We Elect Judges, Don’t We?

It is hardly a revelation, but the  Laurel Walker of the Journal Sentinel has done a study demonstrating that a bit more than half of the circuit judges in the five county area assume the bench by appointment, rather than election. This is an important aspect of judicial selection in our state and the paper does a service by informing the public (and, I suspect, much of the bar) of the fact that many of our judges are selected, in the first instance, by the Governor and not the electorate.

My colleague, Peter Rofes, is certainly correct to note that, in some sense, this demonstrates that a “harsh dichotomy between so-called elector systems and appointment doesn’t really exist.”

But, while I agree that the dichotomy may not be harsh, it remains significant. While the Journal Sentinel is correct to note that challenges to sitting judges are rare, they are more frequent (although still probably not very frequent) when the incumbent is a sitting judge who has not yet faced the electorate. I supervised a study of that a number of years ago in defending a challenge to Wisconsin’s system of electing judges under the Voting Rights Act. My sense is that things haven’t changed much.

This is where the dichotomy reasserts itself and does so in at least three ways. First, governors know that their appointees are subject to electoral challenge and the electability of prospective judges is a consideration in choosing appointees. Second, although incumbency in and of itself confers certain advantages, it is not as strong for new appointees. Every new judge knows that securing an uncontested election is not a matter of happenstance and, in many (if not most) cases, must be made to happen. The first order of business is to line up support and fundraising to dissuade potential challengers. Every judge knows that the absence of a challenger often requires hard work. Third, while challenges are not frequent, they are not unknown and they do happen. Appointed judges get beat. Everyone knows this and that has – for better or worse – an “accountability” impact on newly appointed incumbents.

So, if the study were to be used to argue that we don’t “really” elect judges anyway and so we should accept  Sandra Day O’Connor’s invitation  to drop our electoral system, I think that the situation of the ground is far more nuanced. In any event, there is, rightly or wrongly, a strong public commitment to electing judges. I do not see our system changing any time soon.

Although it is beyond the scope of the Journal Sentinel’s study, I think it would be interesting to consider why so many circuit court vacancies occur. We don’t see half of other public offices becoming open during the incumbent’s term of office.

Part of the answer, I think, would be that new branches have been created during this period so the number of vacancies is less than half. Still, the vacancy rate would remain well above what we see for other elected offices.

Is their just more career dissatisfaction among circuit court judges leading to more resignations? Is it the length of a judge’s term? Does the fact of gubernatorial appointment create incentives for sitting judges to time their retirement in order to create an opportunity for lawyers of the same party?

Cross posted at Shark and Shepherd

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Garcetti in Higher Education? Not So Fast

Scales-red Thanks to Dennis Nolan (South Carolina) for bringing to my attention this decision from California discussing whether the Garcetti First Amendment free speech case applies in the higher education context.  Garcetti held that public employees speaking pursuant to their job duties have no First Amendment free speech protection.

F.I.R.E. (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education) has this article on Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438 RMW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009):

[I]t is heartening to report that a federal court in California has rejected a community college district’s attempt to apply Garcetti to strip a professor of First Amendment protection for her classroom speech. In Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438 RMW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009), the federal district court ruled, contrary to the college district’s argument, that the professor, June Sheldon, did not lose her First Amendment rights merely because her speech took place during classroom instruction. Sheldon lost her adjunct science teaching position at San Jose City College as well as the opportunity to teach courses the next semester following remarks she made to her class about the “nature versus nurture” debate with regard to why some people are homosexuals. Though her comments were part of a class discussion about the topic, some students complained that the way she embraced the “nurture” side of the argument was offensive, leading the college to take the adverse employment actions against her. (FIRE took up Sheldon’s case in 2008.)

In Sheldon’s subsequent suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (a federal statute providing a cause of action for the vindication of federal constitutional and statutory rights), the federal court rejected the college’s argument, based on Garcetti, in favor of dismissing Sheldon’s First Amendment claims altogether. Crucially, the court observed that “Garcetti by its express terms does not address the context squarely presented here: the First Amendment’s application to teaching-related speech. For that reason, defendants’ heavy reliance on Garcetti is misplaced.” The court opined that the “precise contours” of the First Amendment’s reach in this context are “ill-defined and are not easily determined at the motion to dismiss stage.”

I think both from a precedential standpoint and a policy standpoint this decision is on the way to the right result.  First, Garcetti expressly chose not to rule on whether its ruling applied in the academic context.  Second, Supreme Court cases as far back as the 1950s have emphasized the need for academic freedom, including the right to freely say what one thinks in the classroom environment.

To be sure, this decision just gets the case by a motion to dismiss, but I agree that it is heartening that the court might treat academic public employment different from other forms of public employment suffering under the holding of Garcetti.

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New Study Adds to the Debate Surrounding Ideological Divides and the United States Supreme Court

Democrats Republicans boxingThe New York Times published an article detailing the results of a new study regarding the career paths of former United States Supreme Court clerks.  The study finds that “former clerks have started to take jobs that reflect the ideologies of the justices for whom they worked.”  The data collected show a shift in the career paths of clerks hired from 1990 and on:

 Until about 1990, the study shows, there was no particular correlation between a justice’s ideological leanings and what his or her clerks did with their lives.

 Clerks from conservative chambers are now less likely to teach. If they do, they are more likely to join the faculties of conservative and religious law schools. Republican administrations are now much more likely to hire clerks from conservative chambers, and Democratic administrations from liberal ones. Even law firm hiring splits along ideological lines.

It is no secret that the justices have shown a greater propensity to hire clerks that share their ideological beliefs (as the article and previous studies explain).  Yet this newest study, which focuses on life post-clerkship, has alarmed those already worried about the strong ideological splits on the Court.  Says law professor William Nelson of NYU, “It’s cause for concern mainly because it’s a further piece of evidence of the polarization of the court.”

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