to trial, allegedly in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.  That’s right — ten years, occasioned mostly by a six-year delay by the government in initiating extradition proceedings.  What’s an extra five weeks of delay by the defendant in a case that has already been delayed far longer by others?

Pretrial delay by the government and postconviction delay by the defendant are, of course, governed by different legal rules.  The government gets the very malleable and forgiving multifactor test of Barker v. Wingo.  (Depending on the jurisdiction, there may also be a somewhat more rigorous statutory test.)  The defendant, on the other hand, faces (for purposes of federal habeas) the strict one-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).  It was this one-year deadline that Gonzalez missed by five weeks.

To be sure, the priorities of the criminal-justice system appropriately shift after conviction, justifying different approaches to delay.

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