When the Answer is No: Constitutional Protection for Faith Healing?

The tragic case of  Kara Neumann highlights one of the problems with robust protection for the free exercise of religion. Kara died of untreated diabetes because her parents chose to pray rather than take her to the doctor. Both have been convicted of second degree reckless homicide. How does their prosecution square with robust protection of religious freedom?

The difficulty with strong free exercise protection is not simply how to cabin the freedom (by saying that the state may restrict it only if necessary to serve a compelling state interest) but how to define what constitutes a religious claim and to assess the strength of the religious claim asserted. The problem is that the notion of religious freedom cuts against the evaluation of the strength or reasonableness of religious claims and that leaves us with a potential universe of claims that is limited only by Revelation or imagination. That is no limit at all.

This is, I think, one of the reasons that the United States Supreme Court  has not afforded generous protection to free exercise, holding that neutral laws of general applicability not aimed at suppressing religious exercise are not subject to heightened scrutiny. But Wisconsin interprets the protection of religious belief and freedom of conscience included in its Constitution differently.

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Reinert on the Actual Success of Bivens Claims and Its Implications for the Constitutional Rights of Federal Employees

Alex Reinert (Cardozo) has posted on SSRN his forthcoming article in the Stanford Law Review: Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model.

Here’s the abstract:

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Constitution provides a cause of action in damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment by individual federal officers. The so-called “Bivens” cause of action — initially extended to other constitutional provisions and then sharply curtailed over the past two decades — has been a subject of controversy among academics and judges since its creation. The most common criticism of Bivens — one that has been repeated in different venues for thirty years — is that the Court’s individual liability model, in which the offending officer is personally liable in damages, should be abandoned in favor of a governmental liability model akin to respondeat superior liability.

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In Defense of Negative Spaces

ABT--OffsideBBCEd Fallone’s post last week on finding negative space in the Constitution got me to thinking about the uses – and dangers – of metaphors in legal thinking. What does it mean for there to be “negative space” in the Constitution. We could think of it, as Ed does, like the open areas in a soccer match (or, for that matter, a football game). Creating negative space opens possibilities. Drawing a defender away creates opportunities.

Ed’s post plays off the fact that the United States Constitution, unlike the Wisconsin Constitution, creates a government of enumerated – and not plenary – powers. (This is one of the reasons that the state constitution looks rather different than the federal charter.) Ed sees the negative spaces as areas of opporunity, but emphasizes filling those “empty spaces” where the Constitution has not created federal authority with … federal authority. The negative space is for government – at least where exigency is thought to be served by the expansion of state authority.

It will surprise precisely no one that I see it differently. In fact, to continue our soccer metaphor, improperly invading them (as the image at the top of this post illustrates) leaves us offside.

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