The Native American Mascot Issue Will Just Not Go Away

WISCONSIN.  In Wisconsin, the legislature is considering a bill that would give Native Americans the right to formally object to the use of a disparaging nickname by a high school in their school district.  Under the Democratic-sponsored bill, anyone who objects to the use of a race-based team name, mascot, symbol, or logo in their school district can file a complaint with the state superintendent of education.  A hearing would then be heard to determine if the name or mascot was being used in a way that was “discriminatory, or promoted student harassment or stereotyping.”  If the finding is that the use was discriminatory, the district would have one year to eliminate all use of the name or image.  If it failed to do so, the district would be subject to daily fines of $100 to $1000.

On February 25, the bill passed in the State Assembly by a vote of 51-42.  However, before passage, it was amended to exempt from the bill’s coverage any school that uses a federal-government recognized tribal name as its nickname or any district that obtains permission to use its name or logo from a federally recognized tribe.  (Consequently, the Auburndale High Apaches would not be covered by the bill.)  At the moment, the bill appears to be bottled up in the Senate where a vote has yet to be scheduled.

During the current academic year, there are still 38 Wisconsin high schools that use Native American team names, including the above-mentioned Auburndale and the all-Native American Menominee High School.  No school uses a racially-related team name referring to a group other than Native-Americans.

THE NATION’S CAPITAL.  In Washington, D. C., the Supreme Court’s refusal late last year to review a lower court holding dismissing the 1992 Lanham Act challenge to the Washington Redskins trademark filed by Native American activist Suzan Harjo has not ended the Redskins problems.  Harjo’s suit was ultimately dismissed on the basis of laches—Harjo and her fellow complaints had waited too long to challenge the 1967 trademark registration by Pro Football, Inc., the corporate name of the Washington NFL team.

However, a new effort to invalidate the Redskins trademark on disparagement grounds–Blackhorse v. Pro Football, Inc.—is currently pending before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  The plaintiffs in Blackhorse are all young Native American adults who are claiming that because of their age, they had no previous opportunity to object to the mark and thus are not bared by the lower court ruling in the Harjo litigation.  More recently, a second action has been filed by different plaintiffs attacking the legitimacy of six derivative versions of the Redskins trademark—including one for Washington Redskins Cheerleaders—filed since 1992.  These actions are seeking to deny the Washington team the right to use the name “Redskins” but they are trying to prevent the team from being able to license the mark.

NORTH DAKOTA.  Finally, the debate continues in North Dakota over the right of the University of North Dakota to continue to use the name “Fighting Sioux” for its athletic teams.  The NCAA has adopted an approach that prohibits the use of Native American team names and logos unless the tribal group bearing the name in question approves.  (More generic team Native American names like Indians, Braves, or Redmen are limited to those colleges like UNC-Pembroke or Haskell University that were founded as colleges for Native Americans.)

The problem in North Dakota is that one of the state’s two Sioux tribes (the Spirit Lake Sioux) has authorized the use of the name but the other (the Standing Rock Sioux) has not.  The State Board of Higher Education had ordered the University to begin phasing out the nickname on November 30 unless it secured the permission of both tribes.  However, the situation has reached a standstill, and the University is still using the name.  (The Fighting Sioux ice hockey team is one of the favorites in the current NCAA championship play-offs and the team squares off against Yale in a first round game on March 27.)

At the moment a number of Native-Americans are fighting to allow the University to continue its use of the name.  A petition signed by 850 members of the Standing Rock Sioux tribe is currently in circulation as pro-nickname members of the tribe try to force their leaders to schedule a plebiscite on the issue on the reservation.  (The Standing Rock Sioux also elected a pro-nickname council president last year.)

At the same time, eight members of the Spirit Lake Sioux have filed suit against the state arguing that they will be harmed if the University of North Dakota drops the Fighting Sioux nickname and that under an earlier settlement agreement between the NCAA and North Dakota, approval of the name by the Spirit Lake Sioux was sufficient for its continued use.  Their request for an injunction was denied by the state district court, but the appeal in Davidson v. State is currently before the North Dakota Supreme Court.  Apparently no action will be taken until the court rules.  Oral argument in the case is scheduled for tomorrow (March 23).

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How Much Difference Does the Small State Advantage in the Electoral College Really Make?

EV_map_081104-1400ZOne of the many unusual features of the Electoral College established by Article II, Section 1, of the United States Constitution is the provision that specifies that each state shall have “a Number of Electors equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”

The one obvious consequence of this provision is to enhance the influence of the smaller states in the selection of the president.   Because of this provision, smaller states are disproportionately represented in the Electoral College.  For example, the 12 smallest states today—Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming together account for only 17 (of 435) representatives in the House, or 3.9% of the total.  However, in the Electoral College, thanks to the “Senate bump,” the same states account for 41 electoral votes, or 7.6% of the total of 538.

Would the history of American presidential elections have been different, had this non-democratic element not been added to the Electoral College formula in 1787?  What if Electoral votes were calculated only on the basis of the number of representatives in the House of Representatives?  Have some presidential candidates been elected only because they captured the electoral votes of a disproportionate number of small states?

It turns out that the answer to the last question is yes, although the results of only three of the fifty-six presidential elections have been effected.  Not surprisingly, the three affected elections are also the three closest in American history.

The first was the Hayes-Tilden Election of 1876.  Widespread voter intimidation and corruption in the South made it impossible to determine which of the conflicting returns from South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana were accurate, and Congress ended up establishing a special Election Commission composed of Senators, Representatives, and Supreme Court justices to sort out the mess.  Apart from the merits of the Commission’s decision, the official count produced the closest finish in history, with Hayes edging Tilden by a single electoral vote, 185-184.  However, Hayes carried 21 states to Tilden’s 17.  Had it not been for the assignment of two additional electoral votes to each state, Tilden would have prevailed, the rulings of the Electoral Commission notwithstanding, 150-143.

The second affected election occurred in 1916 when Democrat Woodrow Wilson ran for reelection against Charles Evans Hughes who stepped down from the Supreme Court to run for president.  In an election in which Wilson’s slogan was the ironic “He kept us out of war,” Wilson edged Hughes by a margin of 23 electoral votes, 277-254.  In sharp contrast to the late twentieth and twenty-first century pattern, the Republican Hughes’ support was concentrated in urban areas in the North and Midwest, while Wilson was strongest in the smaller states of the West and South.  Wilson ended up carrying 30 states to Hughes’ 18, and if the two additional votes were to be subtracted for each state, Hughes would have prevailed 218-217.

The third election was the 2000 presidential election in which George W. Bush defeated Al Gore, albeit not without great controversy, by a margin of 271-266 electoral votes.  (The total electoral vote was 537  because one Gore elector refused to cast his ballot.)  As in 1916, but with the parties switched, Bush carried most of the smaller states while Gore’s support was stronger in the larger, more urban states.  With the two electoral vote bump removed, Gore would have won 225-211.

If we view the “Senate bump” in the Electoral College as undesirable, nothing short of a constitutional amendment can completely remove it.  A dramatic increase in the size of the House of Representatives, which is within the power of Congress, could have almost the same effect, in that the value of the extra two votes would be minimized, if there were, say, 870 members of the House of Representatives rather than 435.  However, a much larger House of Representatives does seem to be an item on anyone’s political agenda.

That the Electoral College with its strange features has survived for more than two centuries (and with no modification since 1804) is more than anything else a tribute to the stability of American politics and the narrowness of the American political spectrum.  Compared to most European countries, the left and the right in American politics are so close together that presidential elections usually have little real effect on the direction of the country.  The Electoral College may produce an occasional unfair result, but so far the consequences of the unfair results have not been significant enough to inspire a large numbers of Americans to demand change in the current system.

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Red Sox Jurisprudence: A Footnote

image_brooklyn_kieranIn Footnote 12 of her dissenting opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano (the controversial New Haven fire-fighters racial discrimination case), United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg makes reference to a 25-year old decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals known as Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher.  The case is mentioned in the context of Justice Ginsburg’s analysis of the legitimacy of written examinations as a way to determine which firemen were to be promoted, which is the primary issue in the case.

The First Circuit case involved an issue similar to that in Ricci, and in it the plaintiffs won a ruling overturning the state of Massachusetts’ practice of using performance on a multiple choice examination to determine which firemen were eligible for promotion.

After citing the case by name (as the third of three cases mentioned in a footnote beginning, “See also”), the opinion includes a brief quote from the decision, to the effect:

[T]here is a difference between memorizing . . . fire-fighting terminology and being a good fire fighter.  If the Boston Red Sox recruited players on the basis of their knowledge of baseball history and vocabulary, the team might acquire [players] who could not bat, pitch or catch.

For those engaged in the culture war that divides the world into Red Sox fans and Yankee fans, it may seem significant that the Supreme Court, albeit in a dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, and Breyer), implies that the quintessential American baseball team is the Boston Red Sox.  (Two of the Justices that joined her dissent, Souter and Breyer, have long-standing New England connections, and while Justice Ginsburg is normally thought of as a New Yorker, she did begin her legal education at the Harvard Law School.)

Of course, the obvious explanation for the reference to the Red Sox is the setting of the case.  As its name suggest, the Boston Chapter case was litigated in Boston; the First Circuit Court of Appeals sits in Boston; and Judge Levin H. Campbell, the author of the opinion, was a Harvard graduate who resided in the Boston area.

Born in 1927, Judge Campbell was a New Jersey native and a graduate of both Harvard College and Harvard Law School.  He had remained in Massachusetts, and prior to his appointment to the First Circuit in 1972 by President Richard Nixon, he had served as a state legislator, an assistant state Attorney General, and as a judge on Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the United States District Court for Massachusetts.  Campbell later served as Chief Judge for the First Circuit (from 1983-1990), and he assumed Senior Judge status in 1992.  At age 83, he continues to hear cases.

It is hard to know how much of a Red Sox fan Judge Campbell was in 1974.  None of his prior opinions had contained references, gratuitous or otherwise, to the Red Sox, and Google and Nexis searches fail to turn up any evidence of a rabid fandom, although it is clear that his brother, Worthington Campbell, an Episcopal priest, was a fervent supporter of the amateur Cape Cod Baseball League.  Moreover, in a case argued before him only three weeks after he issued his Boston Chapter opinion, Judge Campbell ruled that a private Little League baseball organization that used municipal facilities could not discriminate against female players.  Of course, as a public official in Massachusetts, some degree of loyalty to the Red Sox was, and is, obligatory.

Whatever Judge Campbell’s personal views on the team, September 18, 1974, the day of the Boston Chapter opinion, was a day of anguish for Red Sox nation.  For most of the 1974 season, the Red Sox had appeared to be on their way to a division championship.  As late as August 21, the team was in first place by seven games, but it soon fell into a tailspin.  By Labor Day, the lead was down to one game, and on September 5, the team fell out of first place completely and now trailed the Yankees by one-half game.  After that, it only got worse.  By September 18, the Sox were riding a three game losing streak, and their record had fallen to a mediocre 76-71.  The club was now in third place, 3.5 games behind the Yankees and 2.0 games in back of the second place Orioles.

At this point many Red Sox fans were probably beginning to question the criteria that had been used to select the team’s current players.

Who was John Kiernan?

In addition to what it may tell us about New England and the Red Sox in 1974, Campbell’s Boston Chapter opinion contains a puzzle that has never been conclusively solved.  Because it was omitted from the language quoted by Justice Ginsburg, one has to return to the text of the original opinion to discover the problem.

The actual text of the language quoted by Justice Ginsburg, without ellipses and brackets, is as follows:

The second-part questions deal with fire fighting, yet there is a difference between memorizing (or absorbing through past experience) fire fighting terminology and being a good fire fighter. If the Boston Red Sox recruited players on the basis of their knowledge of baseball history and vocabulary the team might acquire authorities like the late John Kiernan but no one who could bat, pitch or catch.”  [Emphasis added.]

The most obvious omission on the part of Justice Ginsburg is the reference to “the late John Kiernan.”  In Campbell’s opinion, it is “Kiernan” who epitomizes the separation of knowledge and real world experience that the fire department may want to avoid.  So who was John Kiernan, and why didn’t Justice Ginsburg choose to mention him when quoting from Campbell’s opinion?

The short answer to the first question is that it is not clear to whom Judge Campbell was referring.

John Kiernan was a somewhat common name in the Boston area in the first half of the 20th century, but none of the John Kiernans whose careers predate 1974 appear to have any special reputation for detailed baseball knowledge.  One possibility is the long distance runner and Spanish-American War veteran John Kiernan who in 1897 finished second in the first ever Boston Marathon.  However, this John Kiernan was an actual athlete, and there is no evidence that he was known as expert on sports.  Furthermore, he spent most of his life as a sanitation worker in New York City and passed away in 1927, the year that Judge Campbell was born, so he seems an unlikely candidate.

Based on the structure of the quotation one would have suspected that John Kiernan was a sportswriter or a journalist, or perhaps a college professor, but none of the John Kiernan’s of Boston pursued those careers.

The most likely candidate for Campbell’s “John Kiernan” is a well-known New York Times sportswriter and knowledge impresario whose name was actually John Kieran, not John Kiernan. Many different aspects of Kieran’s background strongly suggest that it was he to whom Campbell referred.

John Francis Kieran (born 1892) was the long time sports editor of the New York Times as well as a widely read sports columnist for the Times and other newspapers.  (He was the originator of the “Sports of the Times” column that still appears in the New York Times.)  He was also well known in the 1930’s and 1940’s because of his decade-long participation on the popular NBC Radio quiz show, Information Please! As a regular on the show who displayed impressive knowledge on an extraordinarily wide array of subjects, Kieran developed a national reputation as a repository of arcane information.  He was also the editor of the Information Please Almanac which was founded in the 1940’s to compete with the World Almanac as a single-volume compendium of information.  Kieran was so well known and highly regarded that his name appeared on the cover of the Almanac’s early editions.

While his reputation for expertise extended far beyond the world of bats and balls, he was of course an authority on sports and sports history.  He was, for example, the co-author of one of the first histories of the Olympic Games, and his 1941 work, The American Sporting Scene, was a widely read history of early 20th century American sport.  He is also credited with coining the phrase “grand slam” in reference to the four major men’s tennis tournaments.

After Information Please! left the radio airways in 1948, Kieran made the transition to television where he hosted a knowledge-oriented show called Kieran’s Kaleidoscope.  Furthermore, although he was a superb bridge player, Kieran was apparently not known as a talented athlete himself, presumably a requirement for person used in Campbell’s example.

Judge Campbell was eleven years old when Information Please! debuted, and like most Americans with access to a radio, he would have known about Kieran. Moreover, after his retirement from New York journalism in the 1950’s, Kieran, an amateur ornithologist, moved to Rockport, Massachusetts, which is north of Boston and within the jurisdiction of Campbell’s court.

Based on all of this, it makes perfect sense that in 1974, the 47-year old Judge Campbell would make reference to Kieran, if he was looking for someone who stood for a great degree of knowledge, but knowledge not necessarily related to experience or real world ability.  The incorrect name may well be a typographical error, but if Judge Campbell himself erred in misspelling Kieran’s name, he was hardly alone.  Google and Nexis searches reveal that Kieran’s surname was frequently misspelled Kiernan both during his lifetime and afterward.  (As recently as February 1992, the Boston Globe referred to him as “John Kiernan.”)

The only problem with the theory that Judge Campbell’s reference to “John Kiernan” was actually to John Kieran is the judge’s phrase “the late John Kiernan.”  In 1974, Kieran was very much alive and still living in Rockport, Massachusetts.  He had, in fact, just published a revised edition of his history of the Olympic Games the year before.  Kieran would live in the Bay State for another seven years before passing away at age 89 in 1981.

Of course, by 1974, Kieran had long been out of the public view, and his retirement years had been largely devoted to bird watching and nature writing.  Judge Campbell may have been unaware of Kieran’s more recent activities and simply assumed that he had passed away somewhere along the line.  Apparently, the judge’s law clerk didn’t catch either the spelling error or the mortality error either.  (Campbell’s law clerk in 1973-74 was a young University of Chicago Law School graduate named Frank Easterbrook, now a distinguished judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  However, it appears that Easterbrook had departed before the First Chapter opinion was handed down in September.)

If Kieran ever learned of the opinion’s reference to his supposed demise, he no doubt took solace in the observation of Mark Twain, one of his favorite writers, who famously quipped, “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.”Whether Kieran would have been as forgiving for Judge Campbell’s disparagement of his athletic ability is a different question.

The final question is why did Justice Ginsburg omit Kieran’s name from the portion of Campbell’s opinion that she quoted in her dissent, particularly since the concrete example provided in the original gives weight to the analogy that she is embracing.  Moreover, it is hard to believe that Justice Ginsburg would not have recognized who John Kieran was.

Justice Ginsburg was born in Brooklyn in 1933, and would have just been coming of age in New York City at the time of Kieran’s greatest popularity.  By all accounts a superb student, it seems unlikely that she would have been unaware of one of the city’s best known celebrity “intellectuals.”  (One also suspects that she was a regular listener to Information Please!)

Perhaps she omitted the name because she sensed that most Americans in 2009 would have no idea who Kieran was—which is sadly true.  Perhaps she did not want to distract the reader of the opinion who might feel tempted to stop reading and look up Kieran in Wikipedia.  Or perhaps she was thrown off by Judge Campbell’s misspelling of Kieran’s name.  She may not have realized that Campbell’s “John Kiernan” was actually the John Kieran of Information Please! fame.

On the other hand, it is only a footnote.

Cases Cited:

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).

Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 Fed.2d 1017 (1st. Cir. 1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 910 (1975).

Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975).

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