Intent and the Eighth Amendment: New Restrictions on Sentencing in Cases of Felony Murder?

The felony-murder rule is perhaps the most troubling and controversial surviving relic of the common law of homicide, branding felons as murderers notwithstanding an absence of the sort of culpability otherwise required for a murder conviction.

If we are not going to make culpability-based distinctions in these cases at the guilt stage, then we ought to do so at sentencing, reserving the most severe sentences for those felony-murderers who actually intended to kill.  Some states do indeed recognize this distinction for sentencing purposes, but others do not.  For those in the latter category, the Eighth Amendment might conceivably provide some protection for relatively low-culpability felony-murderers.  The Supreme Court seemed to be moving in this direction in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), but then in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), essentially limited Enmund to felony-murderers who lacked any culpability as to the killing and were not even physically present at the time it occurred.

With the Enmund/Tison line of decisions in mind, I thought it quite interesting that the Supreme Court granted cert. last month in two new Eighth Amendment cases presenting contrasting fact patterns that might provide a good platform for further regulation of felony-murder sentencing.

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Why Following the Rules Should Get You Out of Prison Early

I have a new paper on SSRN entitled “Solving the Good Time Puzzle: Why Following the Rules Should Get You Out of Prison Early.” Most U.S. jurisdictions permit inmates to obtain credit toward early release based on good behavior in prison. It’s not immediately clear, though, why the severity of a prison sentence should vary depending on how well an offender follows the rules while incarcerated. No amount of good or bad conduct in prison is capable of changing the seriousness of the underlying crime for which the offender is being punished.

The most common justification for good time is probably that it makes the job of prison administrators easier by giving them an additional set of incentives and sanctions to hold over inmates. Critics question, however, whether the potential loss of good time really does add anything to the deterrent effect of much more immediate sanctions, such as disciplinary segregation. Critics also object that the loss of good time — functionally an extension of the prison term — is not a just and proportionate response to rules violations that may be relatively technical and harmless and that need not be proven through formal trial-type proceedings.

In the paper, I argue that good time can thought of and justified in a different light. In essence, I suggest that good conduct in prison can be conceptualized as a form of partial atonement for the underlying crime. If seen in this way, good-time credits can be justified as a way of recognizing atonement, which seems to me an appropriate objective for the criminal-justice system.

Cross posted at Life Sentences.

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New Article by Prof. Calboli Explores Tension Between Free Trade and Trademark Rights

Irene Calboli grapples with a longstanding controversy over the “first sale rule” in trademark law in her new article, “Market Integration and (the Limits of) the First Sale Rule in North American and European Trademark Law,” 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1241 (2011).  As she explains,

Trademark law grants trademark owners the right to prevent third parties from using identical or similar signs to identify confusingly similar products in the market. Nevertheless, once a trademark owner has introduced into the market a product, or a batch of products, these rights are considered exhausted with respect to those products, and the trademark owner can no longer rely on trademark rights to control the products‘ future circulation. . . . [F]ierce disputes have characterized the application of this principle in the context of international trade with respect to the parallel imports of gray market goods—i.e., genuine (originally manufactured) products, which are imported into a country from unauthorized third party importers after their first authorized sale by trademark owners in another part of the world.

In the article, Irene considers how the “first sale” issue has been addressed in North American and European trade law.  The abstract to her paper appears after the jump.

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