In conjunction with some papers that I am completing, I have been thinking a lot about the Catholic notion of subsidiarity and what how it may inform our thinking about proposed expansions of the state in response to various “crises,” e.g., the financial seizure, global warming and perceived flaws in the delivery of health care.
Subsidiarity tells us that a “higher order” of authority should not do what individuals or a “lesser order” can do for themselves. Thus, the argument might proceed, the federal government should not do what a state goverment could do. Government should not do what voluntary mediating institutions can do.
Conservatives often advance subsidiarity as a justification for limited government and it often is. But it’s not that simple either.
The reasons are that subsidiarity is not simply a jurisdictional principle but reflects a judgment about — or at least emphasis of a particular perspective on — anthropology. It rests on a set of assumptions about the subjectivity of human persons. It is not only that granting freedom to individuals and the voluntary associations that they form will release human creativity, but that the release of creativity is itself an instrinsic good. True development of the human person requires his or her participation.
This suggests a limit on subsidiarity as a jurisdictional principle strictly defining the role of the state and the spheres of higher and lower levels of government. Catholic social thought also emphasizes solidarity. People are connected to one another and each should be committed to the common good of all. It emphasizes the human dignity of all persons and the duty of charity towards all. Every individual ought to be able to exercise his or her subjectivity and government (or even larger private institutions) are not the only obstacle.
Sometimes intervention of a higher order may be required to make the exercise of subjectivity possible. This may threaten to mire us in indeterminancy. What do we do when the irresistable force of subsidiarity meets the immovable object of solidarity?
I think that we can do many things. But it seems to me that some guidance is provided by the notion that policy must make space for human creativity and freedom. Although not every social outcome produced by human freedom is acceptable, it is not for the state to impose its view of the best of all possible worlds. Once it has done what it can (and that may be far from a guarantee) to ensure the conditions for human flourishing, it ought to step back and allow human beings to flourish.
I don’t know that this resolves many of the political disputes we have in the U.S., but perhaps it is a useful way to think about them.
Cross posted at PrawfsBlawg.
As I understand the principle of subsidiarity, one of the foundational requirments for it to apply is that the “lower order” (local) form of government must actually be capable of redressing the social issue before the “higher order” of government(more centralized) should decline to exercise its power. I have not heard the argument that the State of California is capable of redressing global warming on its own, or that the local regulation of health insurance is capable of ensuring nationwide coverage. Sometimes the local authority lacks the economic power to address the issue, and sometimes it lacks the political will. When the federal government is the only form of authority that possesses the power to redress the social problem, and the federal authority fails to act, that is in itself a moral failure (i.e., the failure of congress to pass federal anti-lynching legislation in the 1920s and 1930s because of the claims of opponents that it would violate states’ rights).
I agree with Prof. Fallone that subsidiarity requires competence by the lower order:
Consider the selection from Pius XI’s
Quadragesimo anno 80:
“The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone **because it alone can do them** [“utpote quae sola ipsa praestare possit”]: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands. (** added.).
Yes which is why I say that it cannot simply be seen as a jurisdictional principle. There is an assumption of interdependence and service between higher and lower orders. It is not really a Madisonian concept of checks and balances.
There is some difficulty, however, in sorting out questions of competence and judgment. A lower order is not incompetent simply because it will not do what the higher order thinks it ought to do. John Paul II wrote in Centesimus Annus that:
The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both directly and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity, by creating favourable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing certain limits on the autonomy of the parties who determine working conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum support for the unemployed worker.
This leaves room for a variety of policies that might be advanced by both the left and the right and, as John Paul wrote later in CA (echoing similar statements by many Popes)”the Church has no model to propose.”
It does seem to me that this theme of subjectivity and its facilitation is nevertheless useful in assessing the models that others may propose. Anti-lynching laws were necessary, I would argue, not because the southern states lacked the political will to enact a policy favored by the federal government but because it’s failure to do so violated the requirements of solidarity in a rather obvious and intolerable way.
But not every preferred federal policy (say the contents of health care policies or the product line of General Motors)would implicate that concern in a way that would permit centralization. Respect for the subjectivity of individuals and lower orders necessarily implies limits on the extent to which their activities should be superintended. Although the line between facilitation and usurpation can be drawn in a number of places, my argument is that the concept gives us some important things to consider as we decide where it ought to be.
Huh, I’ve been thinking about that general principle (government is formed to do the things for us that we cannot do individually) a lot lately, but never realized it had a name. Thanks for educating me!
After briefly reading Pope Benedict XVI’s recent encyclical Caritas in veritate, I believe Benedict offers some guidance on how Catholic Social Teaching could apply to questions of appropriate government intervention. In the encyclical, Benedict explains that “[t]he principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked to the principle of solidarity and vice versa, since the former without the latter gives way to social privatism, while the latter without the former gives way to paternalist social assistance that is demeaning to those in need” (emphasis in original). Accordingly, as I understand it, Caritas in veritate establishes a somewhat two-part test as to when and how a higher authority should intervene.
The federal anti-lynching legislation provides an excellent example of the how that two-part test can apply. With regard to the first part of the test, if the federal government had failed to enact anti-lynching legislation, that would have been a form of privatism and inconsistent with the principle of solidarity—as Professor Esenberg already pointed out above.
However, that does not end the inquiry; the second part of the test asks whether and how a higher authority can provide assistance without giving way to “paternalist social assistance that is demeaning to those in need.” Again with regard to the federal anti-lynching legislation, I don’t think that any reasonable person would view the federal legislation as “paternalistic social assistance” that was “demeaning” to the citizens of those states—especially African-Americans—and their ability to enact their own state anti-lynching legislation. Thus, the federal government’s anti-lynching legislation is consistent with what I see as the Caritas in veritate two-part inquiry as to when and how a higher authority should intervene.
The current question is whether the federal government’s recent actions or proposals can be reconciled with Catholic Social Teaching principles. That question is especially relevant to the government’s bailout of companies that the government viewed as “too big to fail.” Even if one accepts that the bailout of these companies was consistent with the principle of solidarity simply because certain companies were in fact “too big to fail” (which I think is a reasonable view), the second question—based mainly on the principle of subsidiarity—is whether the specific government actions were “paternalistic social assistance” and “demeaning to” those companies in need of federal assistance. And only if that question can be answered in the negative, the government was right—and consistent with Catholic Social Teaching in Benedict’s encyclical—to intervene in the manner that it did.
Applying that specifically to the GM bailout, some of the relevant questions are as follows: After the government provided GM with the bailout money, were the government actions paternalistic and demeaning when the government rejected GM’s restructuring plan? Or when the government forced the resignation of GM CEO as well as the Board overhaul? Or when the government forced GM into bankruptcy? Or—perhaps more appropriately—was the aggregate of all those actions paternalistic and demeaning?
While I am not going to attempt to answer those, the tricky part with respect to the GM bailout is also using the proper measuring stick for determining whether some action is actually “demeaning.” I propose that, at least with regard to GM bailout, whether the government actions were demeaning will be manifested in consumer and investor confidence in GM. Certainly, confidence in GM had been waning prior to the government’s intervention, and the government warranting GM products may increase confidence (although I doubt it). But my initial thought is that the remarkable level of government involvement in the GM restructuring has exacerbated the negative view of GM. Thus, the government violated the principle of subsidiarity because it failed to assist GM in a non-paternalistic and non-demeaning way.
Nick:
An interesting attempt to incorporate Catholic social teaching into a political philosophy of federalism. I am not willing to concede that the one is necessarily relevant to the other, but I am quite interested in seeing how the theories spun around this incorporation play out. One question. Why does the Catholic faith care whether human actions are paternalistic and demeaning to a corporation? For that matter, does the Catholic faith care whether federal policies demean the “dignity” of state government, as opposed to the dignity of human beings?
The most that I can say for now is stay tuned for Professor Esenberg’s paper. The only reason I am partly familiar with this topic is because I have had the opportunity to do research on the subject for Professor Esenberg. But I will respond that I am not sure if it is that important whether or not the Catholic faith cares that government actions are paternalistic and demeaning to a corporation, state, etc. The question is if some of the fundamental principles of CST can or should be applied government action – regardless of CST’s religious affiliation.