International Law as a Tool for Ascertaining Gaddafi’s Whereabouts

In a prior post, I explained that the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has jurisdiction to prosecute Muammar Gaddafi because the Security Council passed a resolution to that effect in February 2011. Utilizing that jurisdiction, the Court issued arrest warrants against Gaddafi, his son, and his military intelligence chief for crimes against humanity in connection with their suppression of an uprising in eastern Libya several months ago. With Gaddafi effectively out of power and in hiding, news media have begun to speculate on his whereabouts. The latest reports suggest that he may have headed by land into Niger, which shares part of Libya’s southern border. It is unclear whether Niger would be Gaddafi’s final destination, or whether he has even left Libya.

Wherever Gaddafi is headed, international law provides an intriguing tool for prediction. Under the Rome Statute—the ICC’s founding treaty—a state-party is generally obligated to comply with ICC requests for arrest and surrender. Of the states bordering Libya, Chad, Niger, and Tunisia are all party to the Rome State, and thus seem to be obligated to turn Gaddafi over to the Court if they find him within their borders. If international law is effective, we should anticipate that Gaddafi will avoid these states out of fear of arrest.

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What Should Be the Prerequisites for Becoming a Law Professor?

Unlike the situation in most academic disciplines, law professors typically do not possess a true doctoral degree.  The J.D. degree, the basic law degree in the United States, is the highest educational level attained by most law professors.  There was a time in the past when advanced law degrees, the LL.M. and the S.J.D., would viewed as desirable prerequisites for would-be law teachers, but that day has clearly passed.  The S.J.D. degree is nearly extinct, and the LL.M. has been reduced to a kind of specialization certificate that implies concentrated, but not necessarily advanced, law study.

New law professors have traditionally been hired to law school faculties on the basis of their impressive level of performance in law school.  High grades and law review membership have usually been equated with potential for teaching, particularly if they are supplemented with a prestigious clerkship and some, but not too much, experience as a practicing lawyer. Professors hired solely for their practical expertise in law are relatively rare.

A recently published study by Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, two law professors at Vanderbilt University, reveals that this situation maybe slowly changing.

According to Hersch and Viscusi, at least some law schools have begun to hire individuals whose credentials also include a Ph.D. degree. Although Ph.D. degrees in law are quite common in Europe and other parts of the world, they are almost unheard in the United States, so law professors with Ph.D. degrees in the United States usually hold the degree in a field other than law.

Examining the faculties of 26 “leading” law schools, Hersch and Viscusi, discovered that 361 of 1,338 current law professors (27%) have Ph.D. degrees.  Thirteen percent (13%) of faculty members have Ph.D. degrees in the social sciences other than economics; 7% have degrees in economics; and 7% have them in other fields ranging from English to chemistry.  Slightly more than 18% of law professors with Ph.D. degrees (65) possess a Ph.D. degree but no law degree.  However, most law professors with Ph.D. degrees (296) hold both a law degree and a Ph.D.

Northwestern University appears to have gone further than any other school in this regard, and 50% of its law faculty now hold Ph.D. degrees.  Other law schools with high percentages of Ph.D. professors include Pennsylvania (43%); UC-Berkeley (42%); Yale (40%); Cornell (40%); and Stanford (39%).

The issue of hiring law professors with Ph.D. degrees goes to the core of the question of the real purpose of law school education. If law schools are primarily academic departments charged with providing students with a sophisticated analytical framework for studying the structure and function of American law, then the Ph.D. law professors, with their systematic training in scholarship and research, clearly have an edge over their non-Ph.D. counterparts who typically scramble for years trying to pick up such skills on the fly.  On the other hand, if the primary purpose of law schools is to prepare lawyers for the nuts and bolts of the practice of law, the Ph.D. law professor is probably at a disadvantage, having spent years in graduate school rather in setting where one learns what it really means to practice law.

Obviously, the temptation is to say that law schools should be both, both centers of scholarship and sources of practical training.  However, balancing the scholarly with the practical is a challenge.  As it is, much of the legal scholarship produced by law professors is held in relatively low regard by the other branches of the academy, and the bar regularly complains that law schools are not doing an adequate job of preparing their students for the realities of law practice.

The Marquette Law School faculty currently includes four professors with Ph.D. degrees.  Three earned their degrees in American universities: Professors Blinka (History); Hylton (History of American Civilization); and Papke (American Studies); while the fourth, Professor Calboli, received hers in law from a European university.

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Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute Does Not Count as PLRA Strike, Seventh Circuit Rules

Choosing form over substance, the Seventh Circuit ruled earlier this week that dismissals of a prison inmate’s repeated “unintelligible” complaints do not count as strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, even though the cases should have been dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Paul v. Marberry (No. 10-3670). The PLRA requires prepayment of all filing and docket fees by inmate-plaintiffs who have three strikes — a requirement that may effectively doom lawsuits by indigent inmates. The PLRA specifies that a strike should be assigned for each action brought by an inmate that was dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Paul filed a series of complaints, each of which was initially dismissed without prejudice under FRCP 8(a)(2) for failure to provide a “short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In none of the cases did Paul take advantage of the opportunity to file a new complaint in compliance with the rule. The district court then dimissed each case for failure to prosecute. Paul finally obtained the assistance of a fellow inmate who had better drafting skills and managed to file a complaint that did state a claim. However, the district court dismissed the new complaint based on the PLRA three-strikes rule and Paul’s failure to prepay his fees.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit indicated that the earlier cases should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim instead failure to prosecute (5). But, given that the dismissal orders nowhere used strike-triggering language, the court held that they should not be counted against Paul:

[W]e think the plaintiff was entitled to take the previous dismissals at face value, and since none of them was based on any of the grounds specified in section 1915(g), to infer that he was not incurring strikes by the repeated dismissals. The statute is explicit, and the case law confirms, . . . that classifying a dismissal as a strike depends on the grounds given for it; since most prisoners litigate their civil claims pro se, they should not be required to speculate on the grounds the judge could or even should have based the dismissal on. (7-8)

Cross posted at Life Sentences Blog.

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