New Issue of Marquette Law Review Available

Congratulations to the editors of the Marquette Law Review, who have just posted the final versions of the articles for their winter issue (volume 92) here.  Here is the table of contents:

ARTICLES

CRAWFORD, RETROACTIVITY, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST
J. Thomas Sullivan: Published on Page 231

WHAT’S SO FAIR ABOUT THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT?
Michael E. Chaplin: Published on Page 307

SPEECH

INDEPENDENCE V. ACCOUNTABILITY: FINDING A BALANCE AMIDST THE CHANGING POLITICS OF STATE-COURT JUDICIAL SELECTION
The Honorable Diane S. Sykes: Published on Page 341

COMMENTS

LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR: LETTING THE AIR OUT OF THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS DOCTRINE?
Allison Cimpl-Wiemer: Published on Page 355

HOW TRIBE AND STATE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS CAN SAVE THE ADAM WALSH ACT FROM ENCROACHING UPON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Brian P. Dimmer: Published on Page 385

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Reflections of a 3L, Installment Two: Fieldwork and Clinics are Indisputably Indispensable

Casebook reading got you down?  Tired of briefing pretend issues for pretend clients?  Wish you’d never heard of Socrates or his dubious method?

Have I got news for you!  Now for the low, low (HA!) price of your already-paid tuition, you can learn about the law through real life experience.

I don’t mean to denigrate the value of our classroom legal education.  It is, of course, of vital importance to our growing legal knowledge and our ability to think about the law.  However, I am of the opinion that no legal education is complete without a foray into the wide world of the real-life practice of law.  For me, Marquette’s well-developed clinic and fieldwork selections were a large part of why I chose to come here.  I remember talking to Professor Hammer on the phone while making my where-to-go decision, just to check that all the clinic experiences listed on the website were real.  He assured me that, not only are they real, but that students who participate in them do real legal work for real clients.

In spite of my pre-law school enthusiasm about fieldwork, after my first two semesters, I became fearful if I left the confines of Sensenbrenner Hall, some sort of apocalypse would ensue.  At the end of my 1L year, I asked a 2L friend about the advisability of taking a clinic in my second year.  I was worried that taking on another responsibility would take away from my classroom performance and keep me from getting as much as I could from my classroom learning.  She told me that without her clinic experiences, her classroom experiences would have been less meaningful.  She couldn’t have been more right.

Continue ReadingReflections of a 3L, Installment Two: Fieldwork and Clinics are Indisputably Indispensable

Seventh Circuit Week in Review: Sentencing Thought Crimes

The Seventh Circuit had four new opinions in criminal cases last week.  Two dealt with sentencing, one with interrogation, and one with a search.  I’ll cover the cases in that order.

In United States v. England (No. 08-2440), the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.  While being held pending trial, England learned that his brother-in-law Robert was cooperating with the police.  In telephone conversations with his father (which were apparently recorded by the police), England expressed feelings of violent rage against the brother-in-law, saying at one point, “[G]o relay a message to Robert [that if he] shows up to court, when I walk outta prison in fifteen years, I’m ‘onna [expletive] murder his [expletive].” 

After being convicted of the original charge, plus three new obstruction-of-justice types of charges, England was sentenced to 262 months in prison.  An earlier appeal and remand for resentencing resulted in a new sentence of 210 months.  Curiously, along the way, the sentencing judge “found” that England would have committed the crime of attempted murder of Robert or one of the other witnesses had he not been in custody before trial.  Indeed, this finding seemed to play a determinative role in the selection of a sentence.  From the standpoint of substantive criminal law, this was a strange move.  As the sentencing judge acknowledged, England took no “substantial step” — in fact, no step of any kind — towards the accomplishment of the murder that he supposedly intended.  There is a sense, then, in which England was punished based on little more than evil thoughts.  And, as any first-year law student will tell you, it is black-letter criminal law that you cannot be punished for thoughts alone.

Continue ReadingSeventh Circuit Week in Review: Sentencing Thought Crimes