Michael M. O’Hear – Page 184 – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Tafas and the Future of Patent Administrative Law

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:September 17, 2008
Post category:Intellectual Property Law Legal Scholarship

My colleague Kali Murray has a new working paper on SSRN, First Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law. Kali analyzes a controversial recent decision from the Eastern District of Virginia in Tafas v. Dudas. In the Tafas decision, currently on appeal in the Federal Circuit, the lower court rejected new rules adopted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that limit the ability of patent applicants to file continuation applications. As Kali demonstrates, Tafas opens up deep questions about the extent to which the PTO is subject to normal principles of administrative law. Kali thinks it is indeed time to engage in a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between patent law and administrative law. Her paper concludes with some helpful suggested principles to guide such a reconsideration.

More From the Seventh Circuit on the Scope of “Crime of Violence”

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:September 16, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Seventh Circuit

Following on the heels of yesterday’s post on United States v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit issued another opinion considering the use of prior convictions to enhance a sentence. In United States v. Jennings, the court held that an Indiana conviction for resisting a law enforcement officer could be considered a “crime of violence” for purposes of a career offender enhancement under the federal sentencing guidelines. As I explained yesterday, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Begay v. United States has altered the framework courts must use in determining whether a prior conviction counts as a crime of violence. In Smith, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Begay such that a crime of negligence and recklessness, even though it may result in serious injury, can no longer be considered a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Although Begay (like Smith) involved an ACCA sentence enhancement, Jennings makes clear that the Begay standards also govern sentence enhancements under the career offender guideline. At the same time, Jennings seems to conduct the Begay analysis in a considerably less rigorous manner than Smith.

Seventh Circuit Narrows Reach of Armed Career Criminal Act

Post author:Michael M. O'Hear
Post published:September 15, 2008
Post category:Criminal Law & Process Federal Criminal Law & Process Public Seventh Circuit

On Friday, in United States v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit held that a conviction in Indiana for criminal recklessness could not be used as a predicate offense for a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Ordinarily, felons found in possession of a firearm face a maximum sentence of ten years. However, the ACCA raises the minimum to fifteen years for felons who have at least three prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” The Seventh Circuit’s decision to vacate Smith’s ACCA sentence last week illustrates the importance of Begay v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that DUI does not count as a “violent felony” for ACCA purposes. Prior to April, when Begay was decided, Seventh Circuit precedent indicated that a felony conviction for criminal recklessness counted; now, in light of Begay, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a new approach.