Does the Threat of Future Copyright Infringement Amount to Irreparable Harm?

Chief among the bundle of rights one obtains in property ownership is the right to exclude others from the use and enjoyment of that property.  This “sole and despotic dominion” that an individual commands over their property is placed in danger, of course, when the property becomes subject to the wants and needs of others.  Absent the owner’s consent (as in the case of licensing) or operation of law (as with adverse possession), a property owner would be able to bring an action for trespass for such intrusions.

A judge holding a defendant liable for trespass perhaps carries the vision of plaintiffs having their rights vindicated, but cases do not end at liability.  The judge must also determine whether further remedies beyond damages are appropriate, including whether a permanent injunction should issue.  Such is a weighty decision touches upon an extraordinary remedy: a court order that a defendant must cease and desist its illegal activity or face punishment for contempt.   That being said, in many property cases, a court order only issuing damages would effectuate a judicial licensing of the behavior.  With that result, the incentives are adjusted such that the right to exclude does not rest with the plaintiff; instead, it is determined only by the extent to which the defendant is willing and able to engage in the trespassing behavior.  As such, the courts have presumptively treated infringement of property rights as worthy of injunctive relief.

That has also been the rule in copyright infringement cases for the last few decades. 

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A Broadening of Diversity Jurisdiction

Students of civil procedure—which should mean just about everybody interested in using the formal processes of the law to vindicate rights—will be interested in a decision today by the United States Supreme Court. The opinion concerned the provision in the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction that deems a corporation “to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U. S. C. §1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). There has been a longstanding imprecision—a lack of unanimity—within the lower federal courts as to whether a corporation’s “principal place of business” is its “nerve center,” “locus of operations,” “center of corporate activities,” “muscle center” (none of these latter four terms being statutory), or some otherwise determined place. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the Court resolved the matter.

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Eighth Circuit Reinstates ERISA Case Against Wal-Mart Involving Iqbal Plausibility Standard

401K_2 A number of my ERISA friends have sent me the case of Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 08-3798 (8th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009).  The case involves a class action dispute, alleging breach of fiduciary issues in the way that Wal-Mart managed its profit sharing and 401(k) retirement plans:

The gravamen of the complaint is that appellees failed adequately to evaluate the investment options included in the Plan. It alleges that the process by which the mutual funds were selected was tainted by appellees’ failure to consider trustee Merrill Lynch’s interest in including funds that shared their fees with the trustee. The result of these failures, according to Braden, is that some or all of the investment options included in the Plan charge excessive fees. He estimates that these fees have unnecessarily cost the Plan some $60 million over the past six years and will continue to waste approximately $20 million per year . . . .

Braden alleges extensive facts in support of these claims. He claims that Wal-
Mart’s retirement plan is relatively large and that plans of such size have substantial bargaining power in the highly competitive 401(k) marketplace. As a result, plans such as Wal-Mart’s can obtain institutional shares of mutual funds, which, Braden claims, are significantly cheaper than the retail shares generally offered to individual investors. Nonetheless, he alleges that the Plan only offers retail class shares to participants. Braden also avers that seven of the ten funds charge 12b-1 fees, which he alleges are used to benefit the fund companies but not Plan participants.

The case is significant because the Plan has over one million participants and nearly $10 billion in assets.

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