Finding a New Canon of Statutory Interpretation in an Old Case

Yesterday, Professor Anita Krishnakumar gave an intriguing presentation on her latest paper entitled “The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The National Narrative Canon.”  A copy of her paper can be found here.  In her paper, Professor Krishnakumar explores the controversial, but not often discussed, portion of the famous Holy Trinity Church decision.  The well-known, and still somewhat controversial, portion of the decision finds the Court relying on the “spirit” of the statute instead of its plain language — with support from legislative history.  The more controversial section of the opinion argues that even setting aside traditional methods of statutory interpretation, the statute — which was essentially an anti-immigrant labor statute — could not be enforced against the employer church because the United States of America “is a Christian nation.”  Professor Krishnakumar argues that this methodology constitutes an interpretive canon for statutory interpretation: the national narrative canon.  She also points to other Supreme Court opinions that use a similar methodology where the Court not only uses traditional interpretive canons, but also this national narrative canon — relying on history and public norms — in deciding the cases.

Professor Krishnakumar warns that this newly-identified, but long extant, national narrative canon poses a threat to the perceived legitimacy of courts’ statutory interpretation because it often runs contrary to the text of the statute, produces bad policy, and can create an unfair exception for a particular entity.  While the national narrative canon has been used selectively, it will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court — and indeed other courts — moves more towards this public norms approach to statutory interpretation.  In this age of New Textualism, it strikes me as likely that — as seen with the cases Professor Krishnakumar analyzes — to the degree its used, the Court will couple the national narrative canon with another more traditional approach to statutory interpretation in reaching its decision.  In this regard, the Court will continue to make the national narrative canon less effective in terms of precedential value, seemingly serving more as dicta.  However, its potential effect  should not be understated, as these portions of the Court’s opinion can still have powerful effects in the political realm in ways which may run contrary to our society’s commitment to pluralism and diversity.

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When Does the Habeas Statute of Limitations Begin to Run?

The Supreme Court hears argument today in the case of Jimenez v. Quarterman (No. 07-6994).  The case requires the Court to determine what triggers the one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus claims.  Congress imposed the one-year limitation in 1996, hoping to diminish the number and success of challenges in federal court to state convictions.  The statute, in pertinent part, provides that the one-year clock for filing a federal claim begins to run on “the date on which the [state] judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”  This may seem straightforward enough, but Jimenez’s case highlights an ambiguity.  

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Cert. Grant: Do Prisoners Have a Right to Use New Technology To Prove Their Innocence?

The Supreme Court today granted certiorari in District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne (No. 08-6, opinion below: 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008)). At issue is whether a prisoner convicted of rape can sue a prosecutor’s office to obtain DNA evidence for more sophisticated testing than was available at the time of the prisoner’s trial. Lurking in the background is the difficult constitutional question of whether the prisoner would be entitled to obtain his release through a federal habeas corpus petition if DNA testing proved his innocence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly dodged this issue in the past, refusing squarely to hold whether or not innocent prisoners have a constitutional right to be relieved from their punishment under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).

The formalists on the Court have a hard time swallowing any constitutional rights that are not spelled out in explicit detail in the text of the Constitution, but I’ve always thought that “due process,” if it is to mean anything at all, must surely include a right not to be punished if one is not guilty. I think most Americans would be shocked to learn that the state may simply ignore persuasive evidence of innocence and continue to hold a prisoner for years (or potentially even execute the prisoner) despite grave doubts as to the prisoner’s guilt. New forensics technology (especially DNA testing) will eventually force the courts to tell us once and for all whether that is indeed the state of the law.

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