The Class Action Fairness Act: History, Uses, and Differences from Traditional Diversity Jurisdiction

In 2005, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) in order to grant class action litigants in diversity cases easier access to the federal courts. The re-formulated sections under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 created a lower threshold to gain access into the federal courts for both the plaintiff class members, and the perspective defendants wishing to remove to federal court. Congress passed these new provisions in order to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.” In its deliberations over the bill, Congress specifically found that certain litigants used the previous jurisdictional regime to create many situations whereby certain cases with national importance did not qualify for federal jurisdiction based upon diversity. Additionally, Congress sought to address the age old concern of discrimination against out-of-state litigants.

Congress also mentions in its findings and purposes prelude to CAFA that over the previous decade (1995 – 2005), abusive practices of the class action device caused numerous harms, thus justifying this remake of the class action jurisdictional regime. But why in 2005? Perhaps because Congress wished to respond to the vast amount of litigation against insurers stemming from Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall in August of 2005. Perhaps because in 2005, Republicans held a majority in both the House and the Senate (and held the presidency), and as a general matter, the Republican Party, rightly or wrongly, is viewed as anti-plaintiff. In this view, Republicans wanted to allow insurance companies greater opportunities to remove to federal court (which is also seen, rightly or wrongly, as somewhat less pro-plaintiff than many state courts). Whatever the true reasoning, Congress did pass CAFA, and some of CAFA’s provisions are worth noting.

CAFA grants federal jurisdiction (through diversity) to class action cases where: (1) the amount in controversy, in the aggregate of all of the class members, exceeds $5,000,000 and (2) in a controversy in which ANY member of the class of plaintiffs is diverse from the defendant. CAFA then defines class members as those persons, named or unnamed, who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class in a class action. Based on these threshold rules, a defendant could rather easily assert diversity from one of the unnamed or proposed class members. The removing party need not identify the diverse class member, but merely show by a preponderance of the evidence, using the face of the complaint or summary judgment type evidence, that it is reasonable to believe at least one class member maintains diversity from the defendant. Hardly a high hurdle to clear. However, several important subsections to CAFA help to qualify these basic underlying tenets, and may impose at least some further obstacles to navigate as a removing party.

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The DOJ’s Agenda to Shut Down School Choice

First off, Dean Kearney, thank you for recommending me to be the September Alumni Blogger of the Month.  It’s much appreciated and, I’m sure, will be a rewarding experience.

For everyone else, I’m CJ Szafir, associate counsel and education policy director at the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty (“WILL”) – a nonprofit legal organization that works to advance the public interest in law, individual liberty, constitutional government, and a robust civil society.  We have offices in Milwaukee.  The president and general counsel of WILL is Rick Esenberg, who is also an adjunct professor at Marquette Law.  Prior to WILL, I worked in the state legislature, serving as policy adviser to the Senate Majority Leader.  I graduated from Marquette Law in 2011.

As noted, I work primarily with education reform and, truly, this is about an exciting time as any to be in such a field, as evident by the state recently expanding school choice statewide.  For all the law students reading this, I never anticipated working in education law and policy; it’s a perfect example of how life can lead you to unexpected places.

My optimism and excitement aside, it’s with great trepidation that my first blog post be on a topic that will be unsettling to many – the United States Department of Justice has a political agenda to shut down school choice.  Think this is an overstatement?  Consider the following two major developments from the summer, one of which is in our backyard.

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Farewell to Ronald H. Coase

CoaseAlmost every student who has attended law school in the past 40 years has encountered Ronald Coase and the Coase Theorem. Even professors who disagree with Coase feel compelled to expose their students to his famous theorem, even if only to rebut its argument. As a long-time teacher of both Torts and Property who is not an advocate of law and economics, I cannot imagine teaching either course without references to the Coase Theorem as a way of evaluating the correctness of legal rules.

In a nutshell, Coase, widely acknowledged as the founder of the law and economics movement, posited that in a world without transaction costs, individuals would bargain with each other to achieve the most efficient use of resources, and legal rules would be irrelevant. As a consequence, in a world with transaction costs, Coase seemed to suggest that legal rules should be constructed so that they favor the most efficient user, since that is the party who will eventually end up with the resource . The Coase Theorem was presented to the world in a 1960 article entitled, The Problem of Social Cost, which appeared in the Journal of Law and Economics and is still the most frequently cited law review article in history.

Sadly, Robert Coase died last week in Chicago at the age of 102. Born in London and educated at the London School of Economics, Coase first achieved widespread recognition in 1937 with the publication of his article, The Nature of the Firm, which introduced the concept of transaction costs and explained why large economic deals were handled by large integrated firms rather than by temporary market-based alliances of suppliers.

Coase came to the United States in 1951 as a professor at the University of Buffalo, and moved to the University of Virginia in 1958. He was a member of the University of Virginia’s Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy when he published his most famous article. In 1964, he left Virginia for the University of Chicago, where he remained until his death.

Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991. His final book, How China Became Capitalist, was published in 2012 when Coase was 101 years old.

 

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