Does Baseball’s Antitrust Immunity Extend to Baseball Card Contracts?

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The baseball antitrust exemption has turned out to be one of the great anomalies of American law.  First recognized in the Supreme Court’s Federal Baseball decision in 1922 at a time when “commerce” was understood much more narrowly than it would be in the post-New Deal world, the exemption took on a life of its own in the 1953 Toolson decision when the Supreme Court acknowledged that professional baseball was commerce after all but that it was leaving the matter of invalidating the exemption to Congress.  In 1972, the Court reasserted the exemption in Flood v. Kuhn, and Congress reaffirmed it in 1999 in the Curt Flood Act in regard to all matters covered by the exemption except major league labor relations.

While there is no question that the Major League Baseball antitrust exemption still exists, it is not at all clear what aspects of the baseball business are protected by the exemption.  Does it apply to any undertaking by Major League Baseball, or is it limited to certain baseball-specific activities? Comments made by my colleague Matt Mitten in an interview presented elsewhere suggest that Matt believes that the exemption applies to all aspects of the professional baseball business.

I am not sure that this is true.  A quarter of a century ago the federal district court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that the baseball antitrust exemption did not extend to restrictions on broadcasting.  (Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, Inc, 541 F. Supp. 263, 265-72 (S.D. Tex. 1982))  So far as I can tell this decision has never been overruled or even directly contradicted by a decision of a different court. Although the Supreme Court has provided no definitive answer, the conventional wisdom appears to be that the exemption applies only to matters central to the “business of baseball.”  This was the standard adopted in the relatively recent case, Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003).

Of course this interpretation just replaces one question with another.  We still have to ask what aspects of the baseball business are “central” to its operation, and as of yet, we have no definitive answer.  Clearly territorial monopolies, minor league salary caps; and restrictions of minor league player mobility are central to the operation of baseball, but what else falls into this category?

Now Major League Baseball has gone and entered into a contract with Topps, Inc., giving that company the exclusive right to use Major League team names and logos with in the production of baseball cards. Topps’ primary competitor in the baseball card market, Upper Deck, can still issue baseball cards of players under its non-exclusive license with the Major League Baseball Players Association, but it will not be permitted to use team names or symbols on its cards.  As a practical matter, this will probably force the company out of the baseball card business, at least until Topps’ exclusive license expires.

It is hard for me to see how the production of baseball cards by an independent company could constitute an activity “central to the business of baseball.”  There was a time when baseball cards were a primary way that fans, particularly young fans, learned about the teams and players of Major League Baseball, but in the age of the Internet, it is hard to believe that baseball cards are in anyway a necessary component of marketing Major League Baseball to the public (if they ever were).  Consequently, the new Topps monopoly will likely to be found to be subject to antitrust challenge.  Whether or not the challenge will succeed is a topic for a different post.

On an entirely personal note, I have extremely fond memories of the old Topps baseball card monopoly that existed from 1956 to 1980.  In that period, only Topps produced baseball cards, and the cards were printed on cheap cardboard, packed to the gills with information about the pictured player not otherwise readily available, and packaged with super sweet sticks of bubble gum.  Even with the gum, they were incredibly inexpensive—a penny a card until the late 1960’s, and less than two-cents a card until the late 1970’s.

There were almost no baseball card shops in that era, so cards had to be purchased by the pack in regular stores that sold candy.  If you were missing a player’s card that you felt you needed, you had to buy more packs or else figure out a way to trade with a friend who had a card of the player you wanted. Many kids learned the rudiments of negotiation from such exchanges.

In fact, the only problem with the old Topps monopoly was that it wasn’t a true monopoly.  Fleer, which competed with Topps in the larger bubble gum market managed to sign a few well-known players including a handful of stars—Ted Williams, Maury Wills, and Wilmer “Vinegar Bend” Mizell (who was later a congressman from North Carolina) for example—but the company never had enough players under contract to produce its own bubblegum based player set.  In 1962, the year he was the National League’s Most Valuable Player, the only way to get a Maury Wills baseball card was to find one on the back of a Post Cereal box.

Because the Topps monopoly only applied to cards packaged with bubblegum or its equivalents cards could be marketed with other products, although that rarely happened.  (The Post experiment of putting baseball cards on cereal boxes only lasted for three years.).  In that era, no one thought of simply marketing the cards alone.

If the new Topps monopoly can somehow bring back the magic to baseball card collecting, then it will be a restraint of trade that we should gladly accept.

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Yankees and New York Decide to Settle First Amendment Case

yankeesfanLast month the City of New York and the New York Yankees baseball club decided to settle rather than litigate a lawsuit filed by a disgruntled fan who was ejected from a Red Sox-Yankees game in August of 2008, ostensibly for refusing to stay in his seat during the playing of God Bless America.

Had the case gone to trial, it could have raised complicated First Amendment questions relating to the ability of a municipally owned stadium to regulate unpopular political speech and symbolic gestures on the part of its patrons.

The ejected fan, Bradford Campeau Laurion, shown above, a 29-year old resident of Queens, New York, was represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union. Under the reported terms of the settlement Campeau received $22,000, $12,000 of which went to the NYCLU for legal services.

Although the details of the incident are still a matter of dispute, Campeau has consistently asserted that he was not trying to make a political statement and that he left his seat during the playing of God Bless America only because he was desperate to go to the bathroom after drinking two beers. Campeau was attending the game with a friend who was a Yankee season ticket holder.

When Campeau left his seat he was confronted by a New York City police officer who insisted that he would have to remain in his seat until the song was finished. Campeau claims that he told the policeman, “, ‘I don’t care about God Bless America. I just need to use the bathroom” and that in response to that statement the policeman and one of his colleagues pinned his arm behind his back and escorted him to the front entrance of Yankee Stadium where he was evicted into the street. According to Campeau, on the way out the policemen told him to “get out of their country if I didn’t like it.”

The officer told a different story, insisting that the ejection had nothing to do with the song. According to his account, Campeau was observed “standing on his seat, cursing, using inappropriate language and acting in a disorderly manner, while reeking of alcohol.” According to the officer, he “decided to eject him rather than subject others to his offensive behavior.” The accuracy of this description is disputed by Campeau and his friend, the season ticket holder.

The settlement contained no confession of liability and, in fact, included a stipulation whereby the plaintiff agreed that the City and the Yankees had the right to regulate the conduct of fans during the singing of God Bless America and at other times. Although Campeau insisted that he was unaware of the policy, the Yankees had, prior to the game Campeau attended, adopted a policy of requiring patrons to remain in their seats during the playing of the National Anthem and God Bless America.

In spite of this concession, New York Civil Liberties Union Executive Director Donna Lieberman pronounced that “[t]his settlement ensures that the new Yankee Stadium will be a place for baseball, not compelled patriotism.” Christopher Dunn, NYCLU associate legal director and lead counsel in the case added: “Neither the Yankees nor the NYPD can force people to engage in acts of political loyalty. As a result of our lawsuit, fans can now go to a ballgame at Yankee Stadium knowing they will not be subjected to NYPD-enforced patriotism.”

A more cynical observer might conclude that the point of the case is that one should plan on going to the bathroom in Yankee Stadium during the playing of God Bless America. The bathrooms should be easily accessible, and if you get thrown out for leaving your seat you can cash in your ticket for $10,000.

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Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What Is a Crime of Violence?

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The Armed Career Criminal Act and § 4B1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines both provide for lengthened prison terms for certain defendants with three or more prior convictions for crimes of violence.  It’s clear that certain prior convictions qualify (e.g., rape and armed robbery), but there are a surprisingly large number of offenses in the gray area between violent and nonviolent. 

As I discussed in an earlier post, the Supreme Court recently developed a new definition for “crime of violence” in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), in which the Court held that prior DUI convictions do not trigger ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum.  Begay cast a lot of circuit-court precedent into doubt, and the Seventh Circuit has been struggling ever since to develop a consistent, coherent approach to identifying what types of offenses count as “violent.”  (See, for example, this post.)  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has also remained active in this area.  Last term, for instance, the Court held that failure to report to prison and walkaway escapes are not crimes of violence in Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).  And the Court recently granted cert in Johnson v. United States to decide whether a battery offense counts as violent.

Reflecting the turbulence in this area of the law, the Seventh Circuit had three — count ’em, three — notable new opinions dealing with the “crime of violence” question last week. 

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