The Constitutionality of Health Reform’s “Individual Mandate”

 

As noted in my blog post last week (“The Beginning of Health Reform“), pushback against the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was swift.  Members of nearly 40 state legislatures have proposed legislation or constitutional amendments limiting or opposing certain provisions of the Act, with most of the proposals targeting the Act’s requirement that individuals have health insurance coverage or subject themselves to financial penalties (the “individual mandate”).  Virginia, Idaho, and Utah are the only states thus far to have enacted new statutes (each of which more or less prohibits compliance with any law that imposes a fine on an individual for declining to enter into a contract for health insurance coverage), and their validity is sure to be challenged in court on Supremacy Clause and other grounds.  Idaho has also passed a non-binding resolution “urging Congress to take action forthwith to amend the United States Constitution by adding a Twenty-eighth Amendment to provide that Congress shall make no law requiring citizens of the United States to enroll in, participate in or secure health care insurance or to penalize any citizen who declines to purchase or participate in any health care insurance program.”

Most dramatic, though—if drama is measured by the amount of media coverage generated—is the lawsuit initiated by the Attorney General of Florida and joined by 19 other state Attorneys General maintaining that several components of the health reform law violate Article I of and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  The argument that is drawing the most attention concerns the constitutionality of the Act’s individual mandate.  Like the contention at the heart of the state proposals, the Florida lawsuit argues that the Act’s requirement that individuals have health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty amounts to an unconstitutional mandate that cannot be upheld under the Constitution’s Commerce or Spending Clauses.

The lawsuit seems unlikely to ultimately succeed, given the procedural and substantive hurdles it has to clear. 

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Arizona’s Big Mistake

Arizona recently passed into law provisions that make a person’s illegal presence in the state of Arizona — currently a civil violation under federal law — a crime under state law.  The Arizona law also provides for the arrest of persons where the police have a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is unlawfully present and where the individual cannot produce the proper documentation.  Last minute changes  were made to the law this past Friday in order to prohibit the use of racial or ethnic profiling by police in determining who to stop and question, and to clarify that questions about an individual’s immigration status should only be asked as part of an investigation of non-immigration related violations.  These changes to the original language were made to try and stave off several threatened lawsuits intended to challenge the constitutionality of the Arizona law.  

These changes to the law may diminish the likelihood that the Arizona state statute will be found to violate the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.  However, the most likely ground for a ruling that the Arizona law violates the Constitution was, and remains, that any state attempt to regulate the border is preempted by the pervasive scheme of federal immigration legislation.  While many observers will anxiously await the outcome of these constitutional challenges, it is important to recognize that there is a separate and more fundamental reason why the Arizona law is a mistake.  The law perpetuates a trend by our elected officials, identified by Professor Jennifer Chacon and others, that mistakenly conflates the criminal law with immigration law.  The convergence between these two separate areas of the law began in the 1990s and gathered momentum after September 11, 2001.  This process needs to be stopped and reversed.

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Does Geography Affect Appointments to the Supreme Court?

It certainly used to.

Perhaps the most obvious examples are those from the early 19th century.  Appointments of new justices were once tied to the creation of new circuit courts.  And that was for good reason:  Circuit courts were not the intermediate courts of appeals of today (with few exceptions, the most notable of which were the “Midnight Judges” that served from 1801 until 1802); they were largely nisi prius courts, functioning alongside district courts, with only limited appellate review.  But they did not have their own judges.  Various combinations of justices from the Supreme Court and judges from the district courts sat to form the circuit courts.

When Congress created the Seventh Circuit in 1807, therefore, which consisted of the new states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, it required that the new justice assigned to that seat hail from there.  The result was Jefferson’s appointment of Thomas Todd of Kentucky. 

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