Merit Selection Amendment Introduced

Yesterday, State Representative Mark Gottlieb (R-Port Washington) announced that he is drafting a constitutional amendment to replace Wisconsin’s current method of judicial elections with “merit selection.” Rep. Gottlieb is a former speaker pro tem of the Assembly, and he is widely regarded as one of the top policy gurus within the Republican caucus.

Currently, the legislature is seriously considering public financing
of judicial elections (a topic on which Prof. Esenberg has written
extensively).  Rep. Gottlieb is offering his amendment as an alternative to public financing as it comes to the floor in the near future. Rep. Fred Kessler (D-Milwaukee) offered his own judicial selection amendment earlier this session. Both Gottlieb and Kessler differ from the typical “Missouri Plan” merit selection system. Under Kessler’s plan, the governor would appoint a justice with the “advice and consent” of a majority of the State Senate for a ten-year term. As that term is coming up for expiration, a justice who wishes to continue may do so unless at least thirteen senators reject the proposed renewal. Under Gottlieb’s plan, the governor must select his nominee from current circuit court and appellate judges who have served at least eight years on the bench. The nominee would then need to be confirmed to the ten-year term by a twenty-vote (3/5) majority in the state senate.  At the end of the ten-year term, and each subsequent ten-year term he or she desires, the justice would have to run in a retention election.  Neither the Kessler nor the Gottlieb plan would change judicial selection for the court of appeals or circuit courts.

Let’s start by stating what’s good about both of these proposals.

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Federal Sentencing and the Lack of Theory in Criminal Justice

Defendants in federal criminal cases often cooperate with the government to get their sentence reduced, especially when facing an extremely high statutory mandatory minimum (it is not uncommon for federal defendants to face mandatory minimums of ten years or higher).  In these cases, to get below the mandatory minimum, the government must file a motion to credit the defendant for his or her assistance.  If this is done before sentencing, it is filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); if after sentencing, it is filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 35(b).  A recent emerging issue in federal sentencing law has been what factors a judge may consider when reducing a sentence under either of these provisions. 

Without a mandatory minimum, a judge is free to impose a reasonable sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which tells judges to account for the nature of the crime; the history, characteristics, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant; the public interest in protection, deterrence, and punishment; the type of sentences available; the applicable Sentencing Guidelines (including pertinent policy statements); the need for uniformity in sentencing similar defendants for similar crimes; and restitution.  When a mandatory minimum must be imposed, however, most courts have held that only the defendant’s assistance may be considered when imposing a sentence below the minimum.

The Seventh Circuit has recently addressed this issue in the context of both 3553(e) and Rule 35.  See United States v. Johnson, No. 08-3541 (7th Cir. September 4, 2009); United States v. Shelby, No. 08-2729 (7th Cir. October 20, 2009). 

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Why Did Lincoln Try to Buy a Slave? (One of Lincoln’s More Troublesome Legacies)

The Legacies of Lincoln Conference held on October 1 and 2, 2009 was, as Dean Joseph Kearney reported earlier, a terrifically successful program by any measure – attendance, audience response, and, most certainly, engaging presentations.  Jointly sponsored by the Law School and the History Department, the Conference featured lectures and comments by influential historians and lawyers which will appear later next year in the Marquette Law Review, yet another measure of the Conference’s success.  This is the first in a series of blog posts by Dean Kearney and me that will highlight each of these submissions, together with links to the audio of the Conference itself.

We begin most appropriately with the draft article of the Klement Lecture delivered by the distinguished historian Allen C. Guelzo of Gettysburg College, entitled “Colonel Utley’s Emancipation; or, How Abraham Lincoln Offered to Pay For a Slave.”  The provocative title reveals the subtlety of Guelzo’s analysis and historical judgment. 

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