The Civil Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes

This is the fourth in a series of posts addressing commonly asked questions regarding American Indians, Indian Tribes, and the law. The first post dealt with casinos, taxation, and hunting and fishing rights; the second focused on the relationship between the unique legal treatment of Indian tribes or their members and the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection; and the third explored the criminal jurisdiction of tribes. This post will examine the civil jurisdiction of tribes, both over members and especially over non-members, in each its three major forms: regulation, taxation, and adjudication.

As noted in the last post, tribal jurisdiction (not unlike federal and state jurisdiction) is uniquely limited in a manner that reflects the place and circumstances of tribes on the American legal landscape. In particular, each tribe is said to retain its original or inherent jurisdiction—the sovereign authority possessed prior to European contact and the subsequent formation of the United States—except insofar as such jurisdiction has been (1) relinquished or ceded by tribe itself through a treaty or other agreement, (2) expressly abrogated or taken away by Congress, or (3) deemed by the judiciary, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, to have been implicitly lost by virtue of the tribe’s historical circumstances and contemporary status.

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Cockfighting, Congress, and Interstate Commerce

Some convicted defendants in South Carolina are crying foul at the application of the federal Animal Welfare Act to criminally punish the promotion of cockfighting. The statute is said to be based in the power of Congress, found in article I, section 8 of the Constitution, to “regulate commerce . . . among the several States . . . .” Federal prosecutors successfully applied the statute at the trial level, and now the case is before a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.

The defendants (now appellants) argue that their conduct is not sufficiently related to interstate commerce, and is too local in character, to justify Congress’ exercise of its interstate commerce authority. Their contention in this regard is not about whether the promotion of cockfighting may be banned, but rather whether such conduct may be banned by Congress, which can only enact statutes that further its constitutionally enumerated powers. (Such conduct is largely prohibited, albeit with a lesser criminal sanction, by South Carolina law.)  Their contention, moreover, appears not to be that the Animal Welfare Act as a whole is unconstitutional, but only that its application to their particular conduct exceeds Congress’s interstate commerce power.

The appellants’ arguments have a familiar ring to them.

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