Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Nken v. Filip, on Question of Standard of Review for Stays of Removal Pending Appeal

Yesterday the Supreme Court heard the argument in Nken v. Filip (formerly Nken v. Mukasey), which asks whether an alien who seeks a stay of deportation pending appeal must prove by clear and convincing evidence that his deportation is prohibited by law.  The majority of courts have held that the ordinary standard for stays pending appeal continues to apply to such stays despite Congress’s enactment in 1996 of legislation providing that “no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law,”8  U.S.C. sec. 1252(f)(2).

The question is especially important in cases like Mr. Nken’s, in which the alien’s underlying claim is that he will suffer severe persecution or even death if returned to his country.  If such aliens must demonstrate their right to stay by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., more than a preponderance of the evidence, to obtain a stay, then the expected result would be that some aliens with valid claims would be returned to their home countries and possibly subject to persecution before having the chance to have their appeals decided on the merits.

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Seventh Circuit Week in Review, Part II: Piling on the Mandatory Minimums

In addition to the two cases covered in my prior post, the Seventh Circuit had four new sentencing opinions last week.  Only one warrants any extended discussion.  And that case, United States v. Easter (Nos. 07-2433, 2435, 3118, 3203, 3540 & 3628), actually presented several different issues raised by multiple defendants.

In Easter, several codefendants appealed their sentences for various drug trafficking convictions.  One, McKay, challenged the application of a mandatory minimum sentence to him based on the quantity of drugs involved in his offense.  The ten-year minimum was applied to McKay because he and his coconspirators were responsible for at least 50 grams of crack or one kilogram of heroin (the actual basis was unclear).  McKay’s appeal centered on the fact that, for purposes of calculating his sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines, the district court found him responsible for only 960 grams of heroin and 45-75 grams of crack.  However, the Seventh Circuit (in a per curiam decision) noted that the guidelines do not hold defendants responsible for as much of the conduct of their coconspirators as do the mandatory minimum statutes.  (For an earlier post on this topic, see here.)  Considering the full set of drug sales foreseeably perpetrated by McKay’s coconspirators, the district court could permissibly reach the quantity thresholds for the ten-year prison sentence.

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Canada Orders U.S. Army Deserter to Return to the United States

Private First Class Kimberly Rivera had been seeking leave to remain in Canada “on humanitarian and compassionate grounds” to avoid prosecution for deserting her post in the U.S. Army.  Her claim, like the claims of other U.S. soldiers seeking to avoid further duty in the Iraq War in Canada, has been rejected, and, unless that decision is reversed, she is supposed to return to the U.S. by January 27th.

I was a bit startled the first time I heard about U.S. soldiers seeking refugee status in other countries to avoid serving, or continuing their service, in the Iraq War.  There have been a number of such cases in Canada, and at least one in Germany.  (And I should note before continuing that I’m not sure that “humanitarian and compassionate grounds” are quite the same as asylum; still, the remainder of this post focuses on these soldiers’ ability to establish asylum.)

Under U.S. law, the basic definition of a “refugee” is someone who “is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” and Canada’s definition is similar.  Generally speaking, as students in my refugee law seminar learn, volunteer soldiers who desert their posts do not qualify as “refugees” under this definition.

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