Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What Can Be Inferred From a Lie?

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When a person is caught in a lie, we normally assume that he is covering something up.  But, if a defendant in a criminal case lies on the witness stand, is it fair to assume that he actually did what he was accused of doing?  Such was the question in United States v. Edwards (No. 08-1124).

Edwards was arrested after making arrangments to sell crack to a government informant.  The intended sale did not actually take place, but that is no barrier to conviction for drug trafficking.  And, once convicted, a drug dealer becomes responsible under the federal sentencing guidelines for the entire quantity of drugs he has ever sold that counts as “relevant conduct.”  (For an earlier post on the pitfalls of relevant conduct, see here.)  In order to establish the amount that Edwards sold, the sentencing judge relied on, among other things, $765 in cash that Edwards was carrying at the time of his arrest.  Edwards tried to explain away the cash with an unsubstantiated and seemingly implausible story about selling his minivan, but the judge was not convinced.  If the minivan story was fabricated, then Edwards must have earned the money from selling crack, right?  The sentencing judge concluded as much, and increased Edwards’ drug quantity accordingly.

On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit held that the judge moved to this conclusion too quickly. 

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Carrying Unloaded Gun During Bank Robbery Puts Teller’s Life in Jeopardy

seventh circuitSimple bank robbery carries a maximum sentence of twenty years, but armed bank robbery has an enhanced maximum of twenty-five.  Should a robbery be considered armed, though, when the robber carries an unloaded weapon? 

It turns out that the armed bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), can be satisfied in either of two different ways.  First, a robber qualifies for increased punishment by committing an assault.  As the Seventh Circuit indicated many years ago in United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1996), the assault prong of the statute is satisfied when a teller has a reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury.  Brandishing a gun — loaded or unloaded — seems almost certain to create such a fear.

The second prong, though, raises a closer question. 

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Ink Blots, Allocution, and Error

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The Seventh’s Circuit opinion last week in United States v. Noel (No. 07-2468) reveals a substantial division over how to handle violations of a defendant’s right to address the court at sentencing.  As now codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the Supreme Court has held that defendants must be personally invited to address the court before being sentenced; it is not enough for defense counsel to be given an opportunity to speak.  I have long thought this right of allocution to be a Rorschach test of sorts, revealing fundamental disagreements in the way that criminal procedure rights are conceptualized. 

Continue ReadingSeventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: Ink Blots, Allocution, and Error