President & Executive Branch – Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog

Prof. Merrill’s Hallows Lecture on How Implicit Legal Ideas Have Deformed the Constitution

Post author:Joseph D. Kearney
Post published:March 6, 2026
Post category:Congress & Congressional Power Constitutional Interpretation Constitutional Law Judges & Judicial Process President & Executive Branch Speakers at Marquette

Thomas W. Merrill amd Joe Kearney at a podium. — Dean Kearney (left) welcomes a question for Prof. Merrill after the Hallows Lecture.

The Law School had the privilege earlier this week to present our annual Hallows Lecture. The occasion remembers E. Harold Hallows, a Milwaukee lawyer who taught part-time at Marquette Law School during 1930–1958 and then served on the Wisconsin Supreme Court from 1958 until his death in 1974, the last six years as chief justice. For the lecture, we welcomed Thomas W. Merrill, the Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia University, one of the nation’s most widely respected legal scholars.

Prof. Merrill’s Hallows Lecture, delivered on March 2 in the Lubar Center before 200 people (we counted), was rather a tour de force. Here were the title and advance description:

“Unstated”: How Three Implicit Legal Ideas Have Sidelined Congress and Empowered the President and the Courts

Why has Congress, the constitutional keystone of the federal government, become so ineffective, relative to the president and the federal judiciary? While many explanations have been offered, one important but unappreciated reason is legal ideas—not just widely discussed concepts such as the unitary executive and originalist interpretation of the Constitution but also, and perhaps even more importantly, unstated ideas that have taken hold without much explicit discussion or acknowledgment. This lecture will identify and discuss three largely unquestioned ideas that have combined to deform our constitutional regime. Their result has been that the president wields immense power in the guise of issuing orders and binding regulations and the courts exercise great power in the guise of interpreting the Constitution and laws, while Congress stands largely out of the picture. While there is no magic incantation for restoring a proper constitutional balance, an important first step is to recognize the role that unstated ideas have played in the transformation, so that they can be unmasked and debated in the open.

Even in advance of its publication this coming fall in the Marquette Law Review and Marquette Lawyer, Professor Merrill serialized the lecture this week for a national audience on the Volokh Conspiracy blog. Following an introductory post by Professor Eugene Volokh, the blog featured the following posts the past four days, March 2–5:

The text of the entire lecture as prepared for presentation can be read here, and a video of the lecture is available to view here.

Running Away from History in Trump v. Slaughter

Post author:Christine Kexel Chabot
Post published:December 4, 2025
Post category:Constitutional Law President & Executive Branch Public U.S. Supreme Court

[This piece is cross-posted and was originally published in the Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment blog.] On December 8, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the landmark case of Trump v. Slaughter. A fundamental issue in the case is whether the statutorily created office of Commissioner for the FTC can include partial restrictions on the President’s ability to remove a Commissioner. The government contends that the statutory removal restrictions impinge on an indefeasible Presidential removal power under Article II.

While the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Seila Law and Collins have recognized an indefeasible Presidential removal power for some officers, a flood of recent research has undermined historical arguments for a categorical rule that would extend removal at pleasure to all officers or all principal officers. For summaries of this historical literature see Chabot, Katz, Rosenblum & Manners, Nelson, Katz & Gienapp. (My latest paper, The Interstitial Executive: A View from the Founding, adds more fuel to the fire: it introduces a critical body of previously overlooked archival evidence to show that the Washington, Adams, and Jefferson administrations routinely complied with statutory removal restrictions in their officer commissions.)

The government’s reply brief banked on recent precedent from the Roberts Court. It leaned into Seila Law and the unitary understanding of the Decision of 1789 that the Court adopted in that case. At the same time, the government offered an extension of Seila Law that would create further conflicts with the historical record.

Both Seila Law and the officers created pursuant to the Decision of 1789 involved departments led by single officers. Neither Seila Law nor the Decision of 1789 involved statutory tenure protections for officers serving on multimember commissions such as the Federal Reserve or the FTC. As a result, Seila Law is not necessarily at odds with historical evidence supporting these independent multimember commissions. Some of the strongest Founding era examples of tenure-protected officers were those serving on multimember commissions such as the Sinking Fund Commission (described in my work here and here) and the Revolutionary War Debt Commission (described in recent work by Victoria Nourse as well as my new paper).

State Supreme Courts and the “Major Questions” Doctrine

Post author:David Strifling
Post published:October 3, 2022
Post category:Constitutional Law Environmental Law President & Executive Branch Public

When a legislative body delegates authority to an administrative agency, it cannot envision every future scenario, and often uses language that is regrettably—but necessarily—imprecise. Take, for example, the power given the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources to exercise “general supervision and control over the waters of the state.”[1] Or consider the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to select the “best system of emission reduction” for certain entities emitting air pollution. (The United States Supreme Court analyzed the scope of the latter provision earlier this summer in West Virginia v. EPA). Operationalizing such vaguely worded authority has proven difficult for agencies. Disputes about the true extent of the delegation arise when the agency takes action near the limit of the delegation.

In the legal skirmishes that result, courts sometimes find the agency has gone too far. The most recent, high-profile example of this is the West Virginia case, in which the Court endorsed the “major questions” doctrine. The Court examined EPA’s authority to enact a plan to cut emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants. To some extent, the plan required a “generation shifting” approach mandating a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources such as solar and wind. The Court took a skeptical view of the plan. It held that in certain “extraordinary cases” raising a “major question” of “economic and political significance,” there is good reason to restrain the scope of an administrative agency’s power, especially if Congress had not clearly delegated authority for the agency to take the questioned action. The Court further explained that the doctrine flows from traditional separation of powers principles inherent in the federal constitution. The holding seems likely to restrict the reach of just about any federal agency’s authority.

In light of West Virginia, will state courts adopt state-level equivalents of the “major questions” doctrine, based on the parallel separation of powers principles in state constitutions? In Wisconsin, the answer is not as clear as you might think, particularly in light of two recent Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions rejecting constraints on agency power, even when based on murky conferrals of legislative authority.