Open Quantity Contracts: Beyond Good Faith

Business concerns sometimes enter into sales agreements that do not specify a particular quantity to be sold.  This might be helpful, for instance, if a manufacturer would like to secure a commitment from a supplier to meet the manufacturer’s needs, but it is not certain what the needs will be.  These business relationships do not always work out over the long term, however, and litigation often results.  In these cases, courts have struggled to establish clear, consistent standards with respect to the validity and terms of open quantity contracts.  Many of these cases turn on the application of amorphous “good faith” standards, raising concerns about unpredictability and the possibility that the courts are effectively imposing requirements on the parties that they never actually contemplated. 

Bravely seeking to bring some coherence and clarity to this difficult area of the law, Shelley Smith has a helpful new article on SSRN entitled “A New Approach to the Identification and Enforcement of Open Quantity Contracts: Reforming the Law of Exclusivity and Good Faith.”  She describes her three-part reform agenda as follows: 

Continue ReadingOpen Quantity Contracts: Beyond Good Faith

Should We Abolish Copyright in Academic Journal Articles?

scholarSome years ago, when I was on the Marquette Law Review editorial board, my responsibilities included obtaining a rudimentary copyright release from authors whose articles we had agreed to publish.  In fact, I signed the form myself when I published my Note.  If we did not obtain the release, we would not publish the article.  I presume this is still the Review’s policy, although current members can confirm or deny it, and I also suspect that many journals have a similar procedure.  If the “open access” movement continues to gather steam, however, one can wonder how long this and similar practices will continue.    For example, Professor Steven Shavell recently posted a draft, pre-publication article for public comment arguing that we should abolish copyright for all academic writings.

The open access debate goes well beyond the world of academia, and what follows is only a brief summary.  Many open access advocates support both free online access to works as well as the granting of a license that permits copying and redistribution of the work.  They underscore the broad societal benefits that would flow from broad public access to such information.  Opponents of the movement have argued that true open access is impossible because publishers could not then recover the costs of their work, and that all but a few scholarly journals would cease to exist.  The usual response to this criticism is that the journals could simply charge the authors fees to cover their costs in publishing such works (and, in turn, that the fees would likely be paid by the authors’ university employers).  Perhaps this counterargument is less attractive given the current global economic downturn.

I think the fundamental question is the following: what motivates academic authors to write and publish journal articles? 

Continue ReadingShould We Abolish Copyright in Academic Journal Articles?

Sentences Merit Closer Scrutiny by Appellate Courts

I have a new article on SSRN entitled “Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference.”  As the title suggests, I review the standard arguments in favor of the prevailing rubber-stamp approach to appellate review of sentences, and I conclude that the arguments are something short of compelling.  Here is the abstract:

American appellate courts have long resisted calls that they play a more robust role in the sentencing process, insisting that they must defer to what they characterize as the superior sentencing competence of trial judges. This position is unfortunate insofar as rigorous appellate review might advance uniformity and other rule-of-law values that are threatened by broad trial-court discretion. This Article thus provides the first systematic critique of the appellate courts’ standard justifications for deferring to trial-court sentencing decisions. For instance, these justifications are shown to be based on premises that are inconsistent with empirical research on cognition and decision-making. Despite the shortcomings of the standard justifications, the Article suggests that there is a stronger argument for deference that is based on the trial judge’s background knowledge regarding the particular circumstances of the local community and courthouse. Even the potential benefits of localization, though, do not clearly outweigh the rule-of-law costs of appellate deference. Thus, the Article concludes with a proposal for a sliding-scale approach to deference that strengthens the appellate role, but also accommodates localization values in the cases in which they are most salient.

The article will appear in the William & Mary Law Review in 2010.

Continue ReadingSentences Merit Closer Scrutiny by Appellate Courts