U.S. Supreme Court – Page 61 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Study Reveals Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection

Post author:Melissa Longamore
Post published:July 20, 2010
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Milwaukee U.S. Supreme Court Wisconsin Criminal Law & Process

Last month, the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) released a study, “Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy,” which revealed a prevalence of racial bias in jury selection in the South. The report stands as the most comprehensive study of racial discrimination in jury selection since 1986, when the US Supreme Court sought to limit the practice in the landmark case Batson v. Kentucky.

Racial discrimination in jury selection first became illegal when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Despite federal legislation, people of color continue to be excluded from jury service because of their race, especially in serious criminal trials and death penalty cases.

Evidence suggests the phenomenon persists through the use of peremptory challenges. A peremptory challenge essentially provides attorneys the ability to exclude a certain number of potential jurors without explanation of their removal.

“Past Formalities” and “Present Realities”: Why Wendy Isn’t a Parent at All

Post author:Taylor Barnes
Post published:July 19, 2010
Post category:Constitutional Interpretation Family Law Federal Law & Legal System U.S. Supreme Court Wisconsin Civil Litigation Wisconsin Court System Wisconsin Law & Legal System

On June 24^th, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled against a woman seeking legal recognition of her parental rights for the two children she adopted with her ex-partner. The two women adopted their children in 2002 and 2004 from Guatemala. The woman appealing, known in the record as Wendy, stayed at home with the children, while her partner, recorded as Liz, worked as an attorney. Liz was the legal adoptive parent so that the children could be on her healthcare plan. When the couple split up, the two women agreed to an informal custodial arrangement, but Wendy has no legal rights over or to her children. When Liz stopped allowing Wendy to see the children, Wendy lacked any legal recourse.

Wisconsin law does not permit same-sex couples adoptive rights; only one parent is the “legal parent.” The court justified its decision on the basis that Wisconsin law defines a “parent” as only the biological or adoptive parent. Wendy is neither of these and thus, at least under the law, not a parent at all.

This leads to questions that are more cultural than legal (though still legal, yes). How do we define parent? How do we define family? The Supreme Court has spoken to these questions, though not in the terms at issue here.

Baby, You Can Drive My Carr . . . Or Maybe Not

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:July 11, 2010
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Seventh Circuit U.S. Supreme Court

The ink is barely dry on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carr v. United States, and already we have a contentious case in the Seventh Circuit questioning its meaning. In Carr, the Court had to interpret a notoriously clumsy bit of legislation from 2006, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (part of the so-called Adam Walsh Act). SORNA makes it a federal crime for a person who is required to register as a sex offender to (1) travel in interstate commerce, and (2) knowingly fail to register or update a registration. In Carr, the Court held that a person may not be convicted under SORNA based on travel that occurred prior to SORNA’s enactment.

At the time Carr was decided, the Seventh Circuit already had pending before it United States v. Vasquez. Vasquez was convicted of a SORNA violation on the basis of stipulated facts that showed (1) he failed to register as a sex offender as he was required to do in Illinois, and (2) he subsequently traveled from Illinois to California for some undetermined purpose. On appeal, Vasquez argued that the statute required the government to prove he had knowledge of his federal registration obligation, and that the statute exceeded Congress’s regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.

The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments in a majority opionion authored by Judge Bauer.