Wisconsin Law & Legal System – Page 71 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

More on Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC

Post author:Daniel Suhr
Post published:July 23, 2009
Post category:Constitutional Interpretation First Amendment Labor & Employment Law Wisconsin Civil Litigation Wisconsin Law & Legal System Wisconsin Supreme Court

As Professor Esenberg has just posted about, earlier this week, the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down a very important decision, Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC (2009 WI 88). Although some describe the holding as “a dramatic change” in Wisconsin employment law, I think the case is more important for its constitutional discussion. On the actual question presented, I think the Court’s holding was straightforward, correct, and not very dramatic.

In Coulee Catholic Schools, the Court was asked whether a first grade teacher in a Catholic school was subject to the “ministerial exception,” meaning that the school’s religious freedom to select its own ministers and leaders barred her age discrimination claim. Half the courts in the country that have considered this question concluded that a religious school teacher is engaged in sufficient ministry to be included, while half have said that such a teacher is not. The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that the religious school teacher in this case did engage in and lead sufficient religious activities to fall within the exception.

Coulee Catholic: Of Loopholes and Legislating

Post author:Richard M. Esenberg
Post published:July 23, 2009
Post category:Constitutional Interpretation First Amendment Religion & Law Wisconsin Law & Legal System Wisconsin Supreme Court

Wednesday, in a case called Coulee Catholic Schools v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the “ministerial exception” to state laws prohibiting employment discrimination applied to a teacher in a Catholic grade school. As a result, the teacher’s claim against the school for age discrimination must be dismissed.

There a few points worth making. First, it is inaccurate and misleading to call the decision, which was written by Justice Michael Gableman and joined by Justices Prosser, Roggensack and Ziegler, “legislating from the bench.” Although this exception is not spelled out in the applicable statute, it is fairly implied from the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the freedom of conscience clause in Article I, sec. 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. In fact, courts everywhere recognize it and it is consistent with a general reluctance on the part of courts to examine the internal decision making of religious organizations on matters that implicate the organization’s religious mission and precepts. To determine whether the plaintiff in this case was terminated due to her age, an administrative agency or court would have to examine the school’s decision in light of its religious mission and that would lead to state evaluation of religious judgments.

Second, it is also unfair to say that the Court found a “loophole,” although I can see that there is some poetic justice in the charge for critics of Gableman campaign ads that used that term in connection with certain of the Court’s criminal law decisions.

Prior Conviction as an Element of a Crime: The Effect of Stipulations After State v. Warbelton

Post author:Brent Simerson
Post published:July 6, 2009
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Wisconsin Criminal Law & Process Wisconsin Supreme Court

In January of this year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the defendant’s conviction for stalking in State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, 759 N.W.2d 557. In doing so, the court held that a defendant in a stalking case cannot prevent the State from submitting evidence of the existence of the defendant’s prior violent felony conviction, an element of the crime, by stipulating to the conviction before trial.

Stipulations to prior convictions became a powerful tool for defense attorneys in Wisconsin following State v. McAllister, 153 Wis. 2d 523, 451 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1989). A precursor to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Old Chief v. United States, the McAllister court held that the State could not submit evidence of the details of the defendant’s prior felony conviction if the defendant offered to stipulate to that element before trial. The court concluded that the details of the conviction were no longer relevant once the defendant stipulated to it. The State could satisfy the element by submitting a certified record of the defendant’s conviction to the jury.

The court in State v. Alexander addressed the derivative question left by McAllister: may the defendant completely prevent the jury from considering the prior conviction element by stipulating to the prior conviction before trial?