The Boston Case: Moving the Line on the Public Safety Exception

My practice is nearly exclusively a criminal appellate practice, and it’s been that way for almost 10 years. Being a one-trick pony, I can’t help but think about legal issues in the news in the context of an imaginary appeal. Of course, recently the news was flooded with stories about the Boston Marathon bombing. The issue that grabbed my interest the most was all of the talk centered on not informing captured suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev his Miranda rights pursuant to the public safety exception.

The idea behind the public safety exception makes sense: gathering information from a suspect to ward off an immediate threat. The exception was originally created nearly 20 years ago, but in the past 10 years or so, has become stretched (some say past recognition) to deal with terrorist threats. But that’s neither here nor there — the public safety exception and the suppression of evidence obtained from it is a trial lawyer’s concern.

First, told or not told, Tsarnaev has all of the same rights every American citizen has, including the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. In this era of cop and robbers television (“Law & Order” in all its various forms has been on the air for 23 years), it seems self-evident that a person has those rights. But still, whether he knows he has those rights or not, the government has an obligation to inform a suspect he has them. But what happens when the defense persuades a court that law enforcement interrogated a person in violation of Miranda? That evidence is suppressed and so are the fruits of it. This is the part that really interests the appellate lawyer in me, because the question I keep coming back to here, is: so what?

If any of the news reports are to be believed, and obviously those outside of the parties won’t know until the trial, if there is one, the government has built a relatively strong case against Tsarnaev without his help. So even if some of his statements are suppressed, it doesn’t really matter because the government will still have plenty of evidence to go around. Presumably, the people who did the interrogating had a really good sense of what evidence they already had against him. Perhaps, sure in its case (even though the investigation was in the infancy), the government opted to question Tsarnaev and ask him everything it could think of. Worst case scenario, some cumulative evidence gets suppressed.

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Wisconsin #1 in Black Incarceration; How Did We Get Here?

new report from the UWM Employment and Training Institute shows that Wisconsin leads the nation in incarcerating black males.  Based on data from the 2010 U.S. census, Wisconsin incarcerates about one in every eight of its black men between the ages of 18 and 64.  This includes individuals held in state and local correctional facilities.  The Badger State’s black incarceration rate is, in fact, about one-third higher than that of the second-place state, Oklahoma, and nearly double the national average.

Wisconsin also leads the nation in incarcerating Native-American males, but its white-male incarceration rate (one-tenth of the black rate) closely tracks the national average.  Wisconsin’s Hispanic incarceration rate is actually below the national average.

The Milwaukee County data are particularly striking: more than half of the County’s black males between the ages of 30 and 44 have been or currently are housed in a state correctional institution.

Is this a recent phenomenon?  I’ve taken a look at some historical data on racial disparities for my three-states research.  The following graph indicates that Wisconsin has been above Indiana and Minnesota for some time in black imprisonment (that is, prisoners per 100,000 residents), but that the current wide gap did not really open up until after 1990: 

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SCOTUS Weighs in on Forced Blood Draws in DUI Cases

In the wake of today’s decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely, DUI defense attorneys across the land are doing the “happy dance.”  Prosecutors (both state and federal) on the other hand are rending their garments and hair trying to figure out how to deal with the high court’s ruling that forced blood draws in most DUI cases will now require warrants, and the flood of “refusals” sure to follow as the implications of the case filter out to the public.

Wisconsin’s approach, first established in 1993 in State v. Bohling and then reinforced in 2004 in State v. Faust had been to allow warrantless blood draws in drunk driving cases after several criteria were met, including the presence of  probable cause for the officer to believe the driver under investigation had indeed been driving under the influence of alcohol. The key factor that drove the Wisconsin interpretation was the fact that the blood alcohol level of a drunk driving suspect is continually shifting and dissipating from the time the driver is apprehended, and the extra time it takes to procure a warrant incontrovertibly causes BAC evidence to be lost.

Wisconsin’s rationale had recently served as a kind of dividing line in the national debate about warrantless blood draws. 

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