Last week, the United States announced its support for U.N. efforts to develop a new treaty regulating international trade in conventional arms. The terms are still far from settled, but draft provisions from a U.N. review conference last summer provide a rough guide on how the treaty might work. In this post, I want to highlight some of the key provisions and then explain a likely practical hurdle to U.S. ratification. In a subsequent post, I’ll address a Second Amendment objection raised by treaty critics.

The latest draft suggests that the treaty would have four basic dimensions. First, it would establish a limited number of categorically prohibited international transfers. These include transfers in violation of a measure adopted by the U.N. Security Council pursuant to the Council’s peacekeeping authority; transfers in violation of other international obligations; and transfers made for the purpose of facilitating genocide, crimes against humanity, or certain categories of war crimes.

Second, the treaty would limit the power of states to export conventional arms by requiring assessments on whether proposed exports would contribute to or undermine peace and security. Mandatory considerations would include whether the arms could be used to commit a serious violation of international humanitarian law, human rights law, or an offense under international treaties relating to terrorism. In the event of an “overriding risk” of one of these consequences, the treaty would prohibit the exporting state from authorizing the transfer. The treaty would also require exporting states to “consider taking feasible measures” to make sure that the arms are not diverted to the illicit market, used to commit gender-based violence, or used by transnational organized crime.

In June of this year, I was privileged to attend a series of discussions at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis between retired four-star Generals from both China and the US. The discussions covered a range of topics relevant to the American and Chinese military, including counter-terrorism operations, the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the South China Sea dispute. But a recurring point of contention and debate was America’s “pivot to Asia”, that is the strategic military refocus on Asia which was announced in 2011.

The Obama administration has been at pains to point out that the so-called pivot is not aimed at containing China. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, speaking in Singapore earlier in June 2012, likewise insisted that the shift of focus to the Asia-Pacific is not intended to contain or challenge China, saying that “increased US involvement in this region will benefit China as it advances our shared security and prosperity in the future”.

However, despite such reassurances, my impression from the Chinese Generals I met in Annapolis was that the pivot to Asia is widely regarded in Chinese military circles as indicative of American mistrust and suspicion towards China and its regional aspirations, and thinly veils America’s intention to assert its power and dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, including by means of military influence.

So I was interested, in last night’s Presidential debate on foreign policy, to note that in the segment dedicated to “The Rise of China and Tomorrow’s World” President Obama took the surprising step of referring to China as an adversary: “China is both an adversary, but also a potential partner in the international community if it is following the rules.” This characterization of China is inconsistent with the rhetoric deployed by the Obama administration, but is sure to resonate with many in China as indicative of the true nature and intent of America’s military pivot.