Seventh Circuit Reverses Position on Fast-Track Sentencing

Last week, in United States v. Reyes-Hernandez (No. 09-1249), the Seventh Circuit overruled United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2006), and held that sentencing judges may consider “the disparate treatment of immigration defendants that is created by fast-track programs in determining whether a Guidelines sentence is greater than necessary under the § 3553(a) factors” (30).  This is an important decision that deepens a circuit split on the sentencing of illegal reentrants into this country. 

At least sixteen districts, including the Mexican border districts, have developed fast-track programs that offer extraordinary sentencing benefits for illegal reentrants who plead guilty in an especially expedited fashion.  (For background, see my article at 27 Hamline L. Rev. 357.)  However, many other districts, including all of the Seventh Circuit districts, do not offer defendants the fast-track option, which creates wide sentencing disparities in illegal reentry cases.  When the federal sentencing guidelines were converted from mandatory to advisory in 2005, many defendants in non-fast-track districts argued that judges ought to give them the fast-track benefit in order to mitigate the disparities.  Appellate courts, however, uniformly rejected these arguments prior to 2007, when the Supreme Court reemphasized the discretionary nature of federal sentencing in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85.  Post-Kimbrough, three circuits, now joined by the Seventh, have ruled that sentencing judges may consider the fast-track disparities.   

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A New Approach to Interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution?

In the most recent edition of the Yale Law Journal, Professor Abbe Gluck observes a phenomenon unique to state supreme courts: precedents that bind courts’ interpretive methods. At the U.S. Supreme Court, justices constantly argue about the proper method for interpreting contractual, regulatory, statutory, and constitutional texts. Prof. Gluck observes that in some state courts, including Wisconsin, a single case definitely sets the method by which future judges will interpret legal texts.

The Wisconsin case she refers to is, of course, State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Circuit Court (2004), which set a method by which the court would interpret statutes. That method focuses first on the text of the statute, and circumscribes the use of legislative history and other secondary sources.

Another Wisconsin case Prof. Gluck could mention is Buse v. Smith (1976), decided nearly thirty years before Kalal

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Negotiation Advice from an International Arbitrator

Last week, I was delighted to welcome Lucy Reed, a partner at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer and co-chair of their international arbitration group as our inaugural speaker for our speakers series on Gender & Negotiation, funded by the University Centennial Celebration Fund to celebrate 100 years of women at Marquette.  Lucy has an amazing background in both the private and public sector.  She has served as a Commissioner of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission and co-director of the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland.  She was the U.S. Agent to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and also general counsel of the Korean Pennisula Energy Development Organization (the organization negotiating with North Korea over its nuclear plants.)  Her private sector work currently focuses on investment treaty arbitrations and other public international law disputes. 

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