John Roberts, the New John Marshall?

Immediately after learning that Chief Justice John Roberts had cast the deciding vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, I emailed my colleague Scott Idleman and suggested that Roberts was trying to be the new Charles Evans Hughes.

The reference, of course, was to Chief Justice Hughes who presided over the United States Supreme Court from 1930 to 1941. During the critical years of the early and mid-1930’s Hughes and his moderate Republican colleague Owen Roberts frequently sided with the Court’s three-man liberal bloc to uphold the constitutionality of a variety of relief statutes enacted to mitigate the harsh effects of the Great Depression. In doing so, Hughes frequently engaged in imaginative readings of supposedly settled parts of the Constitution, like the Obligations of Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause.

I was not the only one to make the Hughes connection. The next day, my friend Dan Ernst of Georgetown University made a similar observation on the Legal History Blog.

However, I have come to believe that the better comparison for Chief Justice Roberts’ Obamacare decision are the opinions of his legendary predecessor, Chief Justice John Marshall.

That Hughes failed to vote with the Four Horsemen (the name for the Supreme Court’s conservative bloc in the 1930’s) is not really surprising. He had long been associated with the Progressive wing of the Republican party, and as a member of the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916, and as the Republican presidential nominee in 1916, he generally supported a reading of the Constitution that was consistent with progressive reform and an activist state.

Hughes sided with the liberals because he was ultimately a liberal himself. Obviously, Roberts’ relationship with the other members of the Affordable Care Act decision (National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius) was a quite different one.

The similarity between Roberts and Marshall is based upon the willingness of both to sacrifice short term results in favor of long term objectives.

Marshall did this most famously with his opinion in Marbury v. Madison (1803). While denying his fellow Federalist William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia—a commission issued by former Secretary of State John Marshall!—Marshall was able to establish the far more important principle of judicial review in his opinion. Although Marshall’s chief adversary, President Thomas Jefferson, knew exactly what Marshall was doing, he was without recourse since his side technically won the case.

Nearly two decades later, Marshall used the same tactic to confirm the superiority of federal constitutional review over that of the state courts in Cohens v. Virginia (1821). The Cohen brothers were convicted of violating a Virginia anti-lottery statute when they tried to sell tickets for a Congressionally-authorized lottery for the District of Columbia in Virginia. Virginia courts ruled that Virginia law took precedence over the act of Congress and both brothers were fined.

The Cohens appealed their conviction to the United States Supreme Court. Virginia contested the court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the Constitution did not give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases begun in state courts or, for that matter, over any matter involving a state as a party. Moreover, it insisted that the Eleventh Amendment immunized it from suit in federal court, including appeals to the United States Supreme Court under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act.

As in Marbury, Marshall issued a powerful defense of federal judicial authority and in doing so rejected all of the arguments advanced on behalf of his home state. However, having rejected Virginia’s constitutional argument, he then found that the statute creating the District of Columbia lottery had not authorized agents to sell tickets in Virginia, and, therefore, there was no issue of federal versus state supremacy, and the Cohens convictions were withheld.

In Green v. Biddle (1823), Marshall adopted a broad, and not at all obvious, reading of the Obligations of Contracts Clause that was clearly at odds with a strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution favored by his Virginia opponents. However, he issued this ruling in the context of upholding the validity of Virginia land titles in the state of Kentucky (which until 1792 was the westernmost county of Virginia), again leaving his opponents with a formal victory on the facts but with a major defeat on fundamental principles.

Roberts’ Affordable Care Act opinion appears to be a decision in this line. At its core, his opinion validates the older constitutional view that the Commerce Clause places real limitations on the extent of Congressional power, even in the realm of economic regulation. This position was long believed to have been discredited by the 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn, but in the Affordable Care Act case (National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius) five of the nine justices endorsed such a position.

However, because Justice Roberts found an alternate constitutional basis for upholding the individual mandate provisions of the act (the tax power), liberals were hardly in a position to criticize his opinion. Instead, he was roundly praised for his willingness to work with the Court’s liberal bloc.

However, as was the case with Marshall’s Marbury, Cohens, and Green v. Biddle decisions, the full implications of Roberts’ decision will not be known until a later day. Only history will tell us if Roberts’ use of this strategy will be as effective for him as it was for John Marshall.

Continue ReadingJohn Roberts, the New John Marshall?

Best of the Blogs: Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Affordable Care Act

The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act has generated a great deal of “instant analysis” on the web.  This post will survey some of the noteworthy commentary.

I have not read anything that has caused me to re-evaluate my initial reaction to the decision.  I thought that neither Justice Robert’s Commerce Clause analysis nor his Taxing Power analysis was particularly compelling, yet I was struck by the manner in which the Chief Justice managed to construct a 5-4 majority that paralleled Marbury v. Madison insofar as the ruling chastized a sitting President with its rhetoric while simultaneously handing the President a major policy victory.  Upon further reflection, I still believe that future Supreme Court justices will find it quite easy to evade the boundaries that the language of the NFIB v. Sebelius decision purports to place on federal government power.  All it will take is a change in one vote for a future Court to designate the opinion’s Commerce Clause analysis as “dicta,” or else to find the requisite level of coercion lacking the next time that Congress’ deploys its Spending Power in a similar fashion.  While the rhetoric of the opinion promises doctrinal limits on federal power, the actual holdings of the decision fail to deliver on that promise.

John Yoo has come to the same conclusion.  In an op ed piece in the Wall Street Journal he considers the spin that some political conservatives have placed on the Court’s ruling — that it was a victory for the advocates of limited governent — and finds these assertions to be no more than a “hollow hope.”  He rejects the comparison to Marbury v. Madison, and instead compares the opinion of Justice Roberts to the “switch in time” that led the Supreme Court to uphold New Deal Era legislation during the Franklin Roosevelt Administration.  By frustrating the Supreme Court’s best chance since the 1930s to reverse what Yoo views as an anti-originalist acceptance of broad legislative power, Justice Roberts has let Professor Yoo down.

Continue ReadingBest of the Blogs: Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Affordable Care Act

Can Congress “Regulate” Decisions Not to Commit Federal Crimes Under the Commerce Clause?

One of the side-debates in the ACA decisions yesterday was between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg over the meaning of the term “regulate.” The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3, empowers Congress “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several states . . . .” Much of the pre-decision debate over the ACA mandate involved whether mandating the purchase of a service — health insurance — fell within the definition of “commerce.” This is where the famous “activity/inactivity” distinction arose: choosing not to buy something is not “commerce,” the argument went, and therefore not within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.

Chief Justice Roberts didn’t exactly adopt that argument, however, in his opinion denying that Congress had Commerce Clause authority to mandate the purchase of health insurance. (I’m not an expert on Supreme Court voting rules, but there’s considerable debate about whether, even though five justices said the mandate was beyond the Commerce Clause, that’s actually a binding holding of the court.) Instead, what Roberts held was that mandating the purchase of health insurance isn’t regulation:

The language of the Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes there is already something to be regulated. . . . The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product,on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority.

Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus., slip op. at 19, 20. This is a novel twist on the argument. Chief Justice Roberts is clear that he is not rejecting the idea that choosing not to buy health insurance affects commerce, at least in the same way that Filburn’s growing the wheat his family consumed affected commerce. It’s that a law forbidding individuals from making a choice not to do something doesn’t regulate commerce.

To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both have measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were “practical statesmen,” not metaphysical philosophers. . . . The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding. There is no reason to depart from that understanding now.

Perhaps I am missing something (a good friend of mine evaluated my argument below as follows: “Meh”), but I don’t see how this can be right.

Continue ReadingCan Congress “Regulate” Decisions Not to Commit Federal Crimes Under the Commerce Clause?