Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What Is a Crime of Violence?

seventh circuit

The Armed Career Criminal Act and § 4B1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines both provide for lengthened prison terms for certain defendants with three or more prior convictions for crimes of violence.  It’s clear that certain prior convictions qualify (e.g., rape and armed robbery), but there are a surprisingly large number of offenses in the gray area between violent and nonviolent. 

As I discussed in an earlier post, the Supreme Court recently developed a new definition for “crime of violence” in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), in which the Court held that prior DUI convictions do not trigger ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum.  Begay cast a lot of circuit-court precedent into doubt, and the Seventh Circuit has been struggling ever since to develop a consistent, coherent approach to identifying what types of offenses count as “violent.”  (See, for example, this post.)  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has also remained active in this area.  Last term, for instance, the Court held that failure to report to prison and walkaway escapes are not crimes of violence in Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).  And the Court recently granted cert in Johnson v. United States to decide whether a battery offense counts as violent.

Reflecting the turbulence in this area of the law, the Seventh Circuit had three — count ’em, three — notable new opinions dealing with the “crime of violence” question last week. 

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Summer Reading List

booksIn his remarks at the hooding ceremony this spring, Dean Kearney encouraged our law graduates to remain active readers.  And during a recent presentation to the Marquette law faculty, Professor Julie Oseid asked us how many books we have on our nightstands.   

That question left me with another: what books are folks reading over the summer for pleasure?  Reading is one of the great joys in life.  Choosing the next good read is almost as satisfying.  We would love to know what books others are reading or have already read this summer to add to our own nightstand collections.  After all, we still have a few weeks to fit in some reading before classes start.   

This summer, I especially enjoyed reading— 

The Historian, by Elizabeth Kostova:  a Dracula tale, with a literary tour of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Best American Science and Nature Writing 2008, Jerome Groopman and Tim Folger, editors:  a compilation of beautifully written articles from magazines like The New Yorker.

When You Are Engulfed in Flames, by David Sedaris:  I read a third of the book before even leaving the bookstore.      

List yours to add to another nightstand.

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The Debate over Statutory History

An interesting debate about statutory history emerged at the Wisconsin Supreme Court this past term in County of Dane v. LIRC (2009 WI 9).  By statutory history, the court is referring to previous versions of a statute, which the legislature has subsequently repealed or revised.  Even prior to County of Dane, the court had stated, “By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute.”  Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance (2008 WI 52).

The current debate centers on whether reliance on statutory history is consistent with a plain meaning analysis.  Justice Roggensack has asserted, “statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis because it is part of the context in which we interpret statutory terms.”  Chief Justice Abrahamson, on the other hand, asserts that statutory history is inconsistent with a plain meaning analysis because if the text is plain, there is no need to go beyond the text.

While the intellectual debate over statutory history is commendable, the arguments thus far have been misplaced, and as a result, we should refocus the debate.  The debate should not center on whether statutory history is consistent with a plain meaning analysis because such a debate does not answer when and how statutory history can be utilized.  As such, the current debate is meaningless.   Rather, the debate should center on whether statutory history is an intrinsic or extrinsic aid to interpretation.    

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