Does Geography Affect Appointments to the Supreme Court?

It certainly used to.

Perhaps the most obvious examples are those from the early 19th century.  Appointments of new justices were once tied to the creation of new circuit courts.  And that was for good reason:  Circuit courts were not the intermediate courts of appeals of today (with few exceptions, the most notable of which were the “Midnight Judges” that served from 1801 until 1802); they were largely nisi prius courts, functioning alongside district courts, with only limited appellate review.  But they did not have their own judges.  Various combinations of justices from the Supreme Court and judges from the district courts sat to form the circuit courts.

When Congress created the Seventh Circuit in 1807, therefore, which consisted of the new states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, it required that the new justice assigned to that seat hail from there.  The result was Jefferson’s appointment of Thomas Todd of Kentucky. 

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Sykes, Sotomayor, and Women Judges

I had the opportunity last week to attend Women Judges’ Night, an event that the Association for Women Lawyers presents annually (indeed, this year’s dinner was the thirtieth such). The Hon. Diane S. Sykes, L’84, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, delivered what was billed as a keynote but was also in the nature of after-dinner remarks. The speech was a very good example of either form, for reasons related to its warmth, its willingness to take on a substantive and even somewhat contentious topic, and the speaker’s self-awareness and humor.

Judge Sykes began with a “confess[ion]”:

[T]the idea of a “Women Judges Night” has always made me vaguely uneasy. I’m uncomfortable with the implications and consequences of gender-identity politics—or any identity politics, for that matter. When we celebrate Women Judges Night every year, what is it precisely that we’re celebrating? If we’re celebrating the appointment or election of women judges just because they are women, then I think we are making a mistake about the qualities necessary in a good judge, which of course are not gender-specific. If we’re celebrating the appointment and election of women judges because they subscribe to a gender-based brand of judging, then we are making an even bigger mistake about the nature of the judicial role. I don’t think we’re celebrating either of these things, but I do think it’s important for us to be careful not to diminish the contributions of women judges by emphasizing their gender as if it had something to do with their qualifications for judicial office or has substantive significance in their work.

She would conclude with her own assessment of what the event celebrates, along the way touching upon matters from Madison to Washington, D.C.—from her former court, a majority of whose justices were in attendance (viz., Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Justice Annette K. Ziegler, and Justice Patience D. Roggensack, the last of whom introduced Judge Sykes), to the United States Supreme Court and, in particular, last year’s confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor. 

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Judge Crabb’s Ambitious Establishment Clause

I am not going to go ballistic over Judge Barbara Crabb’s decision that the National Day of Prayer – an event that has gone on for 58 years and mirrors, in many respects, actions of our federal government throughout the history of the Republic – violates the Establishment Clause.

She is, I think, wrong and may have been well served to have given more attention to a principle of legal analysis that has served me over the years: The law can be an ass, but it doesn’t always have to be. Invalidating the National Day of Prayer seems intrinsically wrong and that sense, while not dispositive, needs to be given attention.

But Judge Crabb’s decision rehearses the doctrine and the various arguments for and against the constitutionality of the matter. She did not mail it in. She did not ignore the obvious arguments against her decision, even if I don’t think she handled them in the right way.

It would be hard for me to conclude otherwise. I have argued — here and here — that there is a trail in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence (and various trails, rather than structure, is all we have in this area of the law) that is overly ambitious. It seeks to protect against relatively small religious insult and utterly fails to deliver it because, to be consistent, would paralyze the government.

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