Running Away from History in Trump v. Slaughter

[This piece is cross-posted and was originally published in the Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment blog.] On December 8, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the landmark case of Trump v. Slaughter. A fundamental issue in the case is whether the statutorily created office of Commissioner for the FTC can include partial restrictions on the President’s ability to remove a Commissioner. The government contends that the statutory removal restrictions impinge on an indefeasible Presidential removal power under Article II.  

While the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Seila Law and Collins have recognized an indefeasible Presidential removal power for some officers, a flood of recent research has undermined historical arguments for a categorical rule that would extend removal at pleasure to all officers or all principal officers. For summaries of this historical literature see Chabot, Katz, Rosenblum & Manners, Nelson, Katz & Gienapp. (My latest paper, The Interstitial Executive: A View from the Founding, adds more fuel to the fire: it introduces a critical body of previously overlooked archival evidence to show that the Washington, Adams, and Jefferson administrations routinely complied with statutory removal restrictions in their officer commissions.)

The government’s reply brief banked on recent precedent from the Roberts Court. It leaned into Seila Law and the unitary understanding of the Decision of 1789 that the Court adopted in that case.  At the same time, the government offered an extension of Seila Law that would create further conflicts with the historical record.

Both Seila Law and the officers created pursuant to the Decision of 1789 involved departments led by single officers. Neither Seila Law nor the Decision of 1789 involved statutory tenure protections for officers serving on multimember commissions such as the Federal Reserve or the FTC. As a result, Seila Law is not necessarily at odds with historical evidence supporting these independent multimember commissions.  Some of the strongest Founding era examples of tenure-protected officers were those serving on multimember commissions such as the Sinking Fund Commission (described in my work here and here) and the Revolutionary War Debt Commission (described in recent work by Victoria Nourse as well as my new paper).  

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Judge Scudder Discusses “Resorting to Courts” in an Exemplary Hallows Lecture

Honorable Michael Y. ScudderThe Hon. Michael Y. Scudder, judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, delivered this year’s Hallows Lecture, yesterday evening, to more than 200 individuals in Eckstein Hall’s Lubar Center. The lecture was exemplary.

The E. Harold Hallows Lecture is an annual highlight at Marquette University Law School. Most often delivered by a judge, the lecture is an opportunity to welcome into our community an accomplished individual from whom all of us interested in the law—students, faculty, other judges, lawyers, and all manner of interested individuals—might learn.

This was not Judge Scudder’s first trip to Marquette Law School, as he presided at the Jenkins Honors Moot Court Finals in 2023 (his similar service in 2021, during the COVID era, having been undertaken remotely by Teams). The judge keeps close to law schools, it would seem—for example, teaching national security law at the University of Chicago Law School and advanced federal jurisdiction at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. Judge Scudder’s interest in legal education, especially in the Seventh Circuit’s region of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana, is impressive and inspiring more generally.

Judge Scudder’s Hallows Lecture was titled “Resorting to Courts: Article III Standing as the Guardian of Free Speech & Democratic Self-Governance.” It proceeds in two main parts.

The first half explains and defends the standing requirement in federal courts. The judge describes the precept’s basis in the “Cases” or “Controversies” requirement of Article III of the Constitution, defends it as a structural limitation on the exercise of judicial power, yet acknowledges the ideological lens through which many individuals seem to view standing issues. The lecture offers a defense of the cases and a strong, institutions-based justification of the concept.

The lecture’s second half explores the relationship between the Case or Controversy requirement and free speech. It emphasizes that the standing requirement—particularly by disfavoring pre-enforcement facial challenges to government policies on very broad grounds—appropriately encourages people to hash out their differences in forums envisioned and intended as policy-setting. This half laments the echo chambers into which many individuals have placed themselves in our society and hopes that more open, respectful, and constructive dialogue, outside of courts, can occur to sort out the “cultural” issues and policies needing resolution at all levels of government.

Here’s a flavor:

. . . . This is how Article III’s limitation on the exercise of judicial power leaves policymaking, and the difficult line drawing it often entails, to the exercise of free speech. Speaking up, objecting, and sharing perspectives with those who differ from us is how we understand, persuade, and, often, find common ground where agreement seems beyond reach.

If that framing is too idealistic in today’s times, I would hope skeptics would at least recognize that the alternative—permitting very difficult legal questions to come to federal court based only on a showing of a genuine worry—casts a vote of little confidence in the role speech can play in finding solutions, or perhaps tolerable compromises, to some of the most divisive questions of our day. And even if these culture war lawsuits should not be viewed as a vote of confidence in federal courts as the ultimate decision makers, they put great pressure on principles of restraint designed to allow democratic processes—whether at the national or local level—to offer answers and outlets for persuasion and compromise in the first instance.

Our constitutional design envisions constitutional answers coming in slower-paced increments than contemplated by pre-enforcement facial challenges like the one Parents Protecting Our Children lodged against the Eau Claire policy. It is not happenstance that the architect who designed the Supreme Court, Cass Gilbert, thought the tortoise an appropriate decorative and symbolic feature for the building’s design. In the same way tortoises move slowly, sometimes the law develops best when principles, doctrines, and answers come with time and, I might add, with more speech and dialogue helping to bridge social divides. Pre-enforcement facial challenges, however, often result in expansive injunctions that apply in one fell swoop—the sort of forward-looking policymaking that is best left to the more democratic branches.

Judge Scudder’s lecture was outstanding, even beyond its timeliness. While versions of it will appear in the fall Marquette Law Review and Marquette Lawyer, one can watch the lecture here or read a working copy of it here.

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Election 2024: Misconceptions About the Future of Reproductive Freedom

Rare is the presidential election in which American voters do not get peppered with the message that the choice to be confronted poses an alternative of monumental importance.

No less rare is the presidential election in which candidates and their surrogates refrain from accusing opponents of misrepresenting facts sufficiently often that even Pinocchio and Charles Ponzi would blush.

In these respects, the current contest—despite its conspicuous differences from those that preceded it—mirrors rather than diverges from those of the past.

Donald Trump’s uneasy relationship with truth provides full-time employment for factcheckers who once needed to supplement their incomes in other ways.

Tim Walz’s missteps have afforded folks thirsty for credibility no shortage of opportunities to demonstrate that the Fourth and Fifth estates hold Democrats to standards approaching the rigor to which they hold Republicans and their surrogates.

Yet one particular set of representations that has assumed a central role in the campaign continues to go unexamined, unchecked, unexplored.  And, oddly enough, this neglect spans the breadth of the ideological spectrum, from Tom Cotton to AOC, from Fox News to MSNBC, from the Wall Street Journal, National Review, Heritage, and Cato to the New Republic, Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, Slate, Mother Jones, CNN, and Brookings.

The Democratic ticket seeks to persuade the nation that the status of reproductive rights for women and their families will undergo a massive change should the Harris/Walz ticket emerge victorious. More specifically, the ticket would have us believe that its victory would lead to increased protection at the national level for these aspects of liberty guaranteed from 1973 up to the cataclysm that goes by the name Dobbs.

But the premise of such an argument remains flawed.

And it remains flawed for at least three reasons.

One is that the status of this once-upon-a-time freedom under federal constitutional law is certain to remain as it stands today for at least the next generation: non-existent. Put simply, while left-leaning law professors exhaled in the aftermath of the 1992 reaffirmation of Roe announced by a trio of Justices appointed by Presidents Reagan (O’Connor and Kennedy) and Bush 1 (Souter), opponents of abortion rights continued their effort to cobble together a coalition targeted to upend Roe and its progeny. A focused slice of the endeavor was to identify, cultivate, and elevate to the nation’s highest court individuals committed to the proposition that the reproductive liberty of women and their families was worthy of less constitutional protection than the potential life being carried by a pregnant woman.

Mitch McConnell knew well that a Justice Merrick Garland would pose an unwelcome obstacle to these efforts. After all, McConnell’s mama didn’t raise no fool. The Garland nomination thus withered on the 2016 vine.

The Trump Justices—Neal Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett—promptly completed the task with surgical-strike dispatch, joining Justices Alito and Thomas to remove the very federal constitutional protection that had been enshrined a half century earlier.  To boot, that quintet received a crucial assist from an unlikely source:  Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Yes: Historians will sidestep the contribution to the pro-life movement made by Justice Ginsburg in resisting overtures to retire during the second Obama term. That assist nevertheless looms large. It will continue to grow in magnitude even as pro-choice advocates who dominate the nation’s law schools raise their glasses to toast RBG at every opportunity. And do so at the very moment at which more than a few women across the nation scour the web for information about jurisdictions that will allow them to end an unwanted pregnancy.

A second reason pro-choice Americans should be skeptical about the changes a Harris/Walz administration would usher in concerns the prospects for Congress passing a law that would guarantee women the reproductive freedom recently lost by virtue of Dobbs.  Simple arithmetic reveals why.

Rare is the prognosticator who believes Democrats will control each house of Congress come January. And even were such an unlikely development to unfold the same simple arithmetic reveals that the filibuster would be employed successfully in the Senate to prevent a national pro-choice law from reaching the floor for a vote. Quite simply: The talk of “codifying” Roe is now and over the coming few years will remain just that:  talk.

Yet suppose pro-choice Americans persist in convincing themselves that my analysis misfires.

Suppose a Harris/Walz administration, assisted by a Democratic Congress, magically transforms the status quo and—poof!—brings into existence a national law that codifies reproductive freedom.

All this merely leads to the third reason a Harris/Walz administration will not succeed at restoring reproductive freedom at the national level. Unpacking this third reason to make it accessible to Americans whose attention span gets briefer with each passing day represents no easy task. But the daunting nature of the challenge has  nothing to do with why the Harris/Walz campaign has steered clear of any effort to do so.

The same Supreme Court majority that delivered us Dobbs construes the enumerated powers of Congress narrowly.

Very narrowly.

More specifically: A core tenet of contemporary conservative jurisprudence is that the commerce power—the constitutional power that has anchored the bulk of law enacted at the national level since the New Deal—is permitted to reach only activities that are genuinely national in scope. Every indication is that the current Supreme Court views reproductive freedom as not such an activity.

Now: It matters not a whit that you, or I, or a pregnant neighbor down the block discerns that a self-evident paradox of Dobbs is to suffuse the plight of pregnant women with concerns that affect interstate commerce and mobility.

What matters, instead, is this: The same Supreme Court majority that refused to acknowledge the close and substantial relationship reproductive liberty bears to other long-established constitutional freedoms will be the majority telling us that views harbored by our eighteenth century “Framers” about subjects worthy of national legislative attention foreclose the authority of a twenty-first century Congress to pass a law that safeguards reproductive freedom without violating core tenets harbored by James Madison and his peers. Put bluntly, no such “codification” of Roe signed by President Harris would survive the scrutiny of what not all that long ago was dubbed the Roberts Court.

Candidate Richard Nixon’s “secret” plan to end the Vietnam war remained a secret for sufficiently long that America’s involvement in that conflict lingered until well after Nixon had left the Oval Office in disgrace.

The vow that emerged from the lips of candidate Bush 1—“no new taxes”—proved demonstrably false by the end of the second year of his administration.

A similar fate awaits the repeated suggestion that a Harris/Walz administration will bring about protection at the national level for reproductive freedom. In point of fact, the safeguards in place for that freedom at the national level when a hypothetical Harris/Walz administration comes to a close will bear an uncanny resemblance to the status of such safeguards today: regrettably non-existent.

Yet uttering that truth aloud—let alone doing so at the climax of a campaign during which the Harris/Walz ticket has sought to leverage the issue for all the votes it can garner—would make for a miserably disappointing rally. And a thirty-second television spot that would galvanize neither the Democratic base nor pro-choice Republicans who find themselves at the vital center in battleground states.

To paraphrase that Jack Nicholson line:  We can’t handle the truth.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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