A Republican Form of Government

King-George-III-xx-Allan-RamsayOn September 17, I participated in the Constitution Day program at the Law School.  All of the presenters were asked to discuss one part of the United States Constitution that is often overlooked.  My choice was the “republican form of government” clause, Article IV Section 4, which reads as follows: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . .  .”   

To call this clause of the Constitution “overlooked” is an understatement.  The authors of the Federalist Papers spent little or no time discussing the meaning of this clause.  The Supreme Court, when asked to interpret this clause, has generally admitted that it doesn’t have the slightest idea what it means—with the consequence that the Court has rendered the clause irrelevant and left it devoid of meaning.  This is a shame because, properly understood, I believe that this clause is one of the most important in the Constitution.

The federal government guarantees every state a Republican form of government.  What does the word “republican” mean?   It certainly does not refer to a specific political party.  Political parties did not even exist in 1789.

Today’s school children are generally taught that the clause is intended to guarantee that state governments use the mechanics of representative democracy over the mechanics of direct democracy.  This interpretation is incorrect.  While the Framers often wrote of the benefits of a political system whereby voters elected representatives who would make important decisions on their behalf, especially in instances where the geographic territory to be governed was large, the Framers never expressed the opinion that the direct exercise of democracy by the people should be prohibited.

Indeed, this incorrect interpretation of the clause is dangerous because it has led some observers to question the constitutionality of state-wide voter initiatives altogether, such as the ones that regularly go before the voters in California.  These types of initiatives may be unwise as a means of using direct democracy to determine the policies of state government.  But the use of state-wide initiatives of this type is certainly constitutional.

So if the “Republican form of government” clause does not prohibit the use of direct democracy as a means of state government, what is its purpose?  Simply stated, the clause prohibits the people of any state in the Union from amending their state constitution in order to adopt a monarchy or an aristocracy.

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Constitution Day Symposium on Judicial Elections

JustRunGreen09On Saturday, I ran a 5K in Stevens Point, in support of Justiceworks, Ltd., a nonprofit organization “dedicated to the advancement of programs and practices that secure right relationships between offenders, victims, and their communities” in Portage County.  My father lives and works in that community and asked me and my sisters to participate in the race.  It was incredibly pleasant, a flat run along the river in picture-perfect weather.

I knew very little about the organization before agreeing to do the run, and in my post-race googling I discovered that Justiceworks is a co-sponsor (along with the Portage County Bar Association and the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point) of an upcoming symposium entitled Judicial Elections:  Navigating the Collision Course (note to lawyers: 7 CLE credits approved).  The conference will take place on September 17, 2009, and the lineup of presenters is impressive, including Bert Brandenburg, Executive Director of the national Justice at Stake Campaign; Thomas J. Basting, Sr., who served as President of the Wisconsin State Bar Association in 2007-08; and Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson.

The conference brochure promises that the program will “raise awareness about the significant issues confronting the State of Wisconsin in its judicial elections,” noting that

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Catholics on the Court

huge_3_19675Three recent events have added a new wrinkle to a debate that has been taking place among legal scholars: what, if anything, does it mean to be both a Catholic and a Supreme Court Justice?

First, the confirmation of Justice Sonia Sotomayor has added a sixth practicing Catholic to the Supreme Court.  As a proportion of the Court’s membership, Catholics on the Court currently exceed their proportionate representation in the general public by a significant amount.  This is an astonishing historical fact, although its significance is not self-evident.

Second, Frank Colucci’s book, Justice Kennedy’s Jurisprudence, was recently reviewed  in the Wall Street Journal by Northwestern University Law School Professor John McGinnis.  Apparently, Mr. Colucci does not adhere to the conventional wisdom that Justice Kennedy is an unpredictable jurist whose primary concerns are the aggrandizement of the Supreme Court and the divination of narrow, fact-based holdings.  Instead, and somewhat unexpectedly, Corlucci argues that Justice Kennedy’s approach to the interpretation of the Constitution is best understood as seeking to advance a moral imperative.

Justice Kennedy’s objective, according to Corlucci, is to vindicate and preserve an ever increasing share of individual liberty within our broader society.  Here is the key portion of Professor McGinnis’ review:

Looking for the sources of Justice Kennedy’s moral judgment, Mr. Colucci discovers one in post-Vatican II Catholic thought, including papal encyclicals like Dignitatis Humanae.  In Roper v. Simmons, a ruling forbidding the death penalty for criminals under the age of 18, Justice Kennedy wrote that juveniles only rarely exhibit ‘irreparable corruption’ – a phrase that a secular judge might not have used.  (Justice Kennedy is an observant Catholic).  It is odd to reflect that the justice most influenced by contemporary Catholic thought may today be – because of his emphasis on individual rights – the decisive vote for preserving the abortion status quo.

It is intriguing to consider whether there is, in fact, a demonstrable connection between Catholic social thought and Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of an evolving liberty interest guaranteed by the Constitution.

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