Seventh Circuit Week in Review, Part I: Use of Prior Convictions

The Seventh Circuit had two new criminal opinions in the past week, including a partial defendant win that broke a string of at least eleven consecutive victories by the government.  The two opinions focus on the admissibility of a defendant’s prior convictions at trial and the application of the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines, respectively.  Because I have a bit more than usual to say about the two cases, I will just cover the prior convictions case here, and leave the crack case (featuring a partial defendant victory) for another post tomorrow.

In United States v. Perkins (No. 07-3383), a jury in the Southern District of Illinois convicted Perkins of various drug trafficking offenses.  During his trial, the prosecutor introduced into evidence Perkins’ three prior convictions for cocaine-related offenses, as well as testimony that Perkins had attempted to hide cocaine in his mouth when he was arrested in connection with one of the earlier convictions.  On appeal, Perkins argued that the evidence should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Although the Rules do indeed prohibit the use of prior convictions to establish a defendant’s propensity to commit new crimes, the Seventh Circuit (per Judge Bauer) rejected Perkins’ argument.  More specifically, the court held that Perkins’ prior convictions were admissible because they helped to establish “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake” — all acceptable purposes of prior convictions evidence under Rule 404(b).

For what it’s worth, my own view is that propensity evidence actually should be admissible as such.

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More Commentary on the Grand Irony of ERISA

Erisa Thanks to Ian Millhiser (National Senior Citizens Law Center) who wrote this piece about the inequities of employee benefits law under ERISA with his colleague Simon Lazarus for the U.K. Guardian.

Here’s a taste:

Erisa sets strict standards to ensure that employers and insurers administering group benefit plans act “solely in the interests of beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits,” not their own bottom-line. But the court has rendered these protections meaningless. In a Catch-22 decision written by Justice Scalia, a 5-4 majority held that, when plan administrators violate their obligations under the law, victims may not recover any monetary compensation for resulting losses they suffer. Adding insult to injury, the court has read Erisa as a warrant for “pre-empting” – ie abolishing – pre-existing state law protections, leaving victims with literally no recourse. Thus, in the words of, the late Justice Byron White, the supreme court has achieved the “perverse anomaly of leaving those Congress set out to protect with less protection than they enjoyed before Erisa was enacted.”

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A Judicial Visit to the Classroom

Thanks to the Hon. Diane S. Sykes (Marquette University Law School, ’84) for speaking to my Wisconsin Supreme Court class this afternoon. Judge Sykes now serves on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but spent five terms on the Wisconsin Supreme Court and shared something of her experience on the court and about the nature of a collegial court with students.

One of the things that I hoped was clear to the students is the notion that even these experienced and gifted lawyers on a court of last resort struggle with the law. Minds change and dissents become majority opinions. While differences in philosophy are real (Judge Sykes does not shy from referring to “conservative” and “liberal” jurists while warning that these labels are not comprehensive and their use is complicated), judges grapple with hard cases and their differences are not simply consequentialist. She talked briefly about a decision — which she knew we had discussed in class — about whether a condition of probation might be that the defendant (who had been convicted of wilful failure to support his nine children) refrain from having further children until he could support those he already had (a state of affairs that was extremely unlikely). While the potential consequences are unpalatable, then Justice Sykes (joined in dissent by two “liberal” justices, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley) concluded that the law prohibited such a condition. Even if we disagree with that view, the recognition that hard cases can make bad law should be married to the idea that they should not.

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