Law Student and PILS Fellow Morgan Kaplan Describes the “Steps” Required of a Pro Se “Movant” in Family Court in Milwaukee County

Milwaukee County CourthouseEarly this semester, I had the privilege of meeting with Marquette law students who this past summer held Public Interest Law Society fellowships. These 25 individuals worked at organizations, geographically from Wisconsin to Chicago to Washington, D.C., with a variety of focuses—including public defender offices, legal services organizations, prosecutor’s offices, government agencies, and civil rights entities, scarcely to exhaust the list.

I learned so much from the conversation, arranged by Angela F. Schultz, assistant dean for public service at the Law School. Much of it would be worth relating, and I encourage everyone in our law school community to converse with one or more of our impressive PILS fellows.

In this post, with thanks to (and permission from) Morgan Kaplan, a second-year student, I want to highlight briefly one phenomenon that she observed this summer as a PILS fellow working at the Milwaukee Justice Center. More specifically, she described for the group some of the difficulties faced by pro se litigants hoping to modify family court orders in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.

Here is the description, which I asked her to write up:

One might hope that filing a motion to modify a family court order would be a relatively straightforward proposition—perhaps even that a party could bring in the completed paperwork, drop it off (file it) in one place, and move on to preparing for the court date or other tasks.

This is not the case. Rather than a simplified process that promotes access to the civil justice system, pro se litigants must navigate a sea of forms and offices, even after they have filled out the modification form (the motion). The Milwaukee Justice Center has prepared a sort of map—a checklist—to guide their journey. Let’s travel with them.

1. Those who are eligible for a fee waiver, either based on income or receipt of public benefits, will start in Room 104, the Clerk of Court’s office, to have their fee waiver notarized.

2. That’s just notarization: Having the fee waiver approved requires a trip up to the Chief Judge’s office in Room 609. Once those interested have an approved fee waiver, then they can move on to the next steps to file the motion.

3. It’s time for filing. This happens in Room 104, the Clerk of Court’s office (a second time for those using a fee waiver). There, interested parties will either show their fee waiver or pay a filing fee, giving the original documents to the clerk. We may now call them “movants.”

4. Then they will move upstairs (a second time for those with a fee waiver)—all the way to Room 707—to visit the office of the Family Court Commissioner. There, movants will hand all remaining copies of the motion to the calendar desk and get a hearing date, which will be stamped on all copies of the motion.

5. If the desired modification—the relief requested by the motion—involves a child support order, movants will head back down to Room 101, the Milwaukee County Child Support Office, to drop off a copy of the motion there as well.

6. After those three stops (five, in fact, for those with a fee waiver), movants will head over to the Safety Building, Room 102 (connected to the courthouse via skywalk), to fill out paperwork in hopes of having the Milwaukee County Sheriff serve the other party (if a county resident) with a final copy of the motion.

We all know that the processes of our civil justice system were not created with unrepresented litigants in mind, yet no one doubts that cases with such pro se litigants, in fact, predominate in family courts across the country. We may well ask whether we have taken enough steps to facilitate access to justice for these pro se litigants.

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Participation in Pro Bono Work and Law Student Well-Being—Any Correlation?

Assistant Dean Angela Schultz
Assistant Dean Angela Schultz

Last week I posted about Marquette Law School’s list—one faculty member, one staff colleague, and one student—for the honor roll of the Pro Bono and Access to Justice Section of the Association of American Law Schools. I explained that I relied on the expertise of Angela F. Schultz, assistant dean for public service at the Law School.

As we begin this week—the sixth of the semester, remarkable to say—I want again to draw on Dean Schultz’s work, perhaps every more directly. In particular, permit me to highlight for you—and direct you to—a post that she recently made on the University of St. Thomas School of Law’s Holloran Center Professional Identity Implementation Blog. Here is a taste of it, as we say in the blogosphere:

I have been at Marquette Law School for eleven years. Over the years, I have witnessed students become more willing and able to identify and discuss mental health challenges they have faced in their own lives—challenges the students themselves have described as stress, anxiety, depression, and sometimes as trauma. I remember one recent student who lost both parents during their first year of law school. Another student took a leave of absence and was hospitalized for severe anxiety. If you work with law students, you also know some of the challenges facing students’ well-being.

I can think of three recent conversations where students identified their involvement in pro bono service as being among the factors that ultimately aided them on a path towards wellness. These three students’ experiences are not unique. Each year, we evaluate student experience in pro bono clinics. Comments from a recent survey included: “This work reminds me why I came to law school in the first place.” “I was afraid of working one-on-one with a client because I didn’t realize I already had skills that could be helpful.” “I feel connected to the people served in the clinic. These are my people.”

Dean Schultz’s post is thoughtful and engaging. I invite you to read the whole thing here—and to gain an insight or two. I was glad to do so.

Continue ReadingParticipation in Pro Bono Work and Law Student Well-Being—Any Correlation?

Can Common Carrier Principles Control Dominance by Twitter and Google?

Prof. Jim Speta
Prof. Jim Speta

The Robert F. Boden Lecture is an annual highlight at Marquette University Law School, public health permitting. After a COVID-19 hiatus in 2020 and 2021—true community events require being in person—the Boden Lecture resumed yesterday. It did so most impressively, with Jim Speta, the Elizabeth Froehling Horner Professor at Northwestern University’s Pritzker School of Law, as Marquette Law School’s distinguished visitor.

For his lecture, Professor Speta took up “The Past’s Lessons for Today: Can Common Carrier Principles Make for a Better Internet?” The topic is especially timely in light of the Fifth Circuit’s decision last Friday upholding a Texas state law regulating internet platforms. Here is a taste of it:

In this lecture, I will address both the dominance of the internet platforms and the calls to regulate them as common carriers. To begin to define our terms, this reference to the platforms means the dominance by Google and Facebook, by Amazon and Apple (and to a lesser extent by Twitter and Microsoft), of the ways we receive information, exchange it, even understand it. The main concern is that these platforms are biased, that they discriminate, that they foreclose speech. That is why, today, platform critics—including governments—are reaching for the traditional law of railroads and of telephone companies: the law of common carriage. That once-dominant law forbade discrimination. In addition to the Texas and Florida statutes . . . , one Supreme Court Justice has written in favor of platform-focused common carrier regulation, as have numerous federal and state lawmakers, some academics, and numerous commentators. Bills have been offered or are pending in Congress and in many states, including Wisconsin.

I think the proposals for common carrier regulation of platforms are very right—and very wrong. I think they are right to worry about the dominance of internet platforms, and they are right that common carrier law, even though it smells musty and over the past few decades has largely been discarded in the United States, can be part of the solution. I think they are very wrong to target common carrier solutions at the platforms’ core operations themselves—to change the ways in which users are permitted access, content is moderated, and search results are provided. Such platform regulation does not fit the common carrier model. Platforms are not merely conduits of user behavior, although they are partly that. Platforms also seek to create a particular kind of speech experience that holds the attention of their users. If we are required to have an analogy to an old form of media, platforms are more like newspapers and broadcasters than telephone companies, though I think the best single analogy is to bookstores. Newspapers, broadcasters, and bookstores curate the content they offer their customers, and common carrier rules have never applied to them. Even more concerning, laws directly controlling platforms simply give the government unprecedented power over the content experiences these private companies seek to create. I think it almost certainly violates the First Amendment and that the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the contrary is quite wrong.

Instead, here’s what we can do: we can and should at least try to address concerns about the currently dominant platforms by using law to make it easier to have more platforms. This is, truly, the essential argument that I will make: Common carrier solutions should be targeted at the infrastructure that enables platforms to be built and to reach consumers. When we think about platforms, we usually think about the ways that users interact directly with Google or Twitter or the other services. But, in fact, myriad companies provide infrastructure and services that both enable user access and platform operation—companies that transmit data, such as the cable companies and other internet services providers that carry data, companies that host websites and platforms, and services such as website defense or payment processing that support both new and established platforms. In the past, these providers have denied services to some new platforms that sought to establish alternative services. Applying a lighter-touch (and differently placed) version of common carrier regulation to the internet’s support providers, I will seek to convince you, can increase the possibility of alternative platforms. This is our best hope to enrich our speech choices and ecosystem without government censorship.

One may read the entire lecture here, even in advance of its publication next year in the Marquette Law Review and Marquette Lawyer.

I am well familiar with the common carrier regime that Professor Speta invokes, as he explains, for inspiration (see, for example, here and here for some of my own relevant past). This Boden Lecture strikes me as a deeply important and unusually judicious contribution to the current debate, well, raging, it is not too much to say, about appropriate public policy in this internet age.

That Professor Speta deftly interweaves references to past Boden lecturers, such as Columbia’s Professor Thomas W. Merrill (2010) and UCLA’s Professor Eugene Volokh (2006), is a fine local touch. Yet his lecture merits engagement nationally.

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