Running Away from History in Trump v. Slaughter

[This piece is cross-posted and was originally published in the Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment blog.] On December 8, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the landmark case of Trump v. Slaughter. A fundamental issue in the case is whether the statutorily created office of Commissioner for the FTC can include partial restrictions on the President’s ability to remove a Commissioner. The government contends that the statutory removal restrictions impinge on an indefeasible Presidential removal power under Article II.  

While the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Seila Law and Collins have recognized an indefeasible Presidential removal power for some officers, a flood of recent research has undermined historical arguments for a categorical rule that would extend removal at pleasure to all officers or all principal officers. For summaries of this historical literature see Chabot, Katz, Rosenblum & Manners, Nelson, Katz & Gienapp. (My latest paper, The Interstitial Executive: A View from the Founding, adds more fuel to the fire: it introduces a critical body of previously overlooked archival evidence to show that the Washington, Adams, and Jefferson administrations routinely complied with statutory removal restrictions in their officer commissions.)

The government’s reply brief banked on recent precedent from the Roberts Court. It leaned into Seila Law and the unitary understanding of the Decision of 1789 that the Court adopted in that case.  At the same time, the government offered an extension of Seila Law that would create further conflicts with the historical record.

Both Seila Law and the officers created pursuant to the Decision of 1789 involved departments led by single officers. Neither Seila Law nor the Decision of 1789 involved statutory tenure protections for officers serving on multimember commissions such as the Federal Reserve or the FTC. As a result, Seila Law is not necessarily at odds with historical evidence supporting these independent multimember commissions.  Some of the strongest Founding era examples of tenure-protected officers were those serving on multimember commissions such as the Sinking Fund Commission (described in my work here and here) and the Revolutionary War Debt Commission (described in recent work by Victoria Nourse as well as my new paper).  

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State Supreme Courts and the “Major Questions” Doctrine

When a legislative body delegates authority to an administrative agency, it cannot envision every future scenario, and often uses language that is regrettably—but necessarily—imprecise. Take, for example, the power given the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources to exercise “general supervision and control over the waters of the state.”[1] Or consider the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to select the “best system of emission reduction” for certain entities emitting air pollution. (The United States Supreme Court analyzed the scope of the latter provision earlier this summer in West Virginia v. EPA). Operationalizing such vaguely worded authority has proven difficult for agencies. Disputes about the true extent of the delegation arise when the agency takes action near the limit of the delegation.

In the legal skirmishes that result, courts sometimes find the agency has gone too far. The most recent, high-profile example of this is the West Virginia case, in which the Court endorsed the “major questions” doctrine. The Court examined EPA’s authority to enact a plan to cut emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants. To some extent, the plan required a “generation shifting” approach mandating a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources such as solar and wind. The Court took a skeptical view of the plan. It held that in certain “extraordinary cases” raising a “major question” of “economic and political significance,” there is good reason to restrain the scope of an administrative agency’s power, especially if Congress had not clearly delegated authority for the agency to take the questioned action. The Court further explained that the doctrine flows from traditional separation of powers principles inherent in the federal constitution. The holding seems likely to restrict the reach of just about any federal agency’s authority.

In light of West Virginia, will state courts adopt state-level equivalents of the “major questions” doctrine, based on the parallel separation of powers principles in state constitutions? In Wisconsin, the answer is not as clear as you might think, particularly in light of two recent Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions rejecting constraints on agency power, even when based on murky conferrals of legislative authority.

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New Marquette Lawyer Magazine Examines War Powers, State Supreme Court Elections, Legal Scholarship Ethics, and More

The bald eagle symbolizes the strength of the United States, not least when the country uses its military power. The eagle on the cover of the Marquette Lawyer magazine, Fall 2018 issue, shows the determination, even the fierceness, of the eagle during times of war.

But the process involved in deciding where and how that eagle flies is more complex than many people may realize. In the cover story in the new Marquette Law School magazine, David J. Barron, judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and formerly a Harvard Law School professor, insightfully examines three chapters in American history when a president and leaders of Congress had differing positions on use of power. Barron focuses on three of the nation’s most revered presidents: George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The article is an edited and expanded version of the E. Harold Hallows Lecture that Barron delivered at the Law School in April 2018. To read the article, click here.

Interspersed throughout the article are reactions by three individuals with different perspectives on the relationship between Congress and the commander-in-chief: Russ Feingold, former three-term U.S. senator from Wisconsin and currently distinguished visiting lecturer in international studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison; Julia R. Azari, associate professor of political science at Marquette University and a scholar of the American presidency; and Benjamin Wittes, editor in chief of Lawfare and senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution.

Barron’s article, together with the reactions, is only one of the thoughtful and thought-provoking pieces in the new Marquette Lawyer. Elsewhere in the magazine:

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