Does Larry Jansen Belong in the Right of Publicity Hall of Fame?

images (1)Former major league pitcher Larry Jansen died this week at age 89.  Although he was one of the leading pitchers in the National League in the 1950’s, he has been all but forgotten by the American public.

Students of sports history primarily remember him as the winning pitcher in one of the most famous games in baseball history, the New York Giants 5-4 victory in the 1951 one-game play-off with the Brooklyn Dodgers that determined the Senior Circuit’s representative in that year’s World Series.  This was the game that featured Giants outfielder Bobby Thomson’s dramatic walk off  home run in the bottom of the ninth inning, the so-called “Shot heard ‘round the world.”  Jansen had pitched a scoreless top of the ninth for the Giants.

During his nine-year major league career, Jansen won 122 games and lost 89 with an earned run average of 3.58, solid but not exceptional totals.  However, his career began in a blaze of glory.  After winning 30 games in 1946 for the San Francisco Seals of the minor league Pacific Coast League (a feat matched only once by any professional pitcher at any level during the subsequent 63 years), Jansen was purchased by the New York Giants.  After going 21-5 as a rookie, he recorded 18, 15, and 19 wins over the next three seasons, before compiling a 23-11, 3.04 record in the Giants championship year, 1951.

What almost no one remembers is that Jansen was also the name plaintiff in an early right of publicity case that contributed to the development of personal publicity rights as a form of “property” at a time when the future of that right was quite uncertain.  But for an even more significant decision handed down the same year in the same state, historians of the right of publicity might remember Jansen’s case as one of the most significant decisions of the post-World War II era.

In the summer of 1952, a number of New York vendors were placing cardboard photographs of New York Giant baseball players in bags of popcorn and packaging them with chewing gum.  (Presumably, they were doing this with Dodger and Yankee players as well.)  This practice was separate and apart for the baseball cards that were sold that summer by the Bowman and Topps companies that were packaging the cards with chewing gum under licenses obtained from major league players.

On August 14, 1952, with their team sitting in second place, eight games behind their archrival Brooklyn Dodgers, Jansen and six of his teammates (Bobby Thompson, Sal Maglie, Wes Westrum, Montia Kennedy, Dave Koslo, and Bill Rigney ) obtained a show cause order from New York Supreme Court Justice Samuel M. Gold requiring the Hi Lo Packing Company, Inc. (rendered Hilo in the subsequent judicial decision) and Theatre Concessions, Inc. to show why they should not be barred from continuing their practice of placing the plaintiffs’ photographs in bags of popcorn that were sold to the public without permission from the players.

Jansen and his colleagues also demanded $50,000 in damages.  Even though Jansen had won 96 games for the Giants the previous five years, postwar major league salaries were so low that players usually had to work at regular jobs in the office season.  Jansen was no different, and each fall and winter he worked in a pharmacy in Jackson Heights, New York.  There is little doubt that the extra money would have come in handy.

As luck would have it, at the Polo Grounds the next day, Jansen blew a 2-1 lead in a game with the Boston Braves when he allowed three unearned runs in the ninth inning.  (Jansen himself and Bobby Thompson both made errors that inning.)  In fact, after he filed the lawsuit, Jansen’s career went into a tailspin.  He failed to win another game during the 1952 season and never again had a winning season in the major leagues.  (Presumably, this was just a coincidence.)

Jansen and his teammates were represented by Jonah J. Shapiro, a well-known New York sports and entertainment lawyer.  By the time the case went to trial, Harry Horowitz’s businesses Model Airplanes, Inc. and Hit Parade, Inc. had been joined as defendants, at least one of whom was packaging player photographs with chewing gum without permission from the players.

Jansen’s suit was technically not a right of publicity action—that term would not be coined until the following year.  His action was brought under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights law which was usually characterized as the New York “privacy statute,” and which provided as follows:

Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without [such person’s] written consent …  may … sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.

The defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs players had failed to state a cause of action, because the baseball players, as public figures, had “waived” their right to be left alone, which was, they argued, the sole purpose of the statute.  At issue were the implications of the decision of New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, in Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, which had been decided on July 15, 1952, less than a month before Jansen and his teammates filed their action.

In that case, Gautier, an animal trainer, sued the Washington Redskins and others for allowing his act, performed at the half-time of an NFL game in 1948, to be televised by the ABC television network which was also broadcasting the game.  The court ruled in that case that no violation of Section 51 had occurred.  Although the court’s rationale was a bit convoluted, there was language in the opinion that seemed to suggest that professional entertainers, like animal trainers and presumably major league baseball players, waived their right to sue for invasion of privacy under Section 51 because they clearly sought out the public spotlight.

The hearing on the motion to dismiss occurred on November 14, 1952, before a Judge Cavagan.  In a brief opinion, 202 Misc. 900 (1952), Cavagan agreed with Jansen’s attorney that the Gautier decision had not ruled out actions under Section 51 when the likenesses of baseball players were clearly being used to aid in the sale of non-baseball related items.  In that regard, he found the present case similar to, and still controlled by, an earlier New York case, Lane v. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, aff’d 256 A. D. 1065 (1939), in which the actress Judy Lane had successfully argued that Section 51 prevented Woolworth’s from including her photograph without her permission in inexpensive lockets sold in its five and ten cent stores.

Judge Cavagan’s ruling was appealed by the defendants, but the ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court slightly more than a year later, on November 17, 1953.  In a memorandum opinion, the five-judge court unanimous confirmed the decision of the lower court without further elaboration.  282 A. D. 935 (1953).

However, by the time that the appellate division issued its ruling, the United States Circuit Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit had handed down its landmark right of publicity decision in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (1953), another case in which lawyer Jonas J. Shapiro served as counsel.  In Haelen, the court ruled that baseball players had not just a right of privacy under Sec. 51 but also a common law property right in their name and images.  As a result, the Haelan decision rendered the final decision in the Jansen case less significant than it might have been.  Without Haelan, Jansen’s case likely would have seemed much more important and might well have played a much more visible role in the development of the right of the publicity in its formative era.

It is also not clear if Jansen ever benefitted directly from the decision in his case.  By the time the final decision was handed down, he was pretty much finished as a pitcher.  In 1954, he pitched in only 13 games for the Giants (after averaging 39 games per season the previous seven years), and on July 12, 1954, he was unceremoniously released by the Giants and had to return to the minor leagues.  It seems unlikely that anyone was going to rush to get in line to pay Larry Jansen for the right to put his photo in popcorn bags after the 1953 season.

As a case, Jansen v. Hilo Packing Company has not been completely ignored.  It has been cited in six subsequent judicial opinions, including the landmark right of publicity decisions Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 N. J. Super 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. Div. 1967) and the recent C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E. D. Mo. 2006).  It has also been cited in six law review articles and the Restatement 2d of Torts.

In many ways, the case of Jansen v. Hilo Packing resembles the baseball career of Larry Jansen.  At one point, it looked like both the pitcher and the case were headed for historical significance.  Instead, they both ended up as important parts of the respective historical records of major league baseball and the right of publicity, but in the end neither turned out to be of Hall of Fame caliber.

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President Chester A. Arthur and the Birthers, 1880’s Style

arthurThe Obama citizenship “debate” has surprisingly brought former president Chester A. Arthur (1829-1886) back into the pages of American newspapers, which is no small feat.  Unlike President Obama, who is clearly eligible to hold the nation’s highest office, Arthur, the twenty-first president (1881-84), may well have been an “unconstitutional” president.

Although Arthur is frequently seen as Millard Fillmore primary competition for the title of “Most Obscure President in U.S. History,” the circumstances of his birth have raised questions eeriely similar to those asked about President Barack Obama by the birthers.

Before 1880, Chester Arthur was a minor New York City politician who was a protégé of Sen. Roscoe Conkling of the Empire State.  Although he was a prominent lawyer, he had never run for, let alone held, elective office at any level.  Nevertheless, at the 1880 Republican Presidential Convention in Chicago, he was added to the Republican national ticket as the running mate of presidential candidate James Garfield.  Arthur was selected to balance the slate geographically — Garfield was from Ohio, part of the Midwest in an era when regions mattered — and to placate Sen. Conkling, a presidential aspirant himself and the leader of the Stalwart faction of the Republican Party.

In 1871, President Grant, with Conkling’s blessings, had appointed Arthur to the lucrative position as Collector of the Port of New York.  However, seven years later, he had been removed from that position by President Rutherford B. Hayes, as part of a presidential effort to crack down on the spoils system.  Although there was no evidence of real corruption at the custom house while Arthur was Collector, it was also clear that Arthur had no objections to padding the Collector’s payroll with loyal Republicans. Once elected, Arthur remained loyal to Conkling and the spoils system, and he and Garfield clashed repeatedly on questions of federal appointments, which led Garfield to ban Arthur from the White House.

However, on July 2, 1881, Garfield was assassinated by Charles Guiteau, a deranged supporter of Conkling, who, after shooting the president, shouted, “I am a Stalwart of the Stalwarts . . . Arthur is president now!”  Guiteau’s two shots actually did not prove to be fatal, and Garfield lived until September 19, when he was finally done in by a combination of infection and poor medical care.

Although he was a product of, and, at least initially, a supporter of the spoils system, as president Arthur actually turned out to be fairly progressive and a strong supporter of civil service reform.  In 1883, he signed the Pendleton Act, which established the first Civil Service Commission.  Although he sought his party’s presidential nomination for 1885, he was not renominated by the Republican Party.  Even so, he left office widely respected by members of both parties.  Even Mark Twain begrudgingly acknowledged that “it would be hard indeed to better President Arthur’s administration.”

Questions of Arthur’s eligibility for the nation’s highest office surfaced during the 1880 campaign.  Arthur was the son of an Irishman who emigrated first to Canada and the then to the United States, and who finally became a naturalized United States citizen in 1843, fifteen years after his son Arthur’s birth in 1829.  Arthur’s mother was a United States citizen born in Vermont but whose family emigrated to Canada where she met and married her husband.  By the time of Arthur’s birth, his parents had moved back to Vermont.

The controversy over Arthur’s citizenship status centers around the place of Arthur’s actual birth.  By one account he was born in his family’s home in Franklin County, Vermont.  If this was true, then he was clearly a natural born citizen.  On the other hand, the competing account has it that he was born during his pregnant mother’s visit to her family’s home in Canada.

If the latter story is true, then Arthur was technically foreign-born, and in 1829, citizenship in such cases passed to the child only if the father was a United States citizen, and, of course, at this point Arthur’s father was still a citizen of the British Empire.

The principal advocate of the “born in Canada” theory was Arthur’s fellow New York lawyer Arthur P. Hinman who was hired in 1880 by the Democratic Party to investigate Arthur’s ancestry.  Hinman initially undermined his owned credibility by embracing an argument that Arthur was himself born in Ireland and didn’t come to the United States until he was fourteen years old.  That story was patently false and easily disproven.

However, Hinman later discovered acquaintances of the Arthur family in Canada who told him the story of Arthur’s accidental Canadian birth.  Convinced that he now had proof of Arthur’s foreign citizenship, he published his findings in 1884 in a short book entitled How a Subject of the British Empire Became President of the United States.  Hinman’s book appeared near the end of Arthur’s presidency, and no official action was ever taken on the basic of his alleged evidence.

Arthur himself always insisted that he was born in Vermont, but he may not have known the place of his birth. By the time he was six years old, his family had left Vermont for New York, and he never lived in the Green Mountain State again.  It is possible that his parents considered the circumstances of his Canadian birth to be personally embarrassing and never shared the details of the story with him.

An investigation by the Boston Globe earlier this year — no doubt inspired by the Birther controversy — confirmed that there are no official records regarding Arthur’s birth in either Vermont or in Canada.  See Boston Globe, “Chester Arthur Rumor Still Lingers in Vermont,” August 17, 2009.

We will probably never know if Arthur was really eligible to be president of the United States in 1881.

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What The Birthers Have Taught Us About Barack Obama And The Constitution

The campaign to prove that Barack Obama is not eligible to serve as president of the United States, carried out by certain opponents who have become known as “Birthers,” has succeeded in establishing (1) that Obama is in fact eligible to be president and (2) that Article II, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, which lists the eligibility requirements for the presidency, leaves a number of unanswered questions.

Article II, Section 1, provides, in part:

No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

Unfortunately, neither the Constitution itself nor the documentary record pertaining to its drafting and ratification in the 1780’s provides any additional insight into what the framers specifically meant by the phrase “natural born citizen.”

Because of the absence of specific standards, Congress has been forced to define what the phrase means, which it has done in a series of citizenship and immigration acts dating from 1790.

Certain factors definitely make one a “natural born citizen.” It has always been accepted that any white person, and since 1870, any person of any race, actually born in the United States is eligible to be elected president once they reach the age of 35 and have been 14 years a resident. (Male gender was never a prerequisite, even when women were denied the right to vote. That is how Belva Lockwood could run for president in 1884 as the candidate of the National Equal Rights Party.)

It has also been accepted from the beginning that a person born outside the United States with two citizen parents is a natural born citizen. Although no president has ever fallen into this category, a number of actual and potential presidential candidates have, including turn-of-the-last-century Supreme Court Justice David Brewer (born in the Ottoman Empire), nineteenth-century Republican politician John S. Wise (Brazil); Michigan Governor George Romney (Mexico), and 2008 Republican nominee John McCain (Canal Zone).

What is less clear is (1) what constitutes the United States for “born in” purposes, i.e., which territories, if any, are included, and (2) what is the citizenship status of an individual born outside the United States with only a single citizen parent. Congress has answered these questions differently in different eras.

Had Barack Obama actually been born in Kenya, as some Birthers claim, he would have fallen into the category of having been born outside the United States with one citizen parent and one alien parent. (Of course, he wasn’t born in Kenya; he was born in Hawaii, after it had become the 50th state.)
Originally, citizenship in such situations passed through the father. If the father of a foreign-born individual was a United States citizen, then the individual was a “natural born Citizen” regardless of the nationality of his or her mother. To become a U.S. citizen, a foreign-born or “outside the U.S.-born” individual with a citizen mother and an alien father had to go through the naturalization process and was not eligible to run for president of the United States.

This was a feature of the original American naturalization statute of 1790, and was a provision that was retained throughout the nineteenth century and through the first third of the twentieth. In fact, the United States citizenship of the mother could not be passed on to a foreign-born child until Congress changed the naturalization laws in 1934.

At the time of Barack Obama’s birth in 1962, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 provided that

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:
* * *
(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years . . .

This proviso shall be applicable to persons born on or after December 24, 1952, to the same extent as if it had become effective in its present form on that date . . . .

Were Obama actually born outside of the United States, then it would appear that under this statute he would not be a “citizen of the United States at birth.” His father was unquestionably a citizen of Kenya, then part of the British Empire, and his eighteen-year-old mother could not have lived in the United States for a minimum of five years after obtaining the age of fourteen. (She could not have done this because she was only 18 when he was born on August 4, 1961. She did not meet the five years “after attaining the age of fourteen years” requirement until the following November 29, when Obama was almost four months old.) Consequently, under this counterfactual scenario, Barack Obama would appear to be ineligible to be president.

However, on November 14, 1986, when Obama was twenty-five years old, Congress enacted an amendment to the above statute, which substituted “five years, at least two” for “ten years, at least five” in the language describing the length of time the citizen parent had to live in the United States after age fourteen. This new standard, unlike the one adopted in 1952 and in effect in 1962, was met by Obama’s mother when she turned 16, more than two years before the birth of her son.

Moreover, according to it terms, this amendment, like the section itself, applied retroactively to anyone born after December 24, 1952, which, of course, included Barack Obama.

Whether or not Congress has the power to reclassify someone as a “United States citizen at birth” after twenty-five years of being classified as not “a United States citizen at birth” is an interesting constitutional question. Could Congress, for example, make the Austrian-born Arnold Schwarzenegger, who had no U.S. citizen parents, eligible to run for president by adopting a statute that defined “natural born citizen” as someone born after gestating in his biological mother’s womb? Presumably not, but why wouldn’t that logic apply to the 1986 amendment? Is it possible that a person such as our hypothetical foreign-born Obama who had a too-young citizen mother could be a citizen of the United States at birth (under the revised statute) but nevertheless not eligible under Article II, Section I?

Fortunately, we do not have to address the question of the retroactive application of the 1986 amendment and its relation to Article II, Section I, because President Obama really was born in the United States.

However, the birthers have provided us with a very interesting civics lesson regarding presidential eligibility, and now most of us know much more about Article II, Section I than we ever did before.

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