Empathy and Catholic Legal Theory

Over at Mirror of Justice, Rob Vischer of St. Thomas wonders about the role of empathy in Catholic legal theory. After referring to Orin Kerr’s summation of different responses to legal ambiguity, Rob asks:

Wasn’t Brown v. Board of Education driven by empathy, not just the weighing of legal merits?  How about Meyer and Pierce?  Is the recognition that “the child is not the mere creature of the state” as a rationale for a judicial decision driven solely by legal merit, or something else?  And what about abortion?  There are lots of Supreme Court decisions that reflect weak constitutional interpretation, but calls for the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade are not just about remedying bad interpretation, are they?  Aren’t we also asking judges to empathize with the unborn in recognizing the need to overturn Roe?

Putting aside Roe (which I think is all about weak constitutional interpretation), Rob’s point goes to the idea that I was trying to explore yesterday about cabined empathy. It can be, to borrow Ed Fallone’s phrase again, useful in reasoning from undisputed (or at least a judge’s accepted) first principles. It isn’t that empathy creates an obligation of equal protection, but it does help us see the flaw in Justice Henry Billings Brown’s (who remembers that name?) assertion in Plessy that the badge of inferiority arising from Jim Crow exists “solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.” 

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Mitten on International Sports Arbitration

Matt Mitten has a new article on SSRN, Judicial Review of Olympic and International Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations.  The article focuses on the review of decisions by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, of which Matt is a member.  Here is the abstract:

This article provides an overview of the nature and scope of judicial review of Olympic and international sports arbitration awards, primarily those rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (based in Lausanne, Switzerland) and their review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal pursuant to the Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law. It also describes and compares U.S. courts’ review of international sports arbitration awards pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as well as domestic sports arbitration awards. Both Swiss and U.S. courts are permitting CAS arbitration awards to establish a developing body of private international sports law that displaces national laws. The author concludes that this is the appropriate jurisprudential view because it is necessary to have universally accepted legal rules and dispute resolution processes for Olympic and international athletic competition, and for the governance of global sports competition to be fair and equitable on a worldwide basis.

The article is forthcoming in the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Journal. 

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Logic and Empathy

I might have commented on Ed Fallone’s post regarding the role of logic in Supreme Court decisions, but there is nothing in the post with which I disagree. But I do think that it raises two additional issues, one of which has been the subject of much recent popular conversation.

President Obama’s stated preference for judges with “empathy” has been a jumping-off point for a variety of conservative versus liberal debates on constitutional interpretation. Folks who tend to think like I do on these matters have roundly criticized the President for suggesting that judges ought to abandon the rule of law in favor of preferred results.

But the real debate, in my view, is not about whether empathy is a desirable quality in people and judges, but what role empathy ought to play in, to borrow from Ed, seeking “the logical consequence of undisputed first principles, the overall structure of the document, and prior interpretations.”

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